Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

235. Telegram 2213 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹ ²

Islamabad, March 10, 1972, 0725Z

Subject:

• GOP Suggestion for Military Collaboration With U.S., Including Availability of Military Facilities in Pakistan

1. Summary: GOP DefSec, saying he was speaking with full knowledge and at request of Pres Bhutto, said GOP sought closer military collaboration with U.S. Said GOP would be willing to make land and port facilities available for US use. I was entirely noncommital, promising merely to report our conversation.

Action requested: Instruction as to any response to be made to DefSec’s presentation. End summary

2. I called on DefSec Ghias Uddin Ahmed March 10 at latter’s request. Ghias said he wished discuss with me, with full knowledge of Pres Bhutto and indeed at his request, question of military collaboration between Pakistan and US. He had wished to talk with me earlier in week, but since I had been out of town he had mentioned subject to Acting DCM(Islamabad 2113). Now he wished to take matter up officially.

3. Ghias immediately suggested that military qte facilities unquote could be made available to US by pakistan if US wished. He said this would include facilities on land or at ports. With regard latter, he mentioned locations along Arabian seacoast including (from west to east) Jiwani, Gwadar, Sonmiani Bay, Karachi and area south and east of Karachi. He thought US might be interested in developing port such as at Gwadar which would be important for economic development of that region of Pakistan.

4. He said GOP was not thinking in terms of having large numbers of American military personnel in Pakistan, but we might find it useful to have access to facilities as needed. Beyond that, Pakistan’s capability for strategic military planning was limited and GOP would welcome collaboration of American planners.

5. Reason for this approach, Ghias said, was that Pakistan now faced entirely new situation after recent war when it had suffered defeat by India with Soviet collaboration. GOP was increasingly concerned over intentions of both Soviets and Indians. Pakistan needed to bolster up its defenses in order to provide some credible deterrent. Ghias acknowledged that Pakistan was now only a small fraction compared to India in size and strength. He went on that Pakistan could not contemplate attacking India but it needed some assurance about its defense. In this regard, he thought Pakistan would be looking to closer defense collaboration with Iran and Turkey, and seeking to improve its relations with Afghanistan.

6. Ghias referred to close Soviet collaboration with Indians both at port of Visakhapatnam and on Andaman Islands, which he interpreted as providing important naval facilities for USSR. He said he thought USG was interested in expansion of Soviet naval presence in area.

7. In latter part of this presentation Ghias mentioned in passing that Pakistan would need some equipment for defense purposes. He offered no specifics but went on to refer to recent testimony of Secretary Rogers before SFRC, during which Secretary was reported in local press as saying that USG had no plans to resume arms shipments to Pakistan. Ghias acknowledged that this was very sensitive issue in U.S.

8. I listened quietly throughout Ghias presentation, which left me with impression that GOP was, more or less, asking US to write its own ticket if we agreeable to strengthening our defense ties with Pakistan. When he had concluded, I said I appreciated importance of his proposal,which had been mentioned to us as possiblity on various levels in recent months but never before with express concurrence of pres of Pakistan. I was not in position to comment in any material way on specific proposals Ghias had mentioned, I went on, but I would promptly report our conversation. I would inform him of any reaction received from Washington.

9. I then asked how GOP might view connection between proposals Ghias had just made and on-going political activity in aftermath of recent Indo-Pak war. Agreeing with Ghias’ observation that Pakistan could not be military match for India, I said it seemed to me that real hope of durable peace in subcontinent lay in a political settlement satisfactory to both India and Pakistan that would permit both sides to give up any revanchist claims. Ghias said he would agree to that and suggested that the Kashmir problem be submitted to international arbitration by impartial entity. He thought people of Pakistan would agree to arbitration finding whatever it might be including possibility of turning present ceasefire line into international boundry as India apparently has in mind. He acknowledged my comment that GOI has made it very clear that it considered Kashmir as issue between India and Pakistan only. He added that it would be extremely difficult for any government in Pakistan to give up, on its own, existing Pak claims on Indian Kashmir.

10. Noting that Pres Bhutto will be in Moscow next week and hopes to meet PriMin Gandhi not long thereafter, I asked how Pak proposal for closer military collaboration with US might affect in Ghias’ mind, possibility of successful talks with Soviets and Indians. Ghias acknowledged that any airing of proposals he had made to me would damage climate for forthcoming political talks, and remarked that the issue should remain between us. He then said that Peking, however, would not mind closer military collaboration between Pakistan and US.

11. As conversation concluded, I promised once again to report our conversation faithfully.

12. Action requested: I have been totally noncommittal whenever suggestions such as DefSec made officially today have been dropped in my presence, and all personnel of this mission have been instructed to be similarly noncommittal. I mentioned to Defsec that various aspects of our policy toward South Asia were now under review in Washington and said I could not predict when I could give him any reaction. I would appreciate instructions on any comment I may make in response to proposals which Defsec put forward.

Sober

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF PAK–US. Top Secret; Exdis.
2. Pakistan offered to make military facilities available in Pakistan for U.S. use as part of a program of closer military collaboration between the two countries.