Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

381. Telegram 79 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹ ²

Islamabad, January 4, 1972, 1255Z

Subj:

• GOP FonSec on Recognition of Bangla Desh

Ref:

• Islamabad 13208

1. During call on FonSec Sultan Khan Jan. 3 on another subject, DCM asked about current status of GOP discussions with variuos governments on BD recognition problem. FonSec said he had sat in on number of reps. Bhutto’s initial meetings with foreign Ambassadors here, during which Bhutto had mentioned problems which recognition would cause him at time when he just taking over and planning to initiate discussions with Mujib. Bhutto’s response to questions this subject had varied slightly from meeting to meeting in context of questions posed by Ambassadors. Report had then been relayed to Bhutto to effect that certain Ambassadors were informing their governments that Bhutto was taking fairly relaxed view. To clarify ambiguity, FonSec said, Bhutto decided to restate his position at diplomatic reception Dec. 27, (Islamabad 13060), when he said it would be considered “hostile” act if foreign governments accorded “premature” recognition.

WM FonSec said that Pak Ambassador in Moscow had had two talks with Soviet officials, and had reported that Moscow seemed be taking cautious line on recognition. FonSec said he had impression too from talks with Sov Ambassador here that Moscow did not want to act precipitately.

3. FonSec confirmed that Bhutto had told some Ambassadors that Pakistan would leave commonwealth if UK Government recognized Bangla Desh. This view, he said, has been officially communicated to HMG. Acknowledging that advantages accrue to Pakistan from continued membership in commonwealth, FonSec said GOP would in no way wish to damage its relations with members of commonwealth, but could hardly fail to react if “leader” of commonwealth took step to impugn territorial integrity of commonwealth member (i.e. Pakistan).

4. DCM inquired whether FonSec did not foresee practical difficulties in maintaining such a position on the event various governments proceeded nevertheless to recognize BD. He referred in that connection to imminent announcement by Pres. Bhutto of his decision to release Mujib unconditionally. FonSec said question of timing was critical. It was important that Pres. Bhutto’s discussions with Mujib be allowed to run their course to determine whether some sort of political link could be maintained between West and East Pakistan. If Mujib, once released and having had chance freely to make up his mind, decided firmly against such political link, GOP would take that into account. Then there would be question of continued Indian Army occupation of east wing, which would be factor in status of government there.

5. Inference from FonSec’s remarks is that, although he is not clearly getting out ahead of Pres. Bhutto in opposing “premature” recognition, he is taking longer-term view which seems essentially realistic and pragmatic.

Farland

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Confidential. Repeated to Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, and New Delhi.
2. Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan told Deputy Chief of Mission Sober that his Government continued to view “premature” recognition of Bangladesh as a hostile act. Pakistani President Bhutto felt that there was still the possibility that a political link could be maintained between what his Government continued to refer to as the two wings of Pakistan.