47. Memorandum From Harold
Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
2
Washington, December 11, 1969
SUBJECT:
- Negotiating Instructions on Wheelus Base
I gather you told Alexis Johnson
that you wanted to clear the negotiating instructions on Wheelus.
As you know, State and Defense tried for a week to get us to break the
negotiating deadlock between them. We stood aside, and they have now
come to terms with each other.
Ambassador Johnson has sent the resulting cable
under the attached note (Tab A). I have described it in a possible
information memo to the President. He has asked for clearance by Friday,
December 12.
I have written the attached memo to the President for his information. It
does not seem to me that negotiating tactics on something like this are
a subject he should be bothered with.
On the tactics themselves, I believe we should now let State and Defense
continue to haggle this out and just go along with their compromise.
Recommendations:
- 1.
- That you acquiesce in the attached telegram (Tab A). [Kissinger wrote OK]
- 2.
- That you send the information memo at Tab B to the President if
you feel he is interested.
[Page 2]
Tab A
Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
(Johnson) to
the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)
Washington, December 11, 1969
Subject:
- Wheelus Base Negotiations
Enclosed are proposed instructions for Ambassador Palmer for the negotiations on
Wheelus Base which are scheduled to commence on Monday. Broad
outlines of this approach have been approved by Secretary Rogers, and the instructions
themselves have been discussed with DOD. I am sending a copy to Dave Packard, who may want
to make some comment to you prior to presentation of the draft to
the President. If so, he should be in touch with you this
morning.
In view of the time element, it would be helpful if these
instructions could be despatched not later than Friday
afternoon.
Enclosure
Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Libya
Washington,
undated
[Page 3]
JOINT STATE/DEFENSE MESSAGE
SUBJ:
- Wheelus Negotiations Strategy
- 1.
- General Considerations. Libyan
political situation unstable and susceptible of change in
directions we cannot anticipate on basis present
information. We wish to avoid actions which would strengthen
hand of such elements of RCC
as may be pro-UAR or to give RCC valuable political issue just prior Arab
Summit or mini-Summit to follow in Tripoli. We also wish to
avoid impression of quick submission to LARG demands for withdrawal
from agreed areas which might affect our base structure
elsewhere. We will require from LARG the conditions precedent to an orderly
withdrawal. At this point we see little possibility
resumption interim training but wish hold out possibility of
resuming WTD training on
reduced scale in post-withdrawal arrangement which would
include continuing relationship LARAF. Finally, we will be negotiating LARG demands for our
withdrawal in the context of preserving other major
interests in Libya.
- 2.
- Strategy. Initial Libyan
position will be to require from us a firm date for our
withdrawal as a condition for discussion of any other
subjects. We hope, however, at some point focus
[Page 4]
LARG attention on ongoing
utility of Wheelus to Libyan military.
- 3.
- In this context, we believe Ambassador’s opening statement
should be keyed to explaining serious problems both sides
will face in precipitous withdrawal. We desire also
emphasize fact base relationship has benefits Libya as well
which we hope will be considered in context negotiations. He
may affirm that we have begun to phase down at base (e.g.,
withdrawal of critical WRM) and that we will be continuing
this process (e.g., Harvest Eagle, Sites 4 & 6, etc.).
He should remind LARG
negotiators that present Agreement provides for one-yeare
period of notice of intent to terminate its provisions; that
this period set advisedly in light complexities of phasing
down complex installation; that assuming satisfactory
agreement can be reached and carried out on withdrawal
arrangements we undertake to complete withdrawal process
within that time frame.
- 4.
- If, as we anticipate, LARG negotiators state that this is not
acceptable, Ambassador should stress that orderly withdrawal
from base depends on full cooperation both sides including
LARG willingness to
cooperate on customs, immigration, base security,
introduction of TDY personnel and general freedom from
harassment or abuse. We desire stress insofar as possible
complexity problems to be faced. For example we will require
LARG agreement to
assume existing real estate leases in toto and to accept
responsibility for any claims arising therefrom. Without
full examination these issues we cannot be more specific
about time frame within which withdrawal would be physically
[Page 5]
possible.
Accordingly, we should insist on creation subcommittees
which would set parameters for LARG cooperation. You may suggest that it
should not take long for subcommittees to define cooperation
we require and propose that they be directed to report back
to principal negotiators within one week (or any other
agreed period). You may indicate that if their reports meet
our requirements, we would thereafter be willing to set a
planning date for our final withdrawal. In this regard, we
will not rpt not entertain
probable LARG suggestion
(made to British) that we withdraw military personnel
immediately and leave to LARG the processing of civilians, dependents
and “equipment.”
- 5.
- If LARG raises subject of
equipment on base and indicates desire for some or all
thereof, Ambassador should indicate that we are not rpt not now prepared to discuss
this subject; that important items will be required to equip
training facilities we must establish elsewhere; that there
are strict legal requirements for disposal of USG property, including
requirement to survey it in light needs other USG agencies. Surveys will
require time, without which we will be required to withdraw
all non-permanent constructions for subsequent survey and
disposal.
- 6.
- We would hope that after initial, expected rhetoric and
some bargaining on subject of specific date during first few
sessions, implications precipitous withdrawal for its
interests would become clearer to LARG. At that point we can indicate our
willingness to enter into discussions of property we will
[Page 6]
be able to
dispose of to LARG if time
is available to us to meet our own legal requirements. In
this context we should sound LARG intentions re future uses to which base
will be put by LARG. We
will then face a decision as to training and other
assistance they may wish from us and/or others. If our
decision is affirmative, we would hope to lead LARG on into examination of
relationship between USAF
presence and our ability to provide training and other
services LARG may require.
It is in this context that we should raise subject of
post-withdrawal training arrangement.
- 7.
- [text not declassified]
- 8.
- US Requirements. To maintain
maximum control of agreed areas we will require, and should
insist on, continued validity of present Agreement until all
personnel and operations thereunder have been withdrawn or
ceased. This will, for example, entail substantial
relaxation of present LARG
customs controls. More importantly from point of view of
preventing potentially serious incidents, it will entail
reversion of base security (including both gates) to
effective US contol; indeed, we should make maximum effort
to this end, even though it may mean denying entry to base
of non-official Americans (other than school children) or
exit from base of all personnel who are not on official duty
strictly defined.
- 8.
- Negotiating team DOD and
Air Force sending representatives join you in discussions
December 15. Further details will follow.
