The policy issues at stake remain unchanged since this subject was
outlined in my memorandum of December 4, 1970 to the Acting Secretary
(attached). AF continues to share
Ambassador Palmer’s view that
it would be in the national interest for us to deliver the planes.
Attachment
Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs (Newsom) to Secretary of State Rogers
Washington, December 4, 1970
SUBJECT:
DISCUSSION:
The eight Northrop F–5 fighter aircraft which the United States
agreed to sell the previous Libyan regime in June 1969 will leave
the production line this December. They will be ready for delivery
on schedule in January and February. Officially, we have had “under
review” since March the question of whether it would be in our
interest to deliver these aircraft. Ambassador Palmer believes strongly that we
must now decide this question since he may be asked by the Libyans
at any time regarding our intentions and he cannot indefinitely
indicate that no decision has been made. Defense has also asked for
a decision regarding the disposition of these planes in order to
complete its programming for the remainder of the fiscal year.
A decision on this subject could conceivably be delayed until perhaps
March by disposing of these eight planes through the military
assistance program to another recipient than Libya, and by
earmarking another eight for delivery to Libya before the summer of
1971. AF does not believe the chances
of a change for the better in our bilateral relations with Libya or
in the Middle East situation between now and March are significant
enough to warrant a continued postponement of a decision. Although
as noted below PM is in agreement in
principle with going ahead with delivery, it
[Page 3]
points out that a decision to proceed at this
time would probably result in an adverse reaction from Congress thus
jeopardizing the pending FY 1971
supplemental request for military assistance funds. PM therefore makes its concurrence in
this memo contingent on the supplemental request.
Defense has also raised the possibility of delivering the eight F–5s
to Libya out of the production of Northrup’s Spanish licensee. Such
deliveries would, however, still require United States approval, and
those who object to delivery in principle would no doubt feel that
this procedure was merely a subterfuge.
The Ambassador believes that we should deliver the eight planes on
schedule to Libya under the contract of June 1969. AF and DOD agree with him. NEA does not.
The reasons for delivering the planes are several.
- - We have a valid contract with the Libyan Government,
although it was signed with the pre-revolution regime. The
contract does contain a “changed circumstances” clause which L
believes could be invoked to justify non-delivery (see
attachment.) However, PM believes
that doing so would set an undesirable precedent and cast doubts
on our role as a reliable military supplier.
- - Militarily, the eight planes are inconsequential in the
Middle East situation. Their flying range is limited and
logistical support of them in a combat zone over the canal would
be either difficult or impossible. Libyan pilot and mechanic
skills are limited severely in number and quality. Even with
these planes Libya would have only 18 fighters.
- - Politically, the delivery of the planes might reassure the
Libyan regime regarding our intentions toward it. Failure to
fulfill the contract would eliminate for a long time any basis
for mutual confidence that may exist. It could also provoke
retaliation by the regime against our diplomatic presence in
Libya, and, at worst, cause a break in relations with the last
[Page 4]
“radical” Arab
regime with which we have such relations. Less likely, but still
possible, would be a retaliation against the American oil
interest. Non-fulfillment would certainly confirm to the regime
its conviction that our policy toward the Arab world is negative
and toward Israel, positive.
NEA does not disagree basically with the foregoing reasoning.
However, it believes that:
- - We would encounter substantial Congressional, press and
public criticism for “arming” a government which advocates a
military solution to the Palestine problem and has been
increasingly unfriendly in its attitude toward the United
States. This criticism would be increased as a result of the
political federation of Libya with the UAR and Sudan which
Syria has now joined. H, in general, shares this estimate of
the possible Congressional reaction.
- - Israel, and its friends in the United States, would
demand still more military assistance to offset the addition
to Libya’s air force, thus adding to pressures for
escalation in military supply to the area.
- - Libya does not need the planes for its defense. Its
defense needs will be more than met by the purchase of a
substantial number of French Mirages, delivery of which
should begin soon. Critics of the F–5 transaction would make
this point. (Originally, about 104 Mirages were ordered, but
this number may be reduced to 60, according to unconfirmed
intelligence reports.)
- - Libyan preoccupation with our Middle East policy means
that there is little we can do under present circumstances
that is likely to change their attitude toward us basically.
Despite our withdrawal from Wheelus, our attempts to
maintain good relations have been basically
one-sided.
- - Deliveries of aircraft to Libya, in light of its closer
relation with the UAR, in effect are deliveries to Egypt.
Even the French are beginning to get concerned that further
moves toward federation raise serious questions regarding
Libya’s commitment that the Mirages would not fall into
third party hands and not be used in the Arab-Israel
dispute. Libya is in no position to give such an assurance
to the United States and, even if it did, it would be
meaningless.
[Page 5]
NEA’s view is shared at the staff level of the White House which
regards the possible disadvantages of fulfilling the contract as
outweighing the possible advantages of doing so.
Some consideration has been given to the possibility of delivery of
the planes to the Libyans on the condition that they transfer them
and the nine F–5s they now have to Tunisia through a bilateral
arrangement with that country after 17 Mirages had been delivered to
Libya. NEA and H do not believe this arrangement would off set the
adverse public and Congressional reaction that would be generated if
we were to go through with the deal now, or deflect increased
Israeli demands on us. Defense would have no objection in principle
to the arrangement but notes that it could not provide the funds
that might be needed to make it work. (Tunisian financial resources
are sharply limited.)
Thus, the basic question is whether the U.S. interest would be best
served by (a) informing the Department of Defense that delivery of
the F–5s to Libya is to be made on schedule, or (b) informing the
Department of Defense that the contract is not to be fulfilled. Your
approval of one of these two options is requested below.
If the decision is to deliver the aircraft, Ambassador Palmer would have to notify the
Libyan Government so that arrangements may be made by the Libyan Air
Force to receive them. If the decision is negative, the tactics and
timing of informing the Libyans would be left to Ambassador
Palmer.
Option 1
Inform the Department of Defense that delivery of the eight F–5s to
Libya is to be made on schedule pursuant to the June 1969
contract.
[Page 6]
Option 2
Inform the Department of Defense that the June 1969 contract with
Libya for eight F–5s is not to be fulfilled and the eight planes
covered by it may be disposed of elsewhere.
