388. Telegram 158 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State1 2
Dacca, January 14, 1972, 0620Z
Subj:
- Bangladesh—The Case for Recognition
- 1.
- Recognition of Bangladesh rests on following assumptions: (1) it is in interest of USG that stability return to South Asia area as soon as possible; (2) USG would prefer not to see South Asia dominated by either Soviet Union or India; (3) all other things being equal, U.S. is inclined to recognize governments satisfying “normal criteria” and, in addition, democratic in character and based on expressed will of people of country.
- 2.
- General criteria. Bangladesh is a clearly-defined geographic area whose borders are not in dispute; government now in power is one which has received clear electoral mandate, has announced its espousal of secular democracy, and shows every sign of enjoying confidence of overwhelming majority of people of country; population of area is relatively homogeneous speaking same language and in general free of ethnic, religious, or linguistic separatism.
- 3.
- Political interests of USG. Present Government of BD is currently dominated by leaders whose orientation can best be characterized as “democratic socialtst”; circumstances in which this government has come into power have given USSR both directly and through association with India considerable advantage in terms or potential influence which Soviet reps in BD are seeking to build up and exploit, assisted [Page 2] by small but vociferous group of indigenous communists and fellow travellers. Govt leadership is clearly conscious of and fears Soviet influence and has taken steps which indicate strong intention resist participation in govt of left-leaning groups, although strongly pressed to do so both by USSR and by India (latter during period when BDG was located in Calcutta). Early recognition of BDG by non-communist world would strengthen present BDG leadership and weaken strong propaganda advantage Soviet bloc now deriving from its initial advantage. On other hand, BDG, while heavily indebted to India, shows signs of seeking to resist Indian domination and to establish its independence from its large and powerful neighbor. Here again early recognition will be of great help to BDG in maintaining an independent stance.
- 4.
- Economic factors. In description of BD as “international economic basket case”, while striking as rhetoric, is not entirely accurate, as pointed out in last para of Dacca 0092; BD will certainly require a great deal of assistance immediately and considerable assistance over medium term if it is to realize its potential for economic viability. Immediate future needs center on foodgrains, foreign exchange, and humanitarian assistance in resettling vast numbers of refugees apparently now beginning to return in quantity from India. In slightly longer perspective assistance will be required in planning, establishing economic priorities, and financing infrastructure projects. While India and Soviet bloc may make great public play of their willingness to help, amounts to be expected from them realistically are small; help of types and quantities required can only come from non-communist aid givers, acting either bilaterally or through international organizations. In either case effective assistance for reconstruction and development purposes, (as distinguished from purely humanitarian relief of suffering) will depend on recognition of BD by potential aid donors, whether individual countries, consortia, or international aid agencies. Thus, if BD is to achieve economic base for stable existence, it must receive early recognition from potential aid sources other than Indian and the Soviet [Page 3] bloc.
- 5.
- Relations with Pakistan. BDG Prime Minister, Mujibur Rahman, has categorically announced (Dacca 111) that there can be no “links” between BD and Pakistan; while acceptance of this reality has yet to be acknowledged by GOP President Bhutto, Islamabad 338 indicates apparent trend in that direction. BD and Pakistan have many important matters to negotiate out between them. This will be impossible until parties can approach negotiating table as psychological equals—condition which requires that Pakistan refrain from pressing claim of some kind of political tie and BD be relieved of psychological necessity of fending off such claims. This sine qua non cannot be achieved as long as Pakistan persists in its version of “Hallestin doctrine”. Recognition of BD by number of important world powers would call Pakistani bluff in this connection and settle issue once and for all, incidentally getting Bhutto off hook by doing so.
- 6.
- Special factors. (a) Large scale presence of Indian Army in Bangladesh raises question of full sovereignty of BDG. That latter is aware this problem is indicated by recent statements of Mujib and others that IA is present with full agreement and at invitation of BDG and will leave whenever BDG desires it to go. There has been no indication that IA presence has, of itself, in any way affected or limited freedom of BDG to conduct its own affairs; such Indian influence as exists, (and there can be no doubt that it does exist) is due to factors other than mere presence of army as such. (B) Timing of U.S. recognition could be important. Today’s announcement that Burma has recognized BDG is first by non-communist country; there are indications that Nepal and Indonesia may follow suit, while possibility of joint recognition by EEC countries in near future now being discussed in Luxembourg (Bonn 531). Should this happen, snowball effect likely. At that point failure of U.S. to extend recognition would become conspicuous and take on policy significance which it does not yet have. At very least U.S. failure to act would be attacked by Soviets and their Bengali supporters as clear evidence of hostility. As incidental effect, BDG could be expected request closure of this office [Page 4] and departure of all American official personnel from BD.
- 7.
- On basis of foregoing, we believe USG should be prepared extend formal recognition to BDG simultaneously or very soon after U.K. and other member common market countries do so. We are aware that there may re many factors arguing to contrary, but we here are not in position to assess them.
Spivack