107. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State1
1876. For Sisco and Atherton. Subject: Possible Change in Power Structure in Saudi Arabia.
Summary: In contrast even with his behavior in recent years, King Faisal is becoming less flexible, more withdrawn from pragmatic daily decision making, and obsessed to the point of mania with the Zionist-Communist menace. At the same time, Prince Fahd, the powerful and well-positioned Minister of Interior, is showing unaccustomed assertiveness and self-confidence and we perceive increasing evidence of support for him within the Saudi governmental apparatus. [1 line not declassified] has said to the Ambassador that Fahd was now the “second man in the country” and “would be the next King.” The passage of power from King Faisal to Prince Fahd—because of the King’s death or growing incapacity—could be accomplished with a minimum of political drama. Crown Prince Khalid would not effective block Fahd either in a practical or constitutional sense. Under Fahd’s direction of Saudi affairs, U.S. interests would enjoy security and privileged status. [7 lines not declassified]. End summary.
1. This message is highly speculative, hence the restricted distribution, but I think the time has come to try to tie together some of the indications we’ve received lately about a possible change in the power structure in Saudi Arabia. I do not wish to suggest that a palace coup is imminent, merely that we could see a reduction of the real royal power and a significant increase in the power and stature of Fahd.
2. Faisal’s decline
Faisal has never been an easy person to work with but he has been intelligent and usually pragmatic. Recently however his growing inflexibility has become a topic of conversation and concern among high-ranking Saudis. [10 lines not declassified]
3. [1 line not declassified] would like to change the Saudi visa policy dramatically, and eliminate entirely the religious requirement for entering the country. They say they have raised this with the King who adamantly refused to consider it. He is apparently refusing the admis[Page 380]sion of Joe Kraft. He now considers this a personal issue and will not change his mind.
4. The King also seems to be becoming even more religious as his age increases and his arteries harden. He no longer wants Saudis to study abroad: they can get all of their education in Saudi Arabia except possibly graduate study. He feels that they are corrupted by life in the West and they return to the Kingdom having strayed from the rigid tenents of Islam. He favors increased education in the Kingdom and its industrialization but he insists that the “old values” remain unchanged.
5. The King’s obsession with Zionism and Communism is well known but it seems to be getting far worse. The first Kissinger visit included the obligatory Zionist-Communist conspiracy speech. The King seems to have concluded that the point was made and he omitted it from the second Kissinger visit, but in the third visit we had to hear it again. Parker Hart, former Ambassador here, was recently in Riyadh (he is now a Vice President of Bechtel) and asked to see the King. The King was able to rearrange his schedule to see him and devoted the entire 45-minute meeting to this theme. Mr. Hart has told me that he and members of the King’s entourage tried to change the subject, and talk about industrialization of Saudi Arabia or other economic subjects but they never succeeded in doing so. Hart left the audience with no other subject having been touched. The obsession has now reached the point where Arab leaders, who had previously been spared the speech, are being subjected to it. Muhammad Ahmad Noman (Special Advisor to Yemeni President Iriani) told me April 9 that he had that day spent an hour with the King. Almost all of the time, he said, was devoted to the King’s exposition of his “mother-daughter, daughter-mother” theme, i.e. that Communism is the daughter (or mother) of Zionism.
6. Faisal makes a miserable impression on those he sees now. Saqqaf and other advisors have managed to keep all newsmen away from him. I should think it unlikely that he will give many more interviews. They cannot however keep Heads of State or Foreign Ministers from meeting him. They’re embarrassed by the meetings and they realize that nothing positive comes out of them; indeed that definite harm is done the country. Yet Faisal is still the absolute ruler and if he says something is or is not to be done, and then refuses to discuss the subject, his wishes will certainly be carried out. It is still a rare official or Minister who will openly disobey the King, although I suspect there will be increasing cases of orders being forgotten.
7. Nonetheless we have heard no one speaking openly against King Faisal. Indeed, almost all meetings we have with Saudis where the King is discussed are prefaced with praise of his wisdom and ability. But Saudis are beginning to talk openly—or at least with me—about the succession, about the King’s health, about his rigidity and his imperfect understanding of the changing world.
