114. Telegram 1291 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1 2

Subj:

  • Arms for Pakistan Financial Aspects

Ref:

  • State 02028
1.
I would be less than candid if I did not express my disappointment regarding the information conveyed in the referenced telegram and my concern for its implications as much as I regret it, it is my feeling that the effort to effect an exception to our 1967 policy, which effort was undertaken in US self-interest, is turning out to be an exercise in futility.
2.
All and sundry are aware of the tensions and stresses which existed in US-Pak relations when I presented my credentials about a year and a half ago. The official GOP posture was critically cool and a large segment of the Pak press was openly antagonistic. Today there is a marked difference in US-Pak relations particularly in the higher echelons of GOP officialdom. It is patent that, to a major extent, the reason for this change stems directly from the limited arms offer to Pakistan and hence requires no amplification a that this improved climate is subject to a precipitous reversal is equally obvious.
3.
I must recall that Pres. Yahya himself has emphasized from the very beginning pakistan’s weak financial position [Page 2] and its need for some accommodation that it can benefit from President Nixon’s one-time arms sale offer. As Yahya told me in our meeting on June 20 last year when I first informed him of Prs. Nixon’s decision, “Pakistan is broke and everyone knows it—you better than anyone else.” Various messages from this Embassy since that time have repeated the concern of the GOP leadership on this question. Yahya has raised the matter with me on most occasions when we have met. He has stressed that the GOP would face a very difficult situation if it turns out that Pakistan is unable to pay for the equipment which the USG has offered to sell. We are now close to that point.
4.
Washington’s effort to ease Pakistan’s disappointment and financial burden in the credit turndown, by offering $13 million in FMS credit this year and promising sympathetic consideration on FMS credit for FY 72, is appreciated by me. I fear, however, that benefit to Pakistan through this route has been overestimated. GOP has thus far made purchases this fiscal year totaling $4.6 million which would qualify for FMS credit: sole major item is one C–130 aircraft which cost $3.7 million. Elements of Pak military have expressed interest in various additional purchases of non-lethal equipment which could conceivably use up all of $13 million FMS credit this year. Such additional equipment could include another C–130 aircraft, 10 t 37 aircraft, couple of helicopters and some jeeps. I wish stress, however, that these additional purchases are uncertain and unless we should wish to press GOP to “buy up” there will be a shortfall in utilization of the $13 million earmarked for this year similar situation may well apply next year. As Embassy has previously reported, GOP interest in procuring US equipment centers at this time on our one-time exceptional offer.
5.
I have one last suggestion to offer before I throw in the towel: it is a matter of interpretation. Someone somewhere along the line, sometime back, decided that an APC was a lethal weapon. An APC can be the mount for a gun or recoiless rifle, but so can a jeep. An APC can carry armed troops, but so can a school bus. An APC can be used in combat, but so can a bulldozer. I strongly urge and soonest that the lethal designation be removed from this [Page 3] particular item of our one-time exception package in order to give substance to the $13 million in FMS credit for the purchase of non-lethal defense equipment.
6.
At a high level it was once acknowledged that there was need to make this offer “meaningful”. I submit that the need continues, and urge that serious consideration be given to this one last suggestion, which I respectfully make before the hatches are again battened down.
Farland
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis.
  2. Ambassador Farland argued strongly that unless Pakistan was afforded credit terms to help finance the weapons offered under the one-time excerption, the undertaking would prove to be “an exercise in futility.”