In the absence of my Ambassador on the West Coast, I have been instructed
to forward the enclosed personal message to President Nixon from the Prime Minister, Mr
Heath, relating to the sub-continent and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s sudden visit to London.
I am of course at your disposal for the transmission of a reply or of any
comments you may have.
Attachment
Message from British Prime Minister Heath to President
Nixon
undated
Following is the text of the message for the President:
Begins:-
I have given much thought since we met in Bermuda to our policies in
the Indian sub-continent in the new situation which has been created
there. In this connection it was of particular interest to me to
have an hour’s talk with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman when he came through
London.
Mujib’s arrival was unexpected. We first heard of his release in a
message from Islamabad which was received when the aircraft carrying
him was only an hour away. He later told me that he had suggested
that he should be sent to Dacca or handed over to the Red Cross or
the United Nations. These ideas were not, however, acceptable to
Bhutto. He himself had
refused to go to Tehran, and had finally agreed to come to
London.
I thought that Mujib had borne his imprisonment well. Although
obviously tired and not fully informed after nine months in solitary
confinement, he spoke with confidence and assurance. He was anxious
to reach Dacca as soon as possible and we gave him an R.A.F.
aircraft for the onward journey. It was his own choice that he
should not transfer to an Indian aircraft in Delhi.
Mujib told me that there can now be no question of a formal link
between Bangladesh and West Pakistan. He had said the same to
Bhutto prior to his
release. In this he has [Page 3]
confirmed the position of the Bangladesh authorities in Dacca and
our own assessment of the state of affairs in the East. However,
although he spoke with understandable bitterness of the actions of
the previous Pakistan regime, he showed no rancour towards Bhutto,
and said that he wished to establish good relations with West
Pakistan. The new partition should be, in his words, “a parting as
of brothers”, but Bhutto had to acknowledge the division of
Pakistan. Relations between the new Bangladesh and India would of
course be much closer.
Sheikh Mujib spoke of his
hope of Commonwealth membership. I assured him of our goodwill, but
at the same time explained the reasons why we could not recognise
Bangladesh at once. He shared our wish for harmonious relations
between Britain and the three countries of the Indian sub-continent
and he hoped that we would help to persuade Bhutto to accept the
realities of the situation.
The independence of the East is clearly something which Bhutto cannot now change. If Mujib
gets early recognition and support from the West it will improve his
chance of keeping the country out of the hands of left wing
extremists. While there may need to be a short delay to give him
time to establish his personal authority, I am sure that it is not
in the general Western interest that this waiting period should be
long.
[Page 4]
The problem is one of timing. Too early recognition would antagonise
West Pakistan and complicate Bhutto’s task. On the other hand, if we delay too
long, the Communist countries will get a start on us in the East,
and the position of their friends there will be strengthened.
Anything which you can do to help Bhutto accept the inevitability of recognition of
Bangladesh would be most helpful. I am myself in touch with him and
have told him that Mujib, in his talk with me, ruled out any formal
link between East and West. But your views will I know weigh heavily
with Bhutto and his
government.
We shall also use all the influence we can to encourage Mijib, as
well as the Indians, to be constructive and to avoid recriminations.
The Awami League leaders have already asked us whether we can make
our good offices available on a confidential basis for the
resolution of problems between East and West Pakistan. I have told
Bhutto that, although we
have no wish to interfere, if there is anything that we can usefully
do, we will be very ready to help.
I very much hope that you will agree that the time has now come to
move forward on these lines. There is much at stake and I believe
that it is of great importance that jointly we use all the influence
at our disposal to maintain our position and interests in the
sub-continent.
With sincere regards,
Ends
