Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972

111. Telegram 51970 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹ ²

Washington, March 27, 1971, 2034Z

USG REPLY TO KING HASSAN RE KENITRA

REFERENCE:

• (a) RABAT 5409 (b) RABAT 1069

1. We have examined King’s request conveyed to Robert Murphy, in latter’s capacity as special envoy of President December 1970, that USG extend additional benefits to Morocco in order to assist King and His Government in convincing Moroccan people of continued desirability US presence at Kenitra. Request has been reviewed in light of Kenitra’s continued usefulness to USG, US resource availability, and traditional US friendship for Morocco demonstrated by our long-term interest in Morocco’s security and economic development. Impending Hassan visit to US has lent certain note of urgency to this examination, but as you are aware, basic political, military and economic aspects of problem were already under review at time of Murphy’s and your audience with King in December.

2. Conclusion has been reached that USG should seek retain access to Kenitra complex as long as possible view special advantages afforded by use of Moroccan frequencies, which its retention entails, if political, both domestic and foreign, as well as economic costs do not become insurmountable. We recognize, however, that Moroccan political climate over near to mid-term future may pose problems for continued US military presence at Kenitra, however disguised or described to Moroccan public. We are also agreed that USG has long-term interest in Moroccan internal political stability and does not wish to do anything which might threaten present regime as it attempts to adjust to incipient internal political forces which have already begun to manifest themselves.

3. USG also recognizes that our presence does not rest on any contractual legal basis and may be terminated by King or GOM at any time. Hopefully, any required withdrawal would be delayed until such time as orderly arrangements had been developed elsewhere. In its own long-term interest, USG prefers avoid confrontation disruptive to our total relationship with Moroccan regime on this issue.

4. In light foregoing, which is for your background only, you are requested to seek audience with King indicating that you wish to deliver on behalf of President latter’s reply to King’s observations regarding Kenitra which were conveyed to you and to Robert Murphy last year. You should note that the President appreciates this opportunity to communicate with the King on a matter of mutual interest which, he would hope, King would agree may now be set aside so that other matters of common concern may be reviewed during King’s state visit in April.

5. In your reply to King you should make following points:

(A) Fact that His Majesty has continued to make possible US access to Kenitra has been very much appreciated by USG as evidence King’s own appreciation of importance to Morocco of effective US presence in area in which Soviet presence has significantly increased.

(B) USG, however, in past had never tied its assistance programs to Morocco to continued US access to Kenitra. Our economic aid program, amounting to $660 million through 1969, has been based on our estimate not only of Moroccan economic requirements but also on Moroccan ability to benefit from USG economic aid. Size of that program, as well as its composition, has also had to reflect availability of US economic assistance worldwide at any given time. Despite pressure on US economic assistance resources, owing to changed attitudes of American public, Congressional opinion, and unforeseen demands arising out of US commitments in Southeast Asia, Morocco had continued to be major beneficiary of US economic assistance programs. In Fiscal Year 1970 alone, they amount to approximately $26.6 million, and will be substantially greater during Fiscal Year 1971.

(c) Similarly, US military assistance program for Morocco had also been maintained at significant level despite downward pressures on military assistance budget and compelling requirements arising out of Southeast Asian problem. USG has always developed its programs for Morocco in terms of total relationship of Morocco to US as a friendly country which we wished to see endowed with a credible defense deterrent. Fact that USG had access to Kenitra was not repeat not a determining factor at any time affecting either the size or composition of USG programs for Morocco. Indeed, USG has a continuing interest in Morocco’s security and development. In future, as in past, size of program will reflect assessment by both governments of Moroccan priority requirements in military area and total resources available US and other donors to meet those requirements.

(d) President wishes King to know that subject to Congressional appropriations we will continue to assist Morocco in future because of our continued interest in Moroccan legitimate security and development needs.

(e) As regards Kenitra, if at any time His Majesty were to conclude that our presence at Kenitra posed unacceptable political liabilities we would understand and we would be prepared to discuss with His Government altering the US presence at Kenitra as appropaiate. In meantime, we hope GOM will find way of conveying full extent of substantial USG economic and military assistance to Moroccan public in order that major benefits US-Moroccan relationship has brought to Morocco may be more widely understood. Morocco is the largest African recipient of US economic and military assistance, over $726 million from 1946 to 1969.

6. At this point the King may identify what specific additional assistance projects he has in mind. If so, you should make clear financial restrictions which preclude additions to ongoing programs while indicating our willingness to reexamine possible adjustments of programs in light GOM priorities. As appropriate and if you deem it advantageous, you should be prepared to review with him our total FY 71 assistance programs (including AID assistance resources made available during FY 71) and indicating that we would hope that our economic assistance would continue to be generally of same order of magnitude in FY 72, qualified as subject to availability funds from Congress. Such review would make it necessary for you to refer to the proposed FMS credit and grant MAP for training, as well as Navy’s proposed improvements to Kenitra (paras (a) and (b) below). In deciding whether to use this info, you should weigh the advantages which may be derived by withholding info until King Hassan’s visit to Washington. We have in mind that notwithstanding our hope Kenitra discussions will be concluded before King’s arrival US and therefore not raised with President, we cannot be certain this will be the case. Consequently, if subject were raised by King with President, there may be advantages in not having conveyed this info in advance.

(a) We are planning on $15 million FMS credit in FY 71 and the same amount for FY 72. The $15 million in FY 71 will require Presidential Determination to waive Congressional ceiling, but this message constitutes White House authorization use of that figure in discussions with the King. We leave to your discretion whether it necessary clarify that the FMS credit for FY 70 is zero as a result of Congressional failure appropriate funds.

(b) Navy projects to improve the power plant and electrical distribution, construct warehouse, refurbish and improve existing housing and structures are planned. Also Navy has authorized for construction 200 new housing units for US personnel. These projects, totaling approximately $14 million, are subject to availability of excess dirhams. $8 million already approved for FY 69 and 71 and Navy seeking approval for additional $6 million in FY 72.

(c) In addition, Navy prepared expand NAVTRACOM Telecommunications School.

7. In summary, we want remain at Kenitra but hope at same time to avoid direct quid pro quo context for discussions, given difficulty of obtaining additional assistance funds for Morocco.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to USCINCEUR. Drafted on March 18 by Blake and G. Bader (DOD/ISA); cleared by PM/ISO, USIA, CIA, OSD/ISA, Navy, S/PC, AID, PM/MAS, OSD/Admin, INR, AF, JCS, S/S, and the White House; and approved by Johnson
2. In this 9 page telegram, Secretary of State Rogers notified the Embassy that the U.S. Government would seek to retain access to Kenitra as long as the political and economic costs were manageable, but it hoped to avoid a quid pro quo.