115. Airgram A–43 From the Department of
State to the Embassy in
Morocco1
2
Washington, June 16, 1971
SUBJECT :
REF:
-
CA-5632, November 3, 1970
Attached are three copies of the Policy Planning Paper for Morocco, as
approved by the members of the NSC
Interdepartmental Group for Africa.
The paper constitutes an official statement of US policy towards Morocco
and should be used as a guideline by all elements of the Embassy in the
preparation of policy statements, action plans and future budgetary
projections.
Enclosure
Policy Planning Paper
Washington, June
1971
MOROCCO: Policy Planning Paper
[Page 2]
[Page 3]
Introduction
Although Morocco has distinctively North African characteristics and
is a part of the “Arab” (or at any rate, Islamic world), geography
and the economics of location have given it a very strong North and
West orientation. It is a key strategic land mass at the Atlantic
end of the Mediterranean, with old cultural and commercial ties with
Spain and France.
Historically, the prime American interest in Morocco has been to keep
it and its adjacent waters free from influences that might be
detrimental to the free flow of commerce and navigation. This is
still a major concern. Since World War II, however, we have had a
more specific strategic interest in the country, reflected in the
1950’s by SAC bases and now by the Kenitra Naval Communications
Station. Over the years we have developed something resembling a
“special relationship” with the Moroccan Government. This
relationship has not only been significant in the bilateral sense,
it has helped provide on occasion a bridge of understanding and
comprehension to other Arab states.
Our commercial relations with Morocco are still relatively modest. As
the country develops, however, we would hope that the technical and
financial aid we have provided over the years, would give American
business a valuable entree.
A. U.S. Interests in Morocco
- 1.
- The United States has a significant communications facility in
the Kenitra complex that is the master communications station
for the Mediterranean area and an important link in our
world-wide communications network.
- 2.
- In Tangier, the U.S. has an important VOA relay station.
- 3.
- Because of its development efforts, Morocco is potentially a
modest market for U.S. capital goods, services, and possibly for
private investment.
- 4.
- The US strategic interest in Morocco derives from its
geographic location and NATO’s responsibility for defense of
Western Europe. While denial of military operating rights in
Morocco will not significantly restrict NATO’s ability to
[Page 4]
carry out its
mission in the Mediterranean, NATO (particularly U.S.) ability
to pass freely through the Straits of Gibraltar is essential to
the protection of the southern flank of Europe.
- 5.
- Morocco, in contrast to a substantial part of the Arab world,
maintains a cordial relationship with the United States, thus
providing the US a valuable means of contact with a significant
region.
B. U.S. 0bjectives Over the Next Five
Years
- 1.
- Continuation of cordial relations with Morocco.
- 2.
- Preservation of U.S. facilities at Kenitra and Tangier as long
as they are required.
- 3.
- Continuation of Morocco’s generally moderate stance on the
Middle East problem and receptiveness to U.S. views on matters
of mutual interest.
- 4.
- More rapid and rational economic and social development of
Morocco.
- 5.
- Continued access to Morocco by U.S. goods, services and
capital on a non-discriminatory basis.
- 6.
- Increased Western European economic and military assistance
and increased international organization economic assistance to
Morocco.
- 7.
- A preservation of Moroccan independence at least to the extent
that it not be used by a hostile power capable of effective
military action against NATO interests.
C. Morocco’s Objectives vis-à-vis the United
States
- 1.
- Use U.S. as counterweight to French presence in political and
economic/military assistance fields.
- 2.
- Maximize U.S. contribution to economic development
plans.
- 3.
- Maximize U.S. military assistance.
- 4.
- Maintain U.S. interest in Morocco, through Kenitra, to the
extent this does not become an unacceptable political (internal
and/or external) liability to the Moroccan Government.
- 5.
- Obtain U.S. support to influence the Spanish towards a
settlement on the Saharan issue.
[Page 5]
D. Recommended Courses of
Action
- 1.
- Recognize that over next five years maximum possible US
support for the Moroccan development effort best assures GOM ability and willingness to cope
with economic and social problems that are likely to grow more
critical in the late seventies.
- 2.
- Attempt to keep our use of the Kenitra communications facility
out of a quid-pro-quo context and as a part of our overall
relationship while at the same time insuring that the Moroccans
realize the value of this total relationship.
- 3.
- Continue the present 10 million dollar annual level of
military sales credits, stretched to the extent possible by
sales from excess military materiel stocks at nominal prices, at
least as long as we remain at Kenitra.
- 4.
- Increase grant military assistance for training to the former
annual level of 1.2 million dollars, at least as long as we
remain at Kenitra.
- 5.
- If we decide we desire to remain at Kenitra, assure allocation
yearly of sufficient US-owned excess foreign currency and dollar
funds to maintain and operate the base and to provide continued
training to Moroccan military personnel.
- 6.
- While leaving King Hassan and senior Moroccan officials in no doubt
about U.S. confidence in the capacity of the regime to deal with
current and future problems, put greater stress within U.S. aid
programs on help to the Moroccans to solve increasing urban
social and economic problems.
- 7.
- Continue PL–480 assistance to
Morocco in a volume related to the needs of the economy.
- 8.
- Provide development loans, as appropriate, in cooperation with
the IBRD and the Consultative
Group of western aid donors to Morocco, over the next two years
to help finance the balance of the Moroccan Five Year Economic
Development Plan.
- 9.
- Continue US technical assistance for selective high priority
development needs where the United States has a capacity for
offering superior services. In this connection, place special
emphasis on provision of French-speaking technicians.
- 10.
- Encourage Export-Import Bank and private investors to
participate in the Moroccan development effort.
- 11.
- Insure long term GOM
commitment to support the Tangier university project, so that
AID excess currency funds
may be released for endowment purposes.
- 12.
- Contingent upon improved administrative procedures, encourage
extension of Promotion Nationale to projects for slum clearance,
low-cost housing, preparatory work on tourist complexes, and
construction of a chain of national camp sites.
- 13.
- Contingent upon improved administrative procedures, examine
with Promotion Nationale possibilities for projects of
vocational training programs geared to public and private sector
employment needs.
- 14.
- Encourage and cooperate where practicable with the Peace
Corps, with foreign bilateral donors, and with international
agencies in regional vocational training and civic programs
designed to provide basic skills for the agricultural
sector.
- 15.
- Increase exchanges of persons in educational and technical
fields, with particular emphasis on identifying and cultivating
promising young people.
- 16.
- Maintain and expand discreet contacts with opposition,
student, labor, and youth groups.
- 17.
- Maintain an active information program that deals directly
with press, radio and TV.
- 18.
- Maintain cultural presentations, exhibits, English teaching,
libraries and book presentations.
- 19.
- Use the VOA regional center in
Rabat to disseminate material designed to encourage MAGHREB
cooperation.
- 20.
- Provide quality material for use by Moroccan international
broadcasts which are carried by VOA facilities for a total of 231 hours
weekly.
