94. Telegram 1699 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State1 2
Tripoli, October 30, 1972, 1600Z
Department pass USINT CAIRO, other interested posts
Subject:
- Farewell Conversation With Qadhafi
Ref:
- Tripoli 1666
Summary: I met with Qadhafi (who was accompanied by Jallud and Kikhya) October 28; Yunis and Hamza joined us later in meeting, but did not actively participate. Wide-ranging, frank exchange was, by and large, replay of earlier talks with Qadhafi. He stressed LAR’s non-alignment; his perplexity at USG’s “total commitment” to Israel; LARG’s need for arms (escalated to Phantoms); his aversion towards communism, but conversely his fear that growing pressures may force him to accept “Soviet option”; and Arabs’ control of oil in context growing US import requirements. I sensed he uneasy about Moscow-Cairo rapprochement and developments in Cairo, factors that perhaps accounted for his avoiding mention of pet project, union with Egypt. His frustration over US ME policy led him to ask if Jewish-Christian pact against Islam exists. He was personally very cordial and appeared to be in [Page 2] excellent health. His easy, informal relationship with his colleagues was impressive; while all were relaxed, they hung on his every word. That he failed to take up Jallud’s October 24 “ice box” alternative re ME imbroglio (para 2 reftel) suggests Jallud was not really floating serious new idea after all.
- 1.
- In response my request, I had one and one-half hour farewell tour d’horizon with RCC Chairman Qadhafi evening October 28 at his Aliziya barracks office. Prime Minister Jallud sat in throughout session and took part in discussion, as did FonMin Kikhya. COS Abu Bayr Yunis and RCC member ’Aliawad Hanza drifted into office during the meeting, casually pulled up chairs, but did not take part in exchanges. Atmosphere was friendly even when discussion touched on Qadhafi’s bete noire, US ME policy and related LAR arms requests. Jallud, Yunis, Hamzad and, by implication their missing colleagues, obviously continue to enjoy close rapport and easy comradeship with Qadhafi. yet their deference to him was striking. Jallud and Yunis looked guiltily at their now-smoking chief before lighting cigarettes. All three hung on his every word. Kikhya did interpreting with Jallud taking copious notes.
- 2.
- Qadhafi began session with much too generous references to my “personal understanding and appreciation” of goals of September 1 revolution vis-a-vis LAR and Arabs in general which he sardonically contrasted with “attitude of USG”. While USG and LARG had resolved major problems, especially evacuation of Wheelus, more easily than had been expected, improvement in relationship had not taken place to extent LARG had hoped. For example, “USG failed to fulfill some of its contracts.”
- 3.
- In thanking Qadhafi for receiving me, I described my departure plans and reasons for my resignation and retirement. I then vigorously denied any lack of understanding on part USG of new situation created by Libyan revolution pointing out we could not have [Page 3] achieved what we have if Washington and I had not seen facts of Libyan situation in same perspective. Stressing that I too have been deeply disapointed that areas of agreement which we have achieved have not resulted in greater improvement in overall relationshp, I asked Qadhafi for his most recent assessment of U.S.–LARG relationship so that I could reflect it to my government when I return. When Qadhafi interrupted to ask if I would see President Nixon, I assured him that President would be apprised of any thoughts he might entrust to me.
- 4.
