Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

17. Telegram 3842 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹ ²

Rawalpindi, April 16, 1969, 1050Z

Subj:

• Miilitary Supply Policy for South Asia

A. Where we are and how we got here.

1. The agreement of Russia to supply some lethal equipment to Pakistan and the imposition of martial law in Pakistan represent two new dimensions to this problem. They will be discussed later on in this message, but first it might be well to review where we are and how we got here.

2. During the Eisenhower-Nixon administration Pakistan was sometimes called “the most allied of our allies.”

(A) SEATO

(B) CENTO

(C) UNCURK

(D) U–2 staging privileges

(E) Peshawar

3. Today:

(A) Inactive in SEATO

(B) Inactive in CENTO except for economic affairs

(C) Inactive in UNCURK

(D) U–2 privileges long departed.

(E) Peshawar being phased out

(F) Close ties with both USSR and ChiComs

(G) Furthermore, for reasons not associated with US, the Ayub government has fallen and martial law has been imposed because of chaos, anarachy, and threats both to strong central government and of extreme leftist-oriented dominations of east wing where radical elements were in ascendancy.

4. How did this transformation take place in a few years? Obviously there was considerable fault on the part of the Paks, but let us consider our fault as it appears to their eyes in spite of the support we have given them in several ways especially economic aid:

(A) In 1962, contrary to our pledged word, we furnished lethal military equipment to India without prior consultation with Pakistan;

(B) In the spring of 1965 we rudely and abruptly called off a scheduled trip to the US by President Ayub;

(C) In the fall of 1965, the Paks believe contrary to our written assurances, we failed to come to Pakistan’s aid when it was quote attacked unquote by India. (On November 5, 1962 Ambassador McConaughy had delivered to the GOP a secret aide memoire stating: “The Government of the United States of America reaffirms its previous assurances to the Government of Pakistan that it will come to Pakistan’s assistance in the event of aggression from India against Pakistan.”)

There is no repeat no doubt that India did commit aggression against Pakistan in September of 1965. The principal justification for it and for our subsequent actions was that Pakistan, among other things, had been infiltrating arms and men into Indian-held Kashmir. There is no repeat no doubt that this was true. But where does one stop unwinding the ball of cord of the past? It is also equally true that India had reneged on several promises to hold Kashmir plebiscite, which had also been called for by UN resolutions.

(D) We not repeat not only failed to come to Pakistan’s aid at the time of the 1965 war, but we suspended economic aid, cancelled the military supply program which was then uncompleted, and cancelled all spare parts programs. While we did the same to India, the effects on Pakistan were much more serious than on India because all of Pakistan’s equipment was American while very little of India’s was;

(E) China came to Pakistan’s aid by massing troops on the Indian border issuing ultimatums to India, and later furnishing Pakistan with substantial quantities of tanks, aircraft and other equipment, and started economic aid to Pakistan.

(F) All of this had the following results:

I. Pakistanis at all levels felt that its ally, the United States, had stabbed it in the back;

II. Pakistanis at all levels were grateful to China and believed that in all the world China was the only dependable friend they had;

III. China’s military and economic aid brought to Pakistan Chinese experts, technicians, military personnel and workers;

IIII. Those Chinese brought with them the Red Book, Mao badges and slogans and all of the other trappings of Chinese propaganda and subversion.

5. In April of 1967 we informed the Paks that we were now repeat now resuming the sale of spare parts and would henceforth approve third country sales, on a case-by-case basis, of lethal end-items controlled by the United States.

(A) Efforts to obtain tanks from Germany, Italy, and Belgium all aborted despite our President’s promise of over a year ago to President Ayub that 100 would be furnished “now” and 100 “later”.

(B) A possible Turkish transaction has been in the works for months, but has hit many snags and may not rpt not be consummated. If it is consummated, deliveries would appear to be 15 months away.

(C) Meanwhile, Iran has been clamoring to furnish the tanks, but we have consistently refused. Apparently our “third country policy” means any third country except Iran—or any other country which is ready, able, and willing to perform.

