India and Pakistan: Pre-Crisis, January 1969–February 1971

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31. Memorandum of Conversation

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger explained the Nixon Doctrine and discussed U.S. relations with Pakistan with senior advisers to Pakistani President Yahya. Presidents Nixon and Yahya joined the conversation at the end.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it is similar to the memoranda prepared by Saunders of the conversations in New Delhi on July 31 and August 1. This memorandum was apparently also prepared from the unrefined notes Saunders took during the meeting. The conversation was held in the Governor’s House in Lahore during Nixon’s visit from August 1–2. According to another record of the meeting between Nixon and Yahya, relations with China were discussed at some length. Nixon said that in any discussion of Asia’s future, China could not be ignored. He said that he recognized the need for a dialogue to bring China into the community of nations, but it would take time before the U.S. public accepted that point of view. (Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, September 2, 1969; ibid., Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I (1970)) According to Kissinger, who was present at that part of the meeting, Nixon also told Yahya that the United States would not be party to any arrangement to isolate China and asked Yahya to convey his feeling to the Chinese at the highest level. (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 180–181) Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, who was traveling with the President, recorded in his diary on August 2 that Yahya had made a strong impression on Nixon “as a real leader–very intelligent—and with great insight into Russia-China relations.” He added that Nixon felt that “Yahya can be valuable channel to China esp.–but also USSR.” (Ibid., Handwritten Journals and Diaries of Harry Robbins Haldeman, H.R. Haldeman Journal, Trips I, February 23, 1969–September 1970)


32. Memorandum of Conversation

President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with Air Marshal Nur Khan to discuss China, Indo-PAK relations, and the question of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. Drafted on August 7 by Spain. The conversation was held in the Governor’s House in Lahore.


33. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of India, Nepal, Ceylon, and Maldives Islands Affairs (Schneider) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Van Hollen)

Schneider analyzed a developing political crisis in India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Schaffer.


34. Telegram 140939 From the Department of State to the White House

The Department assessed Indian Prime Minister Gandhi’s victory over her rivals in the Congress Party and concluded that it would improve prospects for political stability in India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Schaffer, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Stuart W. Rockwell, and approved by Schneider. Sent with an instruction to pass to San Francisco for Rogers and to San Clemente for Kissinger.


35. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Meetings, 1969. Secret; Eyes Only. [2 pages of source text not declassified.]


36. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Meetings, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. [2 pages of source text not declassified.]


37. Letter From Pakistani President Yahya to President Nixon

Yahya requested urgent approval of the sale of 1.7 million tons of wheat under PL–480 to offset a serious food shortage in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. No classification marking. The Consulate General in Dacca underlined the problem of food shortages in East Pakistan on October 10 in telegram 2855 from Dacca. (Ibid., POL 18 PAK )


38. Airgram A–550 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State

Chargé Spain traced the history and drew the lessons from the experience of the Air Force communications facility at Peshawar.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 21 PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Spain on October 2, and cleared in draft by General Geary and in the political section by Stephen E. Palmer and Alan D. Wolfe. Repeated to New Delhi, Ankara for Handley, Tehran for Minister Thacher, London for Minister Hughes, the Peshawar Air Station for the Commanding Officer, Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, USAFI for Hilbert, CIA for Sheldon, NSA for General Carter, USAFSS, and DOD/ISA. The 10-year agreement governing the communications facility at Peshawar was not renewed by Pakistan and expired on July 17, 1969. A limited number of U.S. personnel remained after July 17 to effect an orderly turnover of the facility to Pakistan. A brief ceremony effected the turnover on January 7, 1970, rather than on February 28 as anticipated by Spain. (Telegram 001 from Peshawar, January 8, 1970; ibid., DEF 15–10 PAK–US)


39. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Nixon approved the sale of 1 million tons of wheat to Pakistan under PL–480.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A was an October 10 memorandum from John Hannah to Nixon; attached at Tab B was an October 13 memorandum from Mayo to Nixon; neither is published. The October 1 letter from Yahya to Nixon, attached at Tab C, is printed as Document 37. The President initialed his approval of the recommendation on October 22. On November 13 Nixon sent a letter to Yahya indicating that the United States was prepared to negotiate a PL–480 agreement of 1 million tons of wheat for Pakistan. (Ibid., Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, (1969–1970) )


