Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972

130. Telegram 4147 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹ ²

Rabat, September 8, 1972, 1600Z

Subject:

• Audience With King Hassan

1. Summary: King Hassan convinced that Medbouh and Oufkir were manipulated but says he does not know by whom; is determined to cleanse military establishment; desires establish democratic rule by majority under legitimacy of monarchy; counts on elections and new parliament to promote this; looked well and reflected confidence in his ability to continue managing affairs of state. End summary.

2. At 8:00 p.m. on September 7 I was received in audience by King Hassan at the Skhirat palace. As instructed, I reiterated to King our pleasure and relief that he had sucessfully overcome shameful attempt against his life, and our deep and sympathetic concern with problems he now facing. I added that I had also been instructed to seek his personal assessment of current sitation, with particular reference to army and political parties.

3. After thanking me warmly for these sentiments, King began by saying that he was convinced that both Generals Medbouh and Oufkir had been “manipulated.” He was frank to say, however, that he had no evidence which would tell him “what name or what flag” to attach to the manipulators. When I asked King why he was so certain some outside element was behind the two unsuccessful attempts on his life, he replied that it “had to be so” because neither Medbouh nor Oufkir could have managed to run the country by themselves, lacking as they did any popular base whatsoever. They must have counted on someone outside to help them, someone who would be willing for his own profit to provide the assistance which the Medbouh-Oufkir cliques would have required in order to meet Morocco’s needs and thus maintain themselves in power. In order to avoid chaos and because of the Moroccan people’s concern for legitimacy, either General would also have had to find a member of the Alaouite dynasty to use as a puppet. “I have lots of cousins, of course, but intellectually what are they?” The Generals would have had little help King said. They must have counted on an outside element.

4. The King hoped that the “living forces” of the nation would come to understand that both attempts were not directed against the monarchy per se or “against him personally” but rather against liberty and civilization in Morocco. Had the Medbouh or Oufkir groups been successful, they would have seen to it that the political parties were put out of action permanently and rule by military junta firmly established. “No one would have been safe.”

5. The King said that he was determined to establish democracy by majority rule under the legitimacy of the monarchy. He looked to the forthcoming elections and the resultant parliament to promote this. He could not subscribe to the thesis held by Oufkir that underdeveloped countries cannot have democracy: Even if the opposition political parties should find themselves in a minority position in the parliament as a result of the elections, this would not preclude their representatives from being appointed to the government possibly even to the position of Prime Minister. The King was encouraged by the heavy registration for the elections which had taken place. The parties, he said, had ordered their members to register.

6. With regard to the army, the King said that it had to be “cleansed.” He has determined that those guilty of the events of August 16 should be punished “to the limit.” The army had to be brought under control. I remarked that we had received the impression that there was much resentment among military officers, and a negative attitude toward him personally, as a result of his sharp words to the military after August 16 and because the ammunition had been taken away from military units. The King said that the military, by their shameful behavior, had deserved the dressing down he gave them. Furthermore, it was not normal that military units should have their ammunition with them; in most countries in peacetime ammunition was kept apart from the units in special storage places.

7. The King concluded by saying that he was a “free man,” loyal but not subservient to his friends. Some people might not like this, but he was determined to pursue this course.

8. Ahmed Osman, who was the only other person present during the audience, dropped by the house afterwards to continue the discussion. When I told him that we had absolutely no indication of any foreign manipulation of either Medbouh or Oufkir, and that I really did wonder why the King seemed so certain that there was someone behind the generals, Osman merely said that the King had deduced this by the logic of the situation as he had expressed it to me.

9. Osman went on to say that there was nothing the King would like better than to be a constitutional monarch like Queen Elizabeth. “Do you think he enjoys being shot at?” If he felt there were a political structure capable of running the country, he would retire to a constitutional position at once. He might even, in such circumstances, step down from the throne and reside in Morocco as a private citizen, “as all his property is here.” However, such a political structure does not exist and must be created.

10. Osman said that in his characteristic frankness with his American friends, the King had told Assistant Secretary Newsom during his visit here last year that he expected within hours or days to announce the formation of a coalition government with opposition representatives. The King said this because he really believed that the opposition had accepted his offer of “ten ministries, including the Prime Ministry, and even an Under Secretaryship in the Ministry of the Interior.” However, when he received National Front delegates within minutes after Newsom’s departure, they told him to his stupefaction that instead of accepting what he had offered, they wanted “everything, except defense and P.T.T.” This the King could not agree to, since the National Front had not gained the right through elections to represent the whole country; thus the negotiations had failed. The King’s readiness to grant so many posts to the opposition showed his sincere desire to share power. It had been revealing that representatives of the National Front had frankly confessed to the King that they could not agree among themselves as to who among them should be the Prime Minister. Osman cautioned that what the political leaders say publicly often does not reflect what they really think.

11. Osman hoped that Morocco would be spared another of the traumatic experiences it had recently had and be given the time to work for the establishment by the King of majority-rule democracy the King so earnestly desired. It, and the King, did not deserve what had happened. I commented that the King had a serious problem of image. Osman agreed.

12. Osman said that the people favored the curbing of the military. It was feared because of the excesses it had committfd against civilians. The government had received reports of resentment among military officers similar to those I had mentioned to the King.

13. The King, Osman said, is an intellectual. He would welcome someone of his stature coming into authority so that problems could be meaningfully debated.

14. Osman concluded by saying that they counted on continuing US sympathy and help.

15. Comment: The King looked as well as I have ever seen him and seemed fully in command of himself. He was eloquent and self-assured as he discussed the situation in response to my questions.

16. I do not believe that he really thinks that there was a foreign hand in the two plots. He finds it useful to advance this thesis, which so exaggerates the importance of Morocco, to distract people from the real causes of the two attempts. His stubborn refusal to admit that any failing on his part could have been responsible for what has happened was apparent in the conversation.

17. As to how he intends to proceed over the coming weeks to assure the continuation of royal rule in Morocco, it would appear that he intends to try to lure the political parties into participating in the elections and that he may well be prepared to see the resultant parliament exercise a wider degree of authority. Meanwhile, he will purge the army in order to try to remove any further danger from that quarter. I do not think that he has any intention of abdicating, and I should imagine that if a parliament with broader powers should be established, it will have some difficulty in preventing royal encroachment upon its prerogatives.

18. I now am glad the Department instructed me to see the King. I had been reluctant to seek an audience for fear that under the lingering effects of August 16 he might say something unpalatable about our military presence. However, he was exceedingly cordial and made no reference whatsoever to our military or to any embarrassment arising from the American angle to the August 16 events. Nonetheless, the thesis he set forth with regard to the “name or flag” which was behind the plotters could obviously be applied to the United States if one wished to do so. We believe there are those in his entourage who are alleging US complicity in the August 16 attack. I reiterate my belief, however, that the King does not really think we were involved; he is using the foreign factor theory to distract attention from the regime’s and his personal failings and to keep people, including ourselves, off balance.

Rockwell

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 MOR. Secret. It was repeated to Paris, Madrid, Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, Casablanca, Tangier, USCINCEUR, and COMNAVTRACOM.
2. In this 8 page telegram, Ambassador Stuart Rockwell reported on his September 7 meeting with King Hassan. Hassan analyzed the coup attempt and described his future plans for restoring order.