6. As a result of the above abortive efforts we have succeeed only in:

(A) Annoying India repeatedly;

(B) Embarrassing Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Turkey;

(C) Upsetting Greece (which objects to the upgrading of Turkish tanks which the Pak deal envisages);

(D) Offending Iran; and

(E) Estranging Pakistan which is becoming convinced that we never repeat never did mean to help it but have only been engaged in leading it down a primrose path.

7. Meanwhiile, India has had major aid from Russia, and has created indigenous capacity to produce tanks, jet aircraft and other equipment.

8. The Paks want American equipment for logistics, training, financial and ideological reasons. They do not repeat not want to be dependent upon the communists for all off the same reasons but what choice have they?

9. It is evident that, in desperation, they are again turning to the communists for their principal supplies. It is not repeat not too late to arrest this.

10. In the recent political turmoil in Pakistan the imperatives had become even more acute.

(A) Pro-Chicom Bhashani and radical opporitunist Bhutto were flirting with each other and might well have joined forces.

(B) The military foresaw a radaicalization of the East Pakistan segment of this strategicaly located nation of 125,000,000 people—the fifth largest in the world.

11. Despite its inclinations and preferences, how effective an anti-communist instrument can a military be which is dependent upon the communists for its equipment? Despite our treaty obligations, we can not rpt not permit ourselves to be dragged into another Vietnam in East Pakistan, and the best way to avoid it is to sell the limited equipment needed while making it perfectly clear that they must defend themselves. Certainly we do not repeat not want this bulwark to go into hock to the communists by default.

12. (A) Our present policy is based partly on the premises that it will prevent a dangerous arms build-up and will discourage diversion of resources from economic development to military hardware. Both premises have been proved false both in india and pakistan. therefore, the policy has failed. (B) The other premise for our present policy is that we should not repeat not furnish lethal equipment to either India or Pakistan because in 1965 they used our equipment to fight each other. This has a hollow ring when we are now rpt now furnishing equipment to both Jordan and Israel, who fought a war with each other in 1967 and who are still shooting at each other. It is true that, although we did not rpt not prevent the 1965 war our military supply policy leverage, especially with Pakistan, did help end it quickly.

13. Direct (but limited) US sales would:

(A) Give US an element of leverage instead of the communists;

(B) Hold military expenditures within reason because of:

I. that element of leverage; and

II. the cheaper price and greater value of our equipment.

(C) Benefit our balance of payments situation along with other economic benefits. If the 100 Turkish tank sale does take place it will cost up to $4,000,000, whereas we would profit from a direct sale.

(D) Remove the hypocrisy, ineffectiveness and embarrassing third country elements of our present policy.

(E) The supplying of arms to both India and Pakistan would increase our ability to influence them toward an ultimate rapprochement.

(F) Give US more leverage to work toward USG-USSR cooperation in the subcontinent.

14. It is said that change in policy would offend India:

(A) India is offended by our present policy;

(B) India has recently indicated that it too would like to purchase lethal equipment from US;

(C) What would India do if offended? It is already opposed to US on almost all international issues. It is already closely oriented toward Russia. It already has communists governing in a number of states.

(D) A liberalization of military supply policy for the subcontinent would not rpt not represent a choosing of Pakistan over India no rpt no such choice is necessary either way.

(E) India would of course feel called upon to object, for the record, but the Indians are sophisticated enough to realize that Pakistan would get the arms it needs somewhere, and it should not rpt not be too difficult a feat of diplomacy to convince them that it is in their own interests that it comes from US rather than from China or even Russia.

B. Russian military supply to Pakistan.

1. We have excellent reason to believe that agreement has been reached between the GOP and the Soviets concerning supply of limited number of tanks (but less than previously supposed) and artillery and that the Soviets are willing to supply SU-7 and MIG–21 aircraft. We also have reason to believe that exchanges of delegations, assigning Pak personnel to Soviet military colleges and academies, visits of Soviet naval ships to Pak harbors for refitting, etc., cultural exchanges between the armed forces and observation of military exercises, are under consideration.