[Page 381]8. Fahd’s rise
Then, to complete the picture, we find Fahd showing an unaccustomed assertiveness and confidence in discussing Saudi Arabia’s constitutional and political development. There was no question moreover that he should lead the Saudi side in bilateral talks with the United States on our new cooperative arrangements. He controls one of the most powerful Ministries (Interior) in the country and his brother Sultan is Minister of Defense. Other full brothers are in positions of great authority in the country. And even non-Sudairy Princes and commoners [less than 1 line not declassified] are speaking much more favorably of him. Still more significant is the fact that Kamal Adham (the King’s brother-in-law) who previously had nothing but disdain for Fahd; and Omar Saqqaf and Zaki Yamani, whose power derives exclusively from Faisal, have also recently praised Fahd to me.
9. [name not declassified] told me recently that Fahd was the second man in the country and would be the next King. This is the first instance we know of where a top Saudi [name not declassified] has spoken to a foreigner about the succession; it is certainly the first time we know of where Fahd’s succession was predicted without qualification.
10. The rumors of a change in power have become even more intense recently, with reports that at recent Cabinet meetings Fahd took control and ran the meetings, with the King saying little or nothing. We aren’t sure how accurate these reports are but they are circulating in both Riyadh and Jidda. Possibly as an extension of these general rumors are more specific ones that Fahd is about to assume the Prime Ministry or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—portfolios currently held by Faisal.
11. The Crown Prince
In meetings with foreigners and other Arab visitors, Crown Prince Khalid communicates an impression of irrelevance that matches that of the King. His range of interest appears confined to horses, falcons, Saudi Arabia’s vanishing wildlife and (in extenso) his open-heart operation in Cleveland in 1972. Whether the transfer of power from Faisal to Fahd would involve a constitutional change in the order of succession or simply involve Fahd’s practical dominance of affairs is uncertain. I do not believe, however, Prince Khalid can become either a political figure in his own right, or even a point around which other elements of the royal family (who perhaps do not fully support Prince Fahd) can effectively unite.
12. Effect on the United States
The United States would have very little to fear by such a change in power, at least not initially. Fahd is very well disposed to the United States; he looks on us as the guarantor of the monarchy and therefore [Page 382] of the family in Saudi Arabia and we could expect even more advantages in the country than the very considerable ones we enjoy with Faisal as King. But Fahd at the helm would not be an unmixed blessing. Fahd is no ascetic. His life style is already considerably grander than that of Faisal. [7 lines not declassified]
13. [1 paragraph (10½ lines) not declassified]
14. I’ve had long talks with [name not declassified] about corruption in the country and the effect it will have. (The Embassy is preparing a full report on the subject.) [name not declassified] has told me that he has discussed the corruption problem with [name not declassified], but they feel powerless to stop or even contain it. Corruption, without a doubt, is a major and growing problem and we’re going to have to decide soon what, if anything, we can do about it. It will be more difficult to act when Fahd comes to power.
15. The only force that might oppose a Fahd move, I suppose, would be Abdulla and his National Guard but they are not now and not likely soon to be a match for the forces under the Sudairy brothers. And even those tied most closely to Faisal, even his sons, must know that there’s no hope for his improvement; that as he ages his rigidity will grow, that his obsessions will become even deeper and that the country could become paralyzed.
16. We seem at times to appear to believe that the King’s obsession with the liberation of Jerusalem is his alone. This could lead us quickly to the false conclusion that with his removal from power, in fact if not in name, an Arab accommodation to Israel’s current demands about Jerusalem would be made easier. It is absolutely clear however that any ruler of the two holy cities of the Hejaz will have an obligation toward the third, Jerusalem. This would apply to any member of the house of Saud and to any commoner who might overthrow it. And we should never underestimate the importance of Jerusalem to all Arabs, Muslim and Christian, and to non-Arab Muslims. But what might be possible if Faisal were less completely in control would be a compromise on the city, a joint sovereignty or a joint responsibility for the whole rpt whole city of Jerusalem, or perhaps under some circumstances, for just the old city and its eastern suburbs. As long as Faisal is in complete control probably all we will hear from Riyadh on Jerusalem will be a demand for the return to the status quo ante 1967.
17. Conclusion
There is probably very little we can or should do to preserve the full powers of Faisal or to encourage the rise of Fahd. No matter what happens we will probably be blamed for any change but this should not cause us great difficulties. There will be massive support for the winner. The family has an acute sense of self-preservation and the change, if it comes, will probably not be dramatic, just a gradual shift [Page 383] of power to Fahd. The change could even be to our long-term interests [6 lines not declassified]. We should have time to adjust to any new ruler and, with luck, should be able to exert some positive influence on him.
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Summary: The Embassy predicted the trajectory of Saudi decision making as King Faisal declined.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P850076–2202. Secret; Nodis.
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