40. Telegram 175434 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India

Secretary Rogers reviewed Indo-U.S. relations with Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul and warned that Indian recognition of North Vietnam would have a “serious and lasting” negative effect on relations with the United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Schneider on October 14, cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, and James D. Rosenthal (EA/VN), and approved by Rogers. Sent also to Saigon, Rawalpindi, and Paris. The telegram sent to Paris was also numbered Todel 3367. Kaul was in Washington as head of the Indian delegation to the Indo-US Bilateral Talks; see Document 42. The Secretary’s meeting at the United Nations with Foreign Minister Singh on September 29, during which he raised similar objections to the proposed Indian recognition of the North Vietnamese Government, was reported to the Department on October 1 by USUN in telegram 3325. (Ibid,. Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70)


41. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Rogers reported to Nixon that Southeast Asia was the principal focus of bilateral talks held in Washington between U.S. and Indian delegations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70. Secret. The bilateral talks were the second round in what were anticipated to be annual talks between the United States and India. The initial talks took place in New Delhi from July 26 to 28, 1968. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, South Asia, vol. XXV, Document 509. A 69-page record of the talks on October 16–17 is in the National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Box 503, Lot 70 D 387, CF 409. The talks were reported to New Delhi in telegrams 177194, 179522, and 180313, dated October 18, October 23, and October 24 respectively. (All ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL INDIA–US)


42. Analytical Summary Prepared For the National Security Council Review Group

The summary is of a paper prepared in the Department of State in response to NSSM 26 and approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. The paper reviewed U.S. military supply policy toward South Asia and outlined options for consideration by the Review Group.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–040, Review Group Meeting, South Asia Military Support Policy, 11/25/69. Secret. This summary is of a paper drafted in the Department of State’s Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in response to NSSM 26 (Document 10), and approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. Sisco, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group, sent the paper on November 14 to Kissinger, the Chairman of the NSC Review Group. The paper, entitled “U.S. Military Supply for South Asia–Response to NSSM 26,” is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–040, Review Group Meeting, South Asia Military Support Policy, 11/25/69. Saunders sent the analytical summary and the paper to Kissinger on November 19 under a covering memorandum. Kissinger’s handwritten note reads: “Hal–The President wants action not study. When are the tanks moving? When will the lawyers decide? Please get me quick answers.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Pakistan Military and Intelligence, 1/20/69–12/31/69)


43. Minutes of a Meeting of the National Security Council Review Group

Discussion of military supply policy toward South Asia focused on the question of resuming military sales and assistance to Pakistan and the cost to U.S. relations with India of doing so.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Review Group Meeting, Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For a summary of the paper prepared in response to NSSM 26, see Document 42.


44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Nixon approved a recommendation to endorse the sale of 100 U.S.-originated tanks by Turkey to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation on December 6.


45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger forwarded Secretary of State Rogers’ objections to the sale of tanks by Turkey to Pakistan. Kissinger reiterated his support for the sale.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret. Sent for action. The attached memorandum is dated December 18. Nixon did not approve or disapprove the recommendation, but wrote on the memorandum as follows: “K Discuss with me.” On December 23, David Schneider, Country Director for India, sent a letter to Keating about the memorandum that Rogers sent to Nixon. He wrote of Rogers: “We met with him to discuss the proposal and he was quite emphatic in his opposition to it.” He added, however, “the recurrent theme one hears from the NSC staff is that the President ‘wants to do something for Pakistan.’” (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence 1969/1970)


46. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger summarized a letter to Nixon from Pakistani President Yahya in which Yahya pressed for a decision on military supply policy. Nixon indicated that he was disposed to respond favorably.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1969–1970). Secret. Sent for information. The attached letter from President Yahya to President Nixon is dated January 19. The December 20 letter to which Yahya responded can be found ibid. The reference to a speech on November 3, 1969, is to Nixon’s address to the nation on the war in Vietnam. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909. Nixon underlined the last seven words of point 5 and added the following handwritten instructions in the margin: “1 Let’s give them spare parts immediately as basis of keeping the US word. 2 I lean to the Turkish tanks unless it raises too much hell with Congress. I don’t care about Indian reaction.” He also wrote on the memorandum: “K–doesn’t this show advantage of our letter idea? Let’s continue the practice on a selective basis.”


47. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon

Richardson recommended that the U.S. maintain the embargo on military supplies to South Asia. If, however, Nixon felt he was under an obligation to Pakistani President Yahya, Richardson recommended that military supplies for Pakistan be limited to a one-time exception.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret. Drafted by Van Hollen on February 6, and cleared by Sisco. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: “OBE. See S/S 8019. RLBrown 6/10/70.” For a citation to the paper entitled “U.S. Military Supply Policy for South Asia,” see Document 42. The enclosures to the memorandum are not printed. In the order in which they are cited, the enclosures are an undated memorandum entitled “Recent Developments Affecting South Asia Military Supply Policy Issue,” another undated memorandum entitled “Possible Gestures Toward Pakistan,” and the December 18 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, printed as an attachment to Document 45.


48. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Saunders summarized the contending arguments advanced with regard to military supply policy for South Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret. Sent for information. Brackets are in the original. The attached cable is telegram 1333 from Rawalpindi, February 18. (Ibid.) It can also be found ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Ambassador Keating sent a telegram from New Delhi on February 20 making the anticipated arguments against revising the existing arms policy for the subcontinent. (Telegram 1961 from New Delhi; ibid.) Kissinger’s handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: “We must move this.” He added: “Let me see my memo.” The memorandum is marked in an unknown hand to indicate that Saunders had the action responsibility to respond to Kissinger’s instructions. The memorandum to which Kissinger referred was sent to the President on March 16 and is printed as Document 54.


49. Telegram 29569 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India

The Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Secretary Rogers to Foreign Minister Singh concerning India’s decision to close five USIS cultural centers. Rogers expressed regret over the decision and asked for evidence to support the allegation that the centers had been engaged in “political and other undesirable activities.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by Van Hollen, Sisco, Richardson, and in USIA by Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia David Nalle; and approved by Rogers. The decision by India on February 10 to close five USIS cultural centers was triggered by a Soviet request on December 3, 1969, to open a cultural center in Trivandrum. The Soviet request led to a review of all foreign cultural centers operating in India and a decision to close the U.S. centers in Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Chandigarh, Ranchi, and Varauasi. These were the only such centers operating in cities without diplomatic or consular representation, and they operated on the basis of an understanding reached by former Ambassador Chester Bowles and Prime Minister Nehru. The Soviet Union sought to establish a cultural center in Trivandrum on the same basis.


50. Telegram 2388 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State

Ambassador Keating reported on a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on the “not so pleasant” issue of the impending closure of the U.S. cultural centers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to the consulates in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.


51. Letter From the Indian Chargé d’Affaires (Rasgotra) to Secretary of State Rogers

Rasgotra transmitted a letter from Foreign Minister Singh to Rogers. Singh explained that the Indian decision to close the U.S. cultural centers was part of an effort to establish a uniform policy with regard to such centers and was not directed against the United States. No suggestion of improper activities on the part of the U.S. was intended.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/INS Files: Lot 73 D 377, India 1970, US Cultural Centers. No classification marking. The text of the letter was also conveyed to the Department from New Delhi on March 5 in telegram 2505. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70)


52. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant (Haig) and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Saunders and Haig sent a memorandum to Kissinger, conveying Nixon’s reaction to the closure of the cultural centers: “Tell Sisco I’d like to take a stronger line on this. Not to object to closing-but to accept it and close some other facilities which may ‘irritate’ them a bit.” Saunders and Haig surveyed the possibilities.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret. Haig and Saunders sent the memorandum through David Young of the NSC staff for Kissinger. Attached is a copy of the page of the briefing memorandum with the President’s comments.


