Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976

44. Memorandum From Robert B. Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, July 7, 1975.

SUBJECT

• The Libyan Threat

There is increasing evidence that the unnatural alliance between the USSR and Libya must be taken seriously as a threat to the objectives of the United States in the Middle East and to moderate Arab Governments. Although reports on amounts appear to be exaggerated, the recent Soviet decision to give Qhadafi its blessing and supply large additional quantities of advanced weapons and a nuclear reactor appears clearly designed to increase the pressure on Arab moderates to move away from the United States and back toward the USSR. At the same time Libya has stepped up its active support of extremist groups and governments trying to undermine if not actually overthrow Sadat, Asad and the Saudi leadership in order to increase Libya’s influence and derail efforts to bring about peace in the Middle East. The long-term effectiveness of Qhadafi’s efforts is difficult to judge but his determination has not slackened and his disruptive actions appear to be better focussed and potentially more dangerous than in the past. Cooperation with the USSR, on the one hand, and battle-hardened “reactionists” like Habash, on the other, enhances Libya’s ability to apply leverage to the more moderate Arab Governments and the PLO.

Libyan-Arab Relations

Thus far, Qhadafi has apparently not created major internal problems for the Egyptian, Syrian, Tunisian or Saudi regimes, yet all four governments feel that their stability and security are threatened to some degree by his unique mixture of religious and political fanaticism. Their ability to pursue a reasonable policy toward a Middle East settlement is also hampered, in varying degrees, by Libya’s hard line propaganda and political agitation. This agitation has caused serious complications for certain operations being undertaken by the moderates in an intra-Arab context: most notably in Lebanon where Libyan-backed radicals (Lebanese as well as Palestinian) with the aid of Libyan agents and of Libyan money were primarily responsible for the fierceness of the armed opposition to Lebanese, Egyptian, Saudi and Syrian efforts to restore calm and install a new government; and in South Yemen where Libya has stepped up its supply of arms and money to the Aden regime, thereby encouraging the latter to continue supporting the Dhofar rebellion and resist pressures from Saudi Arabia and Egypt to cease such subversion, drop all Communist ministers and adopt a moderate philosophy. Libya also continues to stir up trouble on a lesser scale in a number of other places, stretching from Northern Ireland to the Philippines, including support for Eritrean rebels.

Sadat’s anger at and fear of Qhadafi has become so great that [1 line not declassified] We know that Saudi Arabia, Iran and even China are also seriously worried by Libya’s unsettling impact on the Middle East.

Recent events in Lebanon have revealed the strong bond which has been forged between Libya and the Palestinian “rejectionist” groups (PFLP of Habash, PDFLP of Hawatmeh, PFLP/GD of Gibril) as well as the growing strength of the latter relative to Arafat’s PLO which follows a less radical approach. The “rejectionists” still enjoy Iraqi, as well as Libyan, support and are determined to overthrow or otherwise eliminate Arafat and other PLO leaders who are considered too “soft” toward Israel. Libya has cut off its funds to the PLO (it had previously supplied about 1/3 of the budget) and is channelling tens of millions of dollars to the “rejectionists.” There are reports that the latter have been involved in bombings and other actions against the Asad regime in Damascus, as well as working against Syrian, Egyptian and Saudi interests in Lebanon and elsewhere. Reacting to this, Egypt has warned them that it will retaliate for “any terrorist action” against Egypt or Egyptian personnel, wherever they may be.

At present the rejectionists can still be neutralized, although not eliminated, by the combined efforts of the PLO and the three Arab Governments. However, should Syria switch from a moderate to a radical mode, the combined strength of Saiqa and the “rejectionists” would probably be enough to capture virtually all of the Palestinians, including Arafat. (One should not underestimate the intelligence, experience and determination of “rejectionist” leaders like Habash, Hawatmah, and Gibril, nor of their potential allies within the PLO like Salah Khalaf, the head of Black September.) Such a development could have serious negative effects on our peace efforts, since it would open the way to intensive guerrilla action against Israel from Lebanon, to an upsurge in international terrorism, and to stepped-up subversive and other action against moderate Arab regimes and leaders. The corrosive effects of combined Libyan-rejectionist pressures are evident in the recent Jerusalem bombing, which appears to be a PLO response to these pressures as well as to Israeli intransigence on the Palestinian issue.