- Qadhafi took this opening to say that LAR determination to achieve complete independence and foster internal development meant that it must steer clear of ties to major powers (this was same theme he had pursued previous day at intellectuals’ seminar in Tripoli—see 271657Z Oct 72). LAR’s nonaligned course, however, does not mean enmity for emmity’s sake against either U.S. or other powers. LAR had looked to U.S. for assistance, and, indeed, has been accused of being U.S. puppet by other states, but LAR has gained little thereby. LAR, like Nasser’s Egypt had turned in vain to U.S. for arms “for self defense”; USG had failed to deliver, though it has opened its arsenals to Israel. Libya, he said, is thus under “great pressure” to seek accommodation with USSR. While LAR forthrightly and consistently has opposed communism in Arab world, America’s pro-Israel stance could drive LAR, like Egypt before it, to turn to Soviets, Libya needs arms and would like to obtain them from the US: “We too want phantoms”. I noted that Egypt and Libya have obtained substantial [Page 4] quantities of war materiel from other sources, including USSR and France, and asked him why LARG wanted further supplies from US. Qadhafi replied that “my country feels threatened” and that weapons would only be used defensively. Although he was not explicit, clear implication was one of concern about an Israeli attack. I reminded Qadfafi that USG has not made negative decision re LAR’s arms requests. Forebearing to inquire about how he defined “his country”, I remarked that I appreciated Qadhafi’s candor and that I wished to reciprocate in same spirit. I picked up his earlier assertion that USG had failed to fulfill contracts by which he “must have meant additional F–5’s”. I reminded him USG had not refused to sell the aircraft. Rather, no decision had been made. This was due to a number of factors, including LARG’s failure to respond to formal US inquiries regarding movement of LARAF’s F–5’s to Pakistan. This movement had raised question of whether LARG would adhere to sales contract stipulations regarding use and disposition US-supplied arms. Qadhafi [Page 5] objected that USG had “refused”—I interrupted to correct this to “had not decided”—to provide additional aircraft “two years ago”, long before Indo-Pakistani war. During that war, he added, USSR had established “bridge of planes” to provide war material to India while US, despite treaty ties, failed to succor Pakistan. I replied that to the extent we thought Pakistan was right, the USG had provided strong moral suppopt to Pakistanis, a fact to which President Bhutto could attest. But, I said, Qadhafi was in effect not speaking to the point: The fact was that LAR had sent planes off, had failed to consult with USG as agreements required, and had failed to respond to our subsequent inquiries. The issue was not Pakistan. If circumstances arose in which he similarly sent planes to the UK, we would have to take issue with his decision insofar as his legal undertakings with the US are concerned. Qadhafi observed that “in any event” planes are now back in Libya and then, rather quickly and lightly, he dismissed the subject by suggesting that LARAF trainees in pakistan had need of F–5 aircraft.
- 5.
- I said that I would, of course, report to Washington his interest in further arms acquisitions from the US. At the same time, I wished again to be frank. The Pakistani aspect of the problem was only one element. The main problem is that arms supply is a highly sensitive subject that can only be dealt with within the context of the overall relationship between countries. We had to face the fact that the present relationship is deficient—certainly not good enough to make extensive military cooperation a promising field under present circumstances. Even with strong assurances regarding defensive use, therefore, I would not wish to encourage him to believe advanced weaponry could really be forthcoming.
- 6.
- I went on to suggest that we ought to consider together what is wrong with our overall relationship and suggested for openers that we what lack is a [Page 6] continuing dialogue. Our contacts tend to be intermittent most of the time. When dialogue has been in progress, major problems—e.g. evacuation, termination of agreements, settlement of claims, relations with oil companies, etc.—have been smoothly resolved. What we need is far better understanding of each others points of view. For example, I pointed out, Qadhafi had several times earlier referred to the USG’s “total commitment” to Israel. The US has no such commitment. The US, I said, is “totally committed” only to its own national interests. So far as ME is concerned US strongly supports independence of UN member Israel, but it equally supports the independence and territorial integrity of Arab neighbors, a peaceful solution to Arab-Israeli dispute, and justice for Palestinians, all within the parameters of UNSC Resolution 242. Perhaps, I suggested, the USG is also at fault in misunderstanding Libyan points of view. For example, we hear Libya saying that it is “totally opposed” to a peaceful solution to the Middle Eastern problem. I could not believe this is true. But, this is what i heard major jallud saying only the other day. pephaps if we spent more time in talking to one another we would discover that facile generalizations are incorrect and that there are important areas of common interest and overlap. I therefore urged on Col. Qadhafi and his colleagues in the RCC a far more continuous dialogue with my successor than I have been able to achieve.
- 7.