53. Telegram 34382 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India

Secretary Rogers instructed Ambassador Keating to see Indian Foreign Minister Singh to ask him to issue a public statement absolving the U.S. of any “political or other undesirable activities” in the cultural centers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Van Hollen; revised in S by Herbert S. Okun and Rogers; cleared by Sisco, and Alan Carter, Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia (USIA); and approved by Rogers.


54. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger’s memorandum laid out the options for the question of military supply for India and Pakistan, which in practice related largely to Pakistan. Nixon indicated that he favored continuing the policy of selling replacement parts to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A but not published is a January 7 paper, apparently prepared by the NSC staff, entitled, “Issues For Decision.” Attached at Tab B but not published is Secretary Rogers’ February 10 memorandum to the President. Both are ibid. Rather than approving or disapproving the recommendation put forward in the memorandum, Nixon responded with handwritten comments in the margins. The thrust of his comments was that he preferred the course of action outlined as option 4. He highlighted the second paragraph of the discussion of option 4 and wrote “OK” next to it. He underscored the first sentence of the following paragraph and wrote next to it, “I agree we do this by all means.” He began his comments under the approval line as follows: “I believe option 4 is less provocative politically in the U.S.–& for that matter in India.” He considered that option 4 plus an increased economic package constituted a substantial gesture in support of Pakistan that he could more easily support politically than the other options detailed in the memorandum. In a handwritten comment in the margin, Kissinger concurred with the President’s response: “I think option 4 gives Paks most.” He added an instruction to Haig: “Al–Get note from Hal [Saunders] what it means.” He was apparently referring to a more complete discussion of the implications of adopting option 4 as policy.


55. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Nixon approved a recommendation that the U.S. accept the closure of the cultural centers by India without complaint, while reserving the possibility of a further response.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. An attached draft of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Saunders and revised by Kissinger. The President initialed the approval line on April 2. Not published is the attached March 17 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon.


56. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Nixon approved a recommended $102.5 million program of economic assistance for Pakistan for fiscal year 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum is undated, but the President’s approval of the recommendation is dated April 6. Kissinger initialed the approval line for the President. Attached at Tab A but not published is Rogers’ March 12 memorandum to Nixon on the economic assistance program. Mayo summarized the recommendations of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in a March 24 memorandum to the President; attached at Tab B but not published.


57. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Kissinger asked Nixon to clarify his decision on South Asian arms policy. Nixon reaffirmed the sale of spare parts for previously supplied equipment and approved a revision of the embargo on the sale of lethal equipment to allow a “one-time exception” for Pakistan for a limited number of items.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. For the previous memorandum dealing with the supply of arms to South Asia to which Kissinger refers, see Document 54. Nixon checked the first option to indicate his approval of a one-time sale to Pakistan. He added the following handwritten instruction: “Hold until we see whether the Indians will be in a control commission.” Nixon’s instruction raised questions as to which control commission he meant, and what he hoped to achieve with regard to India’s participation in a control commission by delaying a decision on arms supply to South Asia. Saunders posed these questions in a memorandum he sent to Haig on April 27. Saunders assumed the President was referring to one of the control commissions in Southeast Asia. Haig did not answer the questions but responded with a handwritten note on the memorandum that reads as follows: “Hal–Pres is inclined to move but wants to wait at least until next week.” (Ibid.)


58. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Eliot reported that the five cultural centers at issue in India would be closed on May 16.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential. The May 6 memorandum cited by Eliot is ibid.


59. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Nixon approved a recommended program of $193 million in economic assistance for India for fiscal year 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum itself is undated, but the President’s approval of the recommendation is dated May 19. Kissinger initialed the approval line for the President. The Rogers to Nixon memorandum, attached at Tab A but not published, is dated March 20. James R. Schlesinger, Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, summarized the recommendations of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in an April 30 memorandum to the President, attached at Tab B but not published. Both are ibid.


60. Memorandum of Conversation

Ambassador Farland warned Secretary of Defense Laird that Pakistan was disappointed with the U.S. and was turning increasingly to China and the Soviet Union for military supplies.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 73 A 1975, Box 22, Pakistan 1970, 000.1–100. Secret. Drafted by Kravitz and approved by Nutter on May 26. The conversation was held in Laird’s office.