2. To my mind the fact that Russian military supply has commenced, as we feared for two years it would, is no rpt no reason not rpt not to liberalize our policy. On the contrary, it emphasizes the urgency of a prompt liberalization.

(A) The quantity of materiel so far agreed on is not rpt not very significant. A small number of Soviet tanks plus 100 from Turkey fifteen months from now (if they materialized) still leaves Pakistan behind the schedule of “100 now and 100 later” which we promised as of March 1, 1968, and far behind our original MAAG and MAP programs.

(B) The fact that the door to Russia is now rpt now open and more can be expected in the future, along with training, maneuver and other personal relations, indicates that unless we do step in promptly it will be too late;

(C) With a powerful Russian fleet in the mediterranean, and Russian naval presence in the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea and intermitently in the Persian Gulf, the threats and pressures on Iran, Saudi Arabia, the trucial states, other friendly Arabs and Turkey are increasing. A Pakistan oriented to Russia and/or China would add to those pressures and threats we know that these nations are concerned, especially the Shah who has been anxious to help, or to see us help, Pakistan militarily, and Saudi Arabia, as recently confirmed by Jidda 1167 of April 9, 1969.

C. Martial law

1. It recognized that the existence of martial law may make the congressional problem greater (Reuss Amendment) but one should not rpt not shrink from a proper decision because it will encounter some opposition. If the executive will act only with unanimous or even near unanimous congressional approval then it will be paralyzed, for nearly all policies, programs and decisions meet with at least some degree of congressional opposition.

The Reuss Amendment does not repeat not express the sense of Congress that sales should not rpt not be made to military governments but rather only not repeat not to military “dictators” who “are denying social progress to their own people.”

(A) There is no rpt no evidence that Yahya is a military dictator;

(B) There is no rpt no evidence that the martial law regime is denying social progress to the people of Pakistan;

(C) On the contrary, in its three weeks of power the regime has refrained from press censorship, has not rpt not outlawed political parties, has moved to increase food availability in East Pakistan and to reduce food prices, has raised salaries of lower paid government employees, has taken liberal steps in the field of labor relations has reopened the schools, colleges and universities, has met the just student demands including lower fees and installment payments, has set up machinery to attack the problem of corruption in government and has eliminated the requirement that Pakistanis obtain exit permits to visit India. It has announced its intentions to hold elections and to return to constitutional civilian government as soon as possible, and I for one believe they meant it. It has maintained a very low profile, intruded as little as possible into civil affairs leaving administration to the civil service, made little or no repeat no show of force, and made only scattered arrests not rpt not including any prominent political leaders. It has not rpt not yet shown its hand in very sensttive areas of east wing autonomy, increased allocation of resources to east, except food grains, power of central government versus provinces, and provincial representation in national assembly, etc. But it is too soon to expect it to do so.

(D) For all of the above reasons, the Reuss Amendment is not rpt not applicable certainly at this time;

(E) Even if it were applicable, the President has the right to wave it;

(F) While I have not rpt not recommended it, it should be noted that the Reuss Amendment apparently would not rpt not apply to grant aid.

2. Although I have had no rpt no opportunity to visit with congressional leaders since the installation of martial law, I can state that in my conversations with them in June of 1968 and March of 1969 I found the greater majority of those to whom I talked (including members of the appropriations foreign relations, and armed services committees of both houses) to be in favor of a liberalization. In fact no rpt no single one expressed himself to me as being opposed to it. In Senator Symington’s letter to me on March 14, 1969 (copies to Under Secretary Richardson and Assistant Secretary Sisco) he states that “...if the Secretary of State writes that he would have no rpt no objection to the selling of arms to Pakistan, and that he believes such sales would be in the interest of the United States, I personally would have no repeat no objection.”

