Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972

121. Telegram 4204 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹ ²

Rabat, August 19, 1971, 1605Z

Subject:

• General Oukfir on Moroccan Military Policy and US-Moroccan Relations

Ref:

• Rabat 4091

Joint Embassy/MUSLO message. SecDef for ASD/ISA. CINCEUR for ECMA

Summary: Moroccan commander Kenitra base Amekrane told MUSLO chief August 11 that MinDef Oufkir recasting GOM military policy into firm pro-US/Western anti-Soviet mold. Amekrane said Oufkir depending on MUSLO in this effort and asked he standby for imminent meeting. Seven days later, August 18, meeting took place. Oufkir told MUSLO chief and political counselor he will do all possible to promote close cooperation and coordination with USG. He said non-alignment not realistic, that GOM lining up with US, and that Morocco could serve US military interests in Mediteranean. Finally, he said he relying on MUSLO for advice and recommendations including FY 71 credit purchase. It not clear if Oufkir speaks for King, but his overture requires careful handling. Recommend correct and helpful but not enthusiastic response. End summary.

1. Reference in reftel to possible major change in requirements and policies of GOM military leadership was based on report that Lt. Col. Amekrane, Moroccan commander Kenitra base, gave to chief MUSLO on August of conversation he had had with Minister of Defense General Oufkir on August 10. Amekrane said he had been directed by Oufkir to contact chief MUSLO for purpose of determining what USG could do for Morocco. Oufkir reported to have said Morocco is anti-communist, does not want to be dependent on Soviet Union, does not want USSR to be in command of Mediterranean, and that he wanted Morocco to be integrated into Western defense. According to Amekrane, Oufkir said he wanted to play same game with us that Algeria has been playing with Soviet Union, in which Algeria has been given a lot of Soviet equipment that is being operated by Soviet military. Oufkir further reportedly stated “we are and always will be a Western country and must have stability, and in cooperation with the US develop our country.”

2. Amekrane also said Oufkir wanted MUSLO to make complete force study of his entire military organization, was cancelling all priorities of credit purchases and was postponing trip of Morrocan delegation to U.S. He quoted Oufkir as saying he would welcome American military presence in Morocco and wanted a large advisory group such as Iran has. When asked whether Oukfir had to have approval of King, Amekrane said King had charged Oufkir with development of armed forces, given him carte blanc, and delegated decision making authority to him. Chief MUSLO was advised he would be called for a meeting within 72 hours. We did not report these details at time because we waiting for confirmation, which was expected momentarily, from Oufkir himself.

3. Subsequently, after seven days wait, General Oufkir received Chief MUSLO and Embassy Political Counselor for long luncheon conversation August 18. Amekrane also present. General Oufkir made it clear GOM is undertaking complete revision of military budget and equipment priorities. And that he will do everything possible to further close cooperation and coordination with USG. Following reports his political commentary and highlights of military statements. Details of military aspects of conversation being reported separately.

4. During detailed discussion of best way to spend $15,000,000 FY 1971 credit funds, Oufkir stated regional priorities were being cancelled and that he was going to rely on MUSLO’s recommendations re allocation of funds. Oufkir stressed view that main mission of Moroccan armed forces is defensive and that objective of program should be to help provide suitable and practical material. He did not, for example, want “school for astronauts,” but rather to include where possisle material that also could be used for civic action. Here he cited helicopters with flexibility for military action and civilian assistance, e.g. search and rescue, medical evacuation, and disaster assistance. He also cited need for communication newtwork to reach all units and an alternate headquarters capability. In allusion to Skhirat, he quipped “in case they take over my etat-jajor, I’ll still have one.”

5. Stressing desire for close and friendly relations with USG, Oufkir said that in his opinion non-alignment is not a realistic policy in a world dominated by two great powers, and that despite ideas prevalent in many developing countries, he thought it necessary to be on one side or the other. Morocco, he reiterated, is very definitely on US side. He noted former US SAC bases were deteriorating and alluded to possible US need for these bases in crisis. In further statement related to Kenitra, he declared “as long as I am here you will have no worries about the bases.”

6. Oufkir said that in, his personal opinion, Morocco should be a member of only two international organizations, the UN as a member of the world community, and the OAU to facilitate relations with African states. From a Moroccan political standpoint, he regretfully added, it also necessary to remain in Arab League.

7. Saying that Morocco is a small part of the free world, Oufkir noted the need to protect its territorial integrity. We stressed Morocco’s position on the Mediterranean, and emphasized the strategic interest of this position to US. Noting statements by some people that Mediterranean should be for people of Mediterranean countries, he said that Morocco could act for Americans by assumption of part of US Navy mission. Using as an example, he read from message he had received during lunch reporting presence of Soviet naval vessels anchored off Al Hoceima. He emphasized need for patrol boats, old or new, to perform missions such as reconnaisance and communications.

8. Revising Moroccan armed forces’ past lukewarm attitude toward MUSLO, Oufkir made clear his desire for close working relationships with it, and said he would rely on MUSLO for many studies and recommendations including FY 71 credit purchases. He made numerous helpful decisions on spot (reported in septel).

9. Comment: We do not know how much Oufkir speaks for King (whom he did not mention during conversation) and how much he is free-wheeling, but his statements bear out expectation that Moroccan regime would seek to draw closer to us in aftermath July 18 attempted coup (Rabat 3815). Believe we must be very careful how we respond to this overture. While we welcome opportunity inject element of rationality into Moroccan military planning, Oufkir is not most popular man in kingdom and we obviously do not want to get in bed with him. Suggest our responses be correct and helpful, but not enthusiasitc.

Rockwell

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 MOR. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. It was also sent to SECDEF and USCINCEUR. In telegram 153823 to Rabat, August 20, the Department agreed that while Washington should be helpful, it did not want to increase the U.S. security posture or political identification with the Moroccan regime. (Ibid.)
2. The Embassy reported that Minister of Defense Oufkir had informed the Moroccan-U.S. Liaison Office that he intended to promote closer cooperation and coordination with Washington.