- Jallud intervened to ask how could USG expect to conduct dialogue “about my life?” repeating his earlier avowal that Palestine cause is matter of “life and death” for Arabs (reftel), he went on to maintain that situation in area has changed since 1956 and 1967. Earlier, US had been able to provide oil to European consumers when war broke out in ME. [Page 7] Now he said, U.S. could not do so and, indeed, U.S. will itself require, increasingly, imports of Arab oil. Taking up thrust of Jallud’s remarks, Qadhafi asked why does USG adhere to its commitment to Israel in face of these facts of life? U.S. interests in Arab world, he said, far outweigh its interests in Israel. He said he could not understand Washington’s special tie to Tel Aviv; could there be a “Jewish-Christian” pact directed against Islam? U.S. he cautioned is making error in basing its ME policies on Israel, just as it errs in relying on political (‘Arab’) personalities “who may change or who may disappear at any time.”
- 8.
- After firmly rejecting any suggestion of Islamophobia, I said USG is committed to a just peace in the ME, a fair compromise that recognizes rights of Palestinians, other Arabs, and Israelis. (Jallud at this juncture [Page 8] remarked to Qadhafi that I earlier had told him that ME problem, like Viet Nam and Korea, could be resolved peacefully through negotiations; Qhadhafi smiled agreement with Jallud’s grimace of incredulity at this idea.) Reverting again to Qadhafi’s repeated use of term “total commitment” to describe our relationship with Israel, I stressed that we often find ourselves at odds with that country. For example, I pointed out our basic motivation is to maintain an arms balance in the area in the interests of peace. We have no interest in giving Israel a clear competivive advantage. This sometimes gives rise to strong differences of opinion between the U.S. and Israel over levels of assistance and there have been important instances in which we have had to refuse or defer Israeli requests. At this point, Qadhafi asked “what, for example”? I affirmed that it was well known that the USG had at various times turned down Israeli requests for additional Phantoms and for other, more advanced aircraft in order to ensure balance. (Qadhafi and Jallud did not comment, but their eloquently raised eyebrows led me to conclude that they thought I was talking through my hat.)
- 9.
- Seeking to divert conversation, I stressed that US, which understands and sympathizes with LAR’s development needs and which has wide experience in development, has previously offered every facility to LAR on reimbursable basis. This offer stands, though the USG will not importune the LAR to accept our assistance. Should LARG understand that it need only ask for our help; it can rely on U.S. understanding and cooperation.
- 10.
- Discussion drew to close with Qadhafi stressing importance LARG attaches to having access to U.S. technology through LARG students in U.S. as almost an after-thought but with some emphasis, he stated that LARG too attaches importance to dialogue as means of solving problems, (I would like to think that I detected a slight note of “mea culpa” in this protestation.) Session ended with more exchanges of greetings and handshakes all around.
- 11.
- Comment: We broke little new ground, but I believe Qadhafi is deeply concerned about the current efforts on the part of Cairo to reach new understanding with Moscow. He understands Sadat’s dilemma but has not yet, at least, been able to accept Egypt’s—much less Libya’s—resort to “Soviet option”. His failure to mention, even in passing, his pet project—merger with Egypt—reinforces my belief in this regard. Interesting too was fact that he did not mention, as Jallud had in our session earlier, possibility that ME problem might be shelved or put on ice for future to resolve; I would judge that Qadhafi is not enamored of this idea. Finally, Qadhafi’s suggestion that “Jewish-Christian” plot afoot was more than half serious and was clue to depth of his Muslim sensitivities. In sum, conversation was yet another reminder (as if we needed one!) that pivotal figure of Libyan revolution is an obsessed man, a curious mix of 7th century Islamic, Bedouin warrior and modern idealistic nationalist. His judgements are simplistically sharp: he persists in seeing everything as either completely right or completely wrong. Unfortunately he perceives the U.S. as wrong. But we can perhaps derive some consolation—and even protection—from fact that virtually everyone else falls in same category and even Qadhafi is sufficiently pragmatic to know he cannot totally alienate everybody.
Palmer