Libya-USSR Relations

The Soviet-Libyan relationship is a complex one, described in detail in the attached study which the CIA prepared at our request. The relationship is underpinned by several arms agreements. The magnitude of the most recent agreement—although greatly exaggerated in most accounts—raises the broader question of whether Moscow will gain a new strategic foothold along the Mediterranean. Even if the scope of deals is less [less than 1 line not declassified] a major expansion of the military relationship between Tripoli and Moscow appears to have taken place, involving later model jet fighters and bombers, submarines, late-model tanks, and large numbers of missiles. The total value is upwards of a billion dollars.

Political considerations—particularly Moscow’s deteriorating relationship with Egypt—are almost certainly the main reason behind Kosygin’s recent visit to Tripoli and Soviet willingness to provide more arms to Libya, but the opportunity to earn substantial amounts of Libyan oil money probably also plays a part. The Soviets want to sharpen President Sadat’s awareness that they have alternatives to Egypt in the Middle East and they expect to gain an element of leverage on him by dealing with his antagonists in Tripoli. Libyan activities in Aden clearly serve Soviet interests—yet the USSR is not forced to take a position of open opposition to Saudi Arabia. The same is true of the “rejectionists” Palestinians, where Libya provides a conduit for Soviet arms and a degree of Soviet influence in the extremist camp while enabling the Soviets to claim that it continues to support the PLO, that it is not unhappy with Asad, and that it still wants a peaceful settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The overall effect of this Soviet strategy is to increase the pressures on the U.S. to abandon its present approach to the Middle East in favor of joint action with the USSR.

As part of the arms deals, the Soviets also appear to have won some concessions from Tripoli regarding access to Libyan port facilities. Tripoli apparently has decided to permit Moscow occasional port calls for bunkering and replenishment under tight Libyan controls. The Libyans also may be dangling the prospect of greater concessions, such as base rights, to gain Soviet help in building up Libyan naval facilities at Tobruk.

The reported Soviet decision to supply Libya with submarines as part of the new military relationship is particularly disturbing. Given Qhadafi’s well-known fanaticism and obsession with controlling the Mediterranean as much as 100 miles from Libya’s coast, an indigenous submarine capability for Libya raises obvious problems for the United States and NATO. It also raises the question of Soviet control over the use and disposition of all types of armament delivered to Libya. Thus far, there is no evidence of Soviet concern over this problem.

Qhadafi also has an obsessive commitment to increase his power by the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. Libya has over the past year feverishly explored all possible sources (US, Soviet, Chinese, Western European, Indian and Pakistani) and reportedly is negotiating at present with France for an accelerator. It has already concluded in 1974 an agreement with Belgian and Swedish firms for a nuclear research center and apparently made a deal last month with the USSR for an experimental nuclear reactor. The USSR has made light of our concern over the danger of helping Libya acquire a nuclear capability, stressing that its reactor would be under IEA safeguards and that it has ratified the NPT. Moreover, Libya is estimated to be technologically 7–10 years away from a nuclear capability, even with its foreign technicians (mostly Pakistani). Nevertheless, the combination of nuclear technology and Qhadafi’s fanaticism is disturbing for the future.

What to do about the Libyan Threat

Given the situation outlined above the obvious question is what can and should the United States do about it. Our present approach to Libya is essentially passive, withholding military equipment and nuclear technology and holding diplomatic representation to the Chargé level. It might be in our best interest to move to a more active approach. However, such a decision should be based on a more precise evaluation of the degree of threat Libya poses to our interests in the Middle East and to the moderate Arab Governments with whom we are cooperating.

I would therefore recommend that Mr. Colby be asked to conduct a high-priority intelligence community study on the seriousness of the Libyan threat. It might also be useful to have the appropriate body look into what actions would theoretically be open to us should a decision be made, in light of the study to move to a more active defensive approach toward Libya.

[3 paragraphs (21 lines) not declassified]

1. Summary: Oakley informed Scowcroft of the potential threat posed by the Soviet-Libyan alliance to U.S. objectives in the Middle East and to moderate Arab governments.

   Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files, Box 3, Libya. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. The CIA study on the Soviet-Libyan relationship was not attached. Scowcroft initialed the document.