The recent attempted coup in Morocco and the uncertain future facing the
regime lead me to believe that we should consider ways of reducing the
level of our military involvement and dependence on the Moroccan
communications facilities.
I am aware that some of our activities and military presence is directly
associated with the oral agreement with King Hassan in 1963 concerning base management and
telecommunications training. I believe, however, that we should make
every effort, consistent with that agreement, to shift the actual
operating functions of the RMAF base at Kenitra to Moroccans,
restricting US personnel to advisory roles. I also recognize that any
precipitous withdrawal of personnel involved in training and base
operations might adversely affect our continued use of the US Navy
communications facilities, and that, therefore, any reductions in
presence would have to be done on a gradual basis.
I would like you to examine this situation and submit recommendations to
me on ways we can reduce our involvement by turning over to the
Moroccans as many of the operations and maintenance functions as
possible at the RMAF base at Kenitra, with US personnel, if necessary,
continuing to serve as advisors. I would also like you to examine the
impact of the Fleet Satellite Communications System on our continued
need for the communications sites at Sidi Yahia and Bouknadel and the
desirability of reorienting these facilities by remote-keying (one of
the options in the 1971 JCS contingency
relocation plan), retaining the use of the Moroccan frequencies but
reducing our overall presence in Morocco, and how quickly this could be
accomplished. This evaluation should identify costs, personnel and any
anticipated degradation of capabilities. I understand the Navy has
already initiated studies and actions that could be helpful in
determining ways to reduce our dependence on the Moroccan-based
communications facilities.
I would appreciate this information and your recommendations by September
23.
Attachment
Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Laird
Washington,
undated
SUBJECT:
- US Military Involvement in Morocco
The purpose of this memorandum is to assess the situation in Morocco
following the abortive coup attempt of August 16, to examine the
level of US military involvement and to propose certain interim
actions you may wish to consider toward reorienting our military
posture there.
Political Assessment
The situatation is outwardly calm but more ominous and ominous toward
Hassan’s longevity than
after last year’s attempted coup. Few believe any longer that
required reforms are likely to be made, and the military’s loyalty
to the regime is more suspect than ever.
MOD Oukfir’s complicity and alleged
suicide, the inept (if not poorly conceived) assassination attempt
by the F–5 squadron, the King’s chastisement and usurpation of
direct control of the military and prospects of yet another purge of
the officer staff, has completely shattered the military’s morale.
The military was the main prop of the regime. Oukfir was the most
qualified leader considered capable of maintaining the military’s
cohesiveness and loyalty. His adventure against Hassan probably reflected his
growing awareness of his own pre-eminent personal authority among
the military and belief that the King could not or would not alter
the regime’s style. Oukfir was among the diminishing few who spoke
frankly to the King about the regime’s shortcomings, and their
relationship appeared to be under increasing tension in recent
months. While there is still much monarchist sentiment among the
poorer classes, Hassan’s
lavish life style, widespread official corruption, critical
unemployment, prospects of increased autocratic rule and military
disaffection are likely to accelerate the process of the regime’s
disintegration.
With the demise of Oukfir and his almost embarassingly demonstrative
pro-US attitudes and apparent desire to maintain the monarchical
structure under his own regency, the next coup attempt is more
likely to be radical
[Page 3]
and
republican in nature and not as favorably disposed to the US. The
chance of our being able to hang on to our naval communications
station under such circumstances, coupled with the new regime’s
likely propensity to look for ways to rally domestic support and
establish its Arab legitimacy, would be greatly diminished. In the
short run, however, while Hassan rules, our Ambassador believes, and we agree,
that there may be some opinion favoring our withdrawal from Kenitra
but that the King is more likely to want to retain our presence as a
gauge of our
continued support for the regime.
US Military Involvement
We have about 1350 DOD personnel
(mostly Navy and Marine) and 1500 dependents located in Morocco at
the Kenitra complex that includes the Moroccan air facility (597 US
personnel) and two outlying communications sites at Sidi Yahia and
Bouknadel (647 US personnel). The Navy communications station serves
as the master station for the area, controlling and coordinating all
ship-to-shore communications with US Naval forces operating in the
Mediterranean. We also have a 25-man MAAG, including a five-man F–5 augmentation team at the
airstrip, associated with a small grant MAP training program (about $0.8 million a year) and a
credit sales program (about $15 million a year).
Our presence in Morocco was covered by an oral understanding between
President Kennedy and King Hassan in 1963, when it was agreed
that we could continue to utilize the communications facilities in
exchange for our (i) putting Kenitra under Moroccan command, (ii)
maintaining the same level of operational expenditures ($2.1
million) and (iii) training Moroccans in base management and
telecommunications. (The sites of the US communications facilities
at Sidi Yahia and Bouknadel were not “Moroccanized.”)
This week, after the Moroccan Government’s initial indication that
the USG was suspected of complicity
in OUKFIR’s attempted coup (apparently because of the impression
that the US F–5 advisors and Navy personnel at the airstrip must
have assisted in some way), the King publicly acknowledged that the
GOM’s investigation showed no
foreign involvement. The King stated that American technicians are
in Morocco to teach Moroccans to fly and communicate, that it would
be irresponsible for him to incriminate them in the affair and that
he was satisfied with the role of the Americans. Our own
investigation shows that US personnel were ordered away from the
operational area before the F–5s went off on their first strike.
Nonetheless, US personnel at the airstrip, in the control towers and
in supervisory management roles with the Moroccan facility (e.g.
generator plant) are a risk to possible exposure or unwitting
involvement in the future.
[Page 4]
A major factor in the value of the station’s location is the 250
frequencies Morocco makes available for our use that could not be
entirely compensated for elsewhere. At its own initiative, Navy ran
a test list last year on the impact of operating without the
Moroccan frequencies. The Navy believes the need of these
frequencies will be critical under our Fleet Satellite
Communications Systems is operational (estimated FY 75/76) and may be of significant
residual importance after them. Since last year’s coup, and your
request for the development of contingency relocation plans, the
Navy has been attempting to reduce its dependence on Morocco in its
future planning. As they identified in last year’s plan, it would be
possible to reduce the number of DOD
personnel in Morocco significantly by remote-keying the Moroccan
station from another location in the Mediterranean, while retaining
use of the frequencies. Cost and degradation of capabilities are
mitigating factors that will have to be weighed again in light of
the present situation in Morocco.
Recommendations
Navy should examine immediately ways to reduce direct US involvement
and operational participation in the base management of the Moroccan
facility at Kenitra, shifting such functions to the Moroccans, with
residual US presence limited to advisory roles. This excludes the
actual sites of Navy’s communications at Sidi Yahia and Bouknadel
that are under direct Navy management and control and would be
better left that way in the current situation. Also, given the
uncertain prospects for the continuity of the regime, Navy’s future
requirements for the communications facilities should be reviewed
with a goal of reducing our dependence and presence as quickly as
practicable. I, therefore, recommend that you sign the attached
memorandum to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requesting
that such reviews be undertaken.
The Assistant Secretary (Telecommunications) concurs with this
recommendation.
Armistead I. Selden, Jr.
Acting Assistant
Secretary
