31. Telegram 540 From the Interests Section in Algeria to the Department of State1 2

Subject:

  • Meeting With Boumediene
1.
Summary: In hour three quarter meeting with me March 27 President Boumediene praised President Nixon’s China initiative, gave us credit for progress on Viet Nam, stated belief we could do much more on Palestinian problem. He was positive on bilateral rapport, but vague on timing and circumstances any resumption relations. Action: None. End summary
2.
President Boumediene asked me see him alone at Presidency March 27. Only other present was Idriss Jazairy, Counselor to President, who served as interpreter.
3.
President Nixon’s letter of March 13 had not yet arrived Algiers, but I gave President photocopy, explaining delay in pouch, and emphasizing keen interest both President and Secretary of State in relations with Algeria. President accepted substitute, expressed pleasure [Page 2] at my visit, his first direct contact with senior American diplomat since break in relations.
4.
In opening remarks, I stressed U.S. search for new paths to peace, minimizing differences and seeking basis for friendship founded on mutual interest and respect. I emphasized no nation can change course without taking into account past obligations and national security. We would, therefore, continue our presence in Europe and Mediterranean, until there is clear progress in world security and disarmament, remaining willing at same time discuss all aspects world security problems. With Israel and African problems in mind, I stressed limitations on U.S. influence on basic policies other nations, particularly when their own vital interests involved. Finally, noting debate in U.S. on national priorities, I assured President U.S. would continue play vital role in world, emphasizing particularly, and increasingly, economic aspects.
5.
Emphasizing President Nixon’s era of negotiations and search for generation of peace, I outlined current policies with respect Viet Nam, Middle East, Soviet Union, and China. On Viet Nam, I stressed unwillingness North Viet Nam and Viet Cong genuinely to negotiate, despite substantial proof of our desire for settlement. Prisoner issue of vital importance, but we would not walk away from and depose South Vietnamese Government; we believed people of South should have opportunity genuinely to express their own will. On Middle East, U.S. had shown restraint, sought peace, recognized importance of Palestinians, but Arab response to U.S. efforts had been disappointing. Relations with Soviet Union, in anticipation of visit, were positive with SALT talks particularly significant. On China, I read President version in French of briefing on visit.
6.
On bilateral plane, I stressed growing mutual interest which balances U.S. needs for energy and with Algerian requirements for technicians, capital, and markets. Recognizing what Algeria has done in settltng claims, in upgrading Interests Section Washington and in [Page 3] moderating position toward U.S. on several issues, I stressed U.S. had also taken significant and unusual steps to facilitate economic relations; encouraging private enterprise and technicians; providing CCC credits for wheat; positive attitude on IBRD and Algeria; permitting U.S. firms bid on air defense contract; EXIMBank interest with potential beyond $800 million; and official expression of confidence in Algeria as energy source. Problems in approval natural gas deals stemmed not from lack of confidence in Algeria, but from internal questions flowing naturally from fact U.S. for first time would be importing substantial quantities LNG.
7.
Having stressed what we had done and personal interest President and Secretary, I expressed strong hope in Washington that new U.S. initiatives in international field and growing economic relations might soon provide basis for resumption normal diplomatic relations.
8.
Boumediene took topics in turn. On Viet Nam he recalled he had told visiting Americans in 1966 they were on wrong track in seeing Viet Nam as problem with Communists rather than as nationalistic struggle. At same time in contacts with NVN, he had stressed that U.S., as major power, must be given chance withdraw gracefully. Recounting Algerian experience, he said no nationalist will trust elections while troops of “imperialist” power remain in country. At same time, Algerians gave France many concessions to permit their departure. Vietnamese should determine future, although he did not see any early union between North and South.
9.
When I reiterated flexibility our response, feeling that North Viet Nam not prepared negotiate in good faith, and importance prisoner issue, he replied he had discussed prisoner issue with NVN. They cannot give way on that since it is “their only card” to bring about U.S. withdrawal both of troops and support for Thieu. Then he asked: “Would we accept any government in South Viet Nam?” I replied we had proposed internationally supervised elections and we were prepared accept any government South Vietnamese choose in such election. I reiterated our desire for genuine negotiations, such as Algerians had finally had with french.
10.
Re China, he called President Nixon’s trip “intelligent step”, welcomed by all. Algeria was “equidistant” between China, Russia and America and would remain that way. When all three can watch moon landing together, there must be understanding between them. He welcomed President’s trip to Moscow in same vein. He had no special obligation to Moscow and had told Kosygin during last visit that he (Boumediene) wished to see both U.S. and U.S.S.R. fleets leave Mediterranean.
11.
Boumediene reserved longest speech for Middle East, asking four rhetorical questions: (1) Are there Arab lands occupied?; (2) Are there or are there not Palestine people in exile?; (3) Does this situation constitute threat to peace?; (4) Is it in interest of U.S. to remain seen in Arab world as sole support of Israel? Israel has won fight and will stay so long as U.S. supports it technologically, but Arabs will not give up. U.S. with interest in energy, cannot afford ignore fact Arabs control major sources of energy. Algerian solution is Palestine in which Jews and Arabs coexist; any other solution is merely prolonged armistice. Boumediene added he still believed U.S. had potential to influence situation and would benefit substantially by doing so.
12.
Re relations, Boumediene wove bilateral concerns with continuing reference problem of Palestine and ten per cent Algerians who died during war with French. He expressed satisfaction at “operational framework” our present relations and acknowledged that when U.S. took 20 million cubic meters of Algerian gas, there would be substantial reciprocity in exports. When I expressed desire return to Washington with clear idea of how he saw circumstances for possible resumption. He replied: “Look at my position. Syria, Egypt, and Sudan broke at same time as Algeria. How can I explain it to them if I resume now?” He agreed resumption was not matter of principle, but matter of time. He agreed when I interpreted his remarks to mean that while Middle East remained important consideration, he did not exclude possibility finding wholly bilateral and economic basis for resumption once present economic projects (primarily gas) were approved. He mentioned resumption with West Germany, who had taken year to reply to Algerian overture. I told him as far as U.S. was concerned, ball in his court. We had done many exceptional things for Algeria. We foresaw advantages to both in having flags flying in respective capitals. We considered next move up to them. He asked if this meant criticism of Algerian position. I replied it was mere statement of fact. He agreed.
13.
Comment on meeting and visit in general will follow in septel.
Eagleton
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 AF. Secret; Priority. It was repeated to London, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, and Tunis. In the septel, telegram 547 from Algiers, March 29, Newsom urged the Department that “We have opportunity in Algeria for major export gain and for strong economic relationship based on our need for gas. Our recent international initiatives have improved political atmosphere. Complications and delays in approving El Paso, however, still major impediment to our success and resumption relations here. Action requested: we need find urgently possible major economic actions which can demonstrate our interest and maintain our momentum here. I suggest meeting pertinent agencies following my return.” (Ibid.) According to telegram 118270 to Djakarta, June 30, the Federal Power Commission gave its general approval of the El Paso importation of Algerian LNG on June 28. (Ibid., ORG 7 S)
  2. In a meeting with President Boumediene, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Newsom stressed U.S. initiatives in the international field as well as in U.S.-Algerian relations, and expressed the hope that diplomatic relations might soon be resumed.