Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–9, Part 1, Documents on North Africa, 1973–1976

41. Telegram 5640 From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, June 7, 1975, 1010Z.

5640. Subject: US-Libyan Relations. Ref: State 130498.

1. Since President Sadat is scheduled proceed directly from Suez to Alexandria, where he will remain for the summer, I discussed referenced subject with Fahmy. I told him of our intention to accept Khalifa as Libyan Ambassador to Washington and to negotiate a new and higher ceiling on Libyan Embassy personnel in Washington with the Libyan Govt. These steps, I pointed out, will not take place until after completion of our Middle East policy reassessment. I asked Fahmy to advise the President of the above, adding we would welcome any comments Sadat might have.

2. Fahmy asked about the background of this development. I therefore told him about the Libyan note of April 14 requesting agrément for Khalifa as Ambassador to the US and the April 15 action by the Libyan Govt lifting the ceiling on US Embassy personnel in Libya. I pointed out that the absence of Ambassadors in the respective capitals was not the result of a decision of either government to expell or not to accept an Ambassador from the other, but came about as a result of our decision not to replace Ambassador Palmer at the time of his departure at the end of his tour because the Libyan Govt had not received him at appropriate levels and there had been no meaningful contact. Libyans had reacted by not sending an Ambassador of their own. The acceptance of a Libyan Ambassador represents no significant change in USG policy and might be a step toward a better dialogue between our two governments. Lifting the ceiling of the Libyan Embassy in Washington enables the latter to take care of the large number of Libyan students in the US.

3. Fahmy’s reaction was mixed. He viewed the Libyan initiative as an effort to balance their recent arms agreement with the Soviets. Even though the Libyan actions had taken place in April, he believed Libyan-Soviet discussions were by then already underway. While this is desirable in principle, Fahmy expressed concern that such action on our part, coming now, will be viewed in Arab world as US endorsement of Libya’s recent massive arms deal with the Soviets. Fahmy expressed concern that the USG seems to minimize the Libyan-Soviet arms deal and fails to see it as a direct threat to Egypt. (I know that Sadat made same point to visiting Saudi MODA Prince Sultan a few days ago.) Apart from this aspect, Fahmy noted Qadhaafi’s recent attacks on Sadat for attending the Salzburg Summit and reopening the Suez Canal have become shriller and have forced Sadat to respond. Thus, the Sadat-Qadhaafi battle of words is again the public domain. Actions such as we contemplate, if they come now, will be viewed in Egypt and in the Arab world as a slap at Sadat or at the very least indifference to his position. They would scarcely seem to be consistent with the frequently stated US policy of considering Sadat as the key Arab leader and working to strengthen his position. Fahmy stated his comments represented his personal reaction and undertook to let us have any comments the President might have.

4. Shortly after above conversation, Fahmy called to say he had discussed the matter with Sadat and President’s reaction is distinctly negative. For US to take proposed action now would vitiate positive reaction of Salzburg Summit. They would be viewed in Egypt and the Arab world as a slap at Sadat and a lack of US concern about Qadhaafi’s scurrilous attacks against Sadat and his subversive activities in Egypt. While the decision must be made by USG, Sadat emphatically urged that any such steps be postponed for time being.

Eilts

1. Summary: Eilts summarized his conversation with Fahmy regarding Libyan representation in Washington.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750199–1071. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Tripoli. In telegram 133634 to Egypt, June 7, Eilts was instructed to thank Sadat and Fahmy for their views regarding Libyan representation in Washington and to inform them that the matter had been postponed indefinitely. (Ibid.)