Enclosed for your information is a copy of a memorandum prepared for the
Acting Secretary by the Acting Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs.
Enclosure
Information Memorandum to the Acting Secretary of the National
Security Council
Washington, February 14, 1970
[Page 2]
SUBJECT: Possible Consequences in North Africa of U.S. Response to
Israeli Arms Request
The Problem
The President’s announcement on January 30 that the decision on the
Israeli arms request will be made within the next thirty days, and
the secretary’s presence in Morocco and Tunisia have focused North
African attention on the U.S. response in an ominous way. It is
clear that the North Africans expect the decision to be favorable to
the Israelis and that all of the governments in the area, including
the moderates, would be subjected to substantial pressure by local
public opinion, as well as by the radical Arabs, to retaliate
against the United States. We believe Morocco and Tunisia would
endeavor to resist these pressures. However, they would have to
yield to them at least to some degree in view of the recent evidence
of the growth of public support in both countries for the Palestine
cause.
Discussion
It goes without saying that a decision to postpone action on the
Israeli request would have a positive effect on our relations with
all four North African states, although not in any dramatic
manner.
To the extent that we agree to provide further advanced aircraft,
however, we risk severe damage to U.S. interests in the area.
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Libya
Our most exposed position is in Libya because of our important oil
interests, the size of our American colony and the fact that we are
still liquidating Wheelus. Libya’s recent contract with France for
the purchase by the end of 1974 of “some 100” advanced aircraft has
of course given added momentum to the Israeli arms request. In a
sense, the Libyans “created” the present problem of dealing with the
Israelis because of their purchase of Mirages. This fact is,
however, unlikely to influence the Libyan reaction in view of the
current superiority of the Israeli Air Force and the minimum 3 to 5
year interval before the French aircraft are likely to be
operational.
The Libyan reaction could, at worst, mean the rupture of diplomatic
relations, which we doubt, or, perhaps, a request that we close our
Embassy office in Benghazi or our cultural centers. Pressures
against the American-controlled oil industry would certainly be
increased, and efforts to improve our bilateral relations and to
expand our dialogue with the regime would be severely set back. A
physical attack on our installations—permitted by the LARG—is also conceivable.
Tunisia and Morocco
In Tunisia and Morocco, the governments would not wish to take any
direct actions against U.S. interests. Popular, and particularly
student, discontent with the U.S. decision could, however, result in
demonstrations against U.S. installations: the Embassies, the USIS centers, and possibly against
Kenitra (U.S. Navy communications facility in Morocco). In the
longer run, these same pressures might force Morocco and Tunisia to
diverge increasingly from their close relationship with the U.S. The
Tunisian government’s desire to avoid a confrontation with the
students during the Secretary’s visit and Prime Minister Ladgham’s statement to the Secretary
that the U.S. must assume a prime share of the responsibility for
Israel’s aggressive attitude are two signs of the erosion of the
U.S. position. In both countries opposition elements are seizing
this issue and the regimes’ ties to the U.S. to undermine internal
stability.
Algeria
In Algeria the recent improvement in relations would suffer a
setback. We believe any possibility of an early resumption of
relations would be nullified by a decision favoring the Israelis. In
view of Algeria’s longer term importance in North Africa, we believe
it would be most unfortunate if our relative isolation from the
regime should be prolonged.
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In our view we should exhaust all non-military alternatives as
answers to any Israeli security problem, before moving against North
African sentiments; the most provocative signal to the North
Africans, of course, would be to furnish additional Phantom
jets.
