Enclosed, for your information, is a copy of a memorandum dated October
24 concerning Algerian foreign policy.
Enclosure:
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State
Washington, October 24, 1969
[Page 2]
SUBJECT:
-
Boumediene’s Reorientation
of Algerian Foreign Policy: Implications for the United
States
Algerian President Houari
Boumediene made an important foreign policy address
on October 21 at a conference of Algerian chiefs of mission, His
diplomats were told that, with one exception, they would all soon be
transferred to inaugurate a new foreign policy asserting the
priority of internal over external affairs. Algeria would shun the
example of those “progressive” regimes that had played a “vanguard”
role on the international scene only to collapse for internal
reasons.
Algeria’s foreign policy priorities would henceforth be in this
order: “material, political, and ideological”. The main emphasis
would be on setting Algeria’s economic and financial house in order,
and the performance of ambassadors’ would be rated accordingly.
Boumediene said that Algerian
foreign policy would also be based on a number of key principles:
(1) independence of all foreign powers, whatever their position; (2)
stability, peace and non-interference in the Maghreb; (3) mutual
“cooperation” rather than “alms”; (4) an abhorrence of blocs,
military bases, and special preserves; (5) in the Middle East an
“escalation of armed struggle” by the Palestinians themselves -
which he stated somewhat defensively was not an “extremist” position
but simply an extension of Algeria’s own independence creed; and (6)
continued support to Vietnam and the African liberation
movements.
[Page 3]
What stands out in this speech is the emphasis on Boumediene’s personal philosophy of
concentration on internal goals. The theme had figured in earlier
Bournediene speeches but had never been fully woven into Algerian
foreign policy. Until the past year Boumediene’s attention had been preoccupied with
internal problems. With these now in hand, he is free to turn more
to foreign affairs and to lean more in that field on his own
ideas.
This is an attractive refrain, since the assertion of economic
interests can be used to justify a bettering of relations with the
U.S. In any event, the downgrading of political and ideological
concerns may signal the emergence of a more pragmatic,
technocratically-oriented Algeria.
Nowhere in the October 21 speech was the U.S. attacked. The old
self-image of a beleaguered socialist Algeria “surrounded” by
hostile pro-Western states appears to have disappeared. Even the
sharper passages in the speech relating to the Middle East seemed
designed mainly to demonstrate that Algeria had not renounced its
revolutionary heritage.
But it was probably too much to expect that Algeria would completely
forsake its old ways. On October 22, Boumediene—perhaps reacting to criticisms of his
previous mildness—corrected the record on the U.S. with respect both
to Vietnam and the Middle East. He explained that Algeria’s
criticism of the U.S. had nothing to do with purely national
interests but was directed to the international role of the U.S.,
which he described as “hostile” to just causes. In private, the
Algerians now tend to tone down this kind of language, but not yet,
it appears, for general consumption.