3. We have had, and are having, arms transactions with other military governments.

4. Recent developments make it clear that for some time to come the Pakistani military will be the principal determinant of both internal and external policy. It is engaged, in its view, in preserving the country from chaos and from communist influence at home and from abroad. It is pro-American oriented. We should keep it that way. We can not rpt not expect it to stay that way if we force it to be dependent on the communists for its vital equipment. Both its hardware and its morale are at stake, and its requirements are modest, both in terms of quantities and degree of sophistication. it does not rpt not seek substantial expansion of numbers of equipment or (at this time) an increased level of modernity but basically only replacement.

5. The GOP military command sees its equipment requirements as necessary both to meet external threats and to preserve internal law and order. The most urgent requirements will be used to maintain its general position of strength relative to India. But intelligence reports in recent months indicated growing activity of revolutionary-minded, pro-Peking domestic elements, and the military must face this contingency as well. We even have one unconfirmed report of the training of guerrillas in North Vietnam. A pro-Peking take-over in East Pakistan would be as dangerous to India as it would be to our own national interests.

6. Most important of all, a liberalization of policy would give us leverage to persuade the martial law government to continue to work for social justice, to effect an early return to constitutional civilian government, and to provide for a better deal for East Pakistan. The greater the percentage of their hardware which is American, the more important are our spare parts and training programs, among other considerations. The thrust of the communists will be to influence the GOP toward the retention of an authoritarian government and against the private sector of the economy. We must not rpt not leave the most important leverage to influence the present and future course of this and successor governments to the communists, and time is of the essence.

D. Recommendations.

1. It is recommended that our arms policy toward both India and Pakistan be liberalized to permit direct sales of lethal equipment on a case-by-case basis. In effectuating such a policy we would be selective and deliberate, and we could impose inhibiting conditions on acquisitions elsewhere as we have with respect to third country sales. The Conte and Symington Amendments could be more effectively implemented if we were in the supply picture.

2. It is recommended that such a decision be reached ASAP.

3. At some appropriate occasion, either upon advising Yahya of a decision on military supply and/or in connection with economic assistance. We should discuss with him our line of thinking about the restoration of political life, East-West relations, etc., and inform him that in our view our assistance must be related to these.

4. It should be noted that a change in policy not rpt not mean instant delivery of hardware. There would of necessity be a substantial lead-time between a decision and agreement on items and conditions and their delivery this would enable us to work for the conditions we want here and to reconsider if the situation should deteriorate.

5. The huge economic effort we have made in India and Pakistan has brought us far less goodwill than the Russians have obtained by arming India and than the Chinese and in the future the Russians have obtained by supplying arms to Pakistan.

6. Pakistan per se means nothing rpt nothing to me. The United States of America does. I’m proud of the fact that I’m still square enough to believe in the boy scout oath. When I abandoned my own career to come here for two years it was in the hope of being able to help restore some of America’s lost prestige and influence. I did not rpt not come to preside over the funeral of the last vestiges of that prestige and influence. I hope that history has not rpt not cast me in that unwilling role.

7. Above all this is no rpt no time for further procrastination. A failure to make and announce a decision now rpt now will unquestionably be interpreted by the GOP as one more effort at delay and deception. Although I would consider it a grievous error from the viewpoint of US interests, I would prefer to tell them frankly that we will not rpt not liberalize our policy in the foreseeable future rather than to say that we must consider the matter further. At least we would preserve some self-respect for our government and for this mission.

They need our help now rpt now. They need it desperately. A friend is a person who helps you when you need it.

Let’s move boldly and courageously, and not rpt not slink in the shadows of indecision.

Oehlert.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret; Exdis. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House, Department of Defense, the Departments of the Air Force, Army and Navy, JCS, and CINCSTRIKE.
2. Ambassador Oehlert reviewed the history of U.S. military supply policy for South Asia and argued for a revision to increase supplies to Pakistan.