Attached is a memorandum from a member of my staff, which argues that
there will soon be increasing public evidence both of famine in the
former Biafran enclave and of failure by the Nigerian Government
adequately to deal with it. He bases his argument on the Western Report, written by a team of Public
Health doctors from the Atlanta Communicable Diseases Center. He
believes that this will lead to increasingly serious political problems
here.
I have talked to Dr. Western and his associates and find their evidence
persuasive. It indicates that 1 to 1-1/2 million people are in danger of
dying from starvation or epidemics over the next three weeks. Several
Senators and public figures have already called about the situation.
This reaction will grow. It is interesting to note that both the Right
(Bill Buckley and Congressman Lukens) and the Left (Senators Goodell,
Kennedy, et al) are united in
arguing that America is not doing its duty on this problem.
Attachment
Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council
Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs
(Kissinger)
Washington, January 20, 1970
[Page 2]
SUBJECT:
- The Nigerian Relief Crisis
I have seen your account of the noon meeting today with the President
on Nigeria. I must re-emphasize the point of your recent memorandum
to the President (attached). The President may be sitting on a
political time-bomb. Our only chance to protect him, and to save a
million or more lives, is to move decisively and urgently in
pressing the Nigerians.
The only authoritative survey of famine in
Biafra—the Western Report, done by a team of
our Public Health doctors from Atlanta—tells us that 1 to 1-1 /2
million Biafrans will be dying over the next 2–3 weeks unless there
is a massive injection of high-protein food. This means (a) 3–4
times as much food as State/AID and
the Nigerians now plan to put in, and (b) an emergency airlift into
Biafra, which both the Nigerians and State say is unnecessary. The
State/AID and Nigerian plans
were not based on a scientific on-the-spot survey of the need, but
rather estimates made outside Biafra.
Dr. Western and his colleagues (who worked in the Federal Relief Program last fall as well as in
Biafra):
—have documented in a thorough study of historical famines that all
eye-witness accounts have been seriously inaccurate in such cases in
the past. They contend that in the Nigerian case, as in every recorded famine in modern history,
initial observer reports have vastly under-estimated the magnitude
of the problem.
—conclude, with the same scientific authority, that the Nigerians
cannot conceivably cope with the starvation upon them. There is no
question of their good intentions. But they do not understand the
size and urgency of their task, and they lack the people or
equipment to deal with it.
[Page 3]
—are willing to put their professional reputations on the line in
support of their findings. They are fully backed by the Atlanta
Communicable Diseases Center.
Thus, we are in the position of knowing that the collapse of Biafra
would bring a disaster of the first magnitude unless a massive
effort were undertaken immediately. Without impressing this upon the
Federals and urging their immediate action in strong terms, we open
the President to the charge of complacency in the face of mass
deaths, after we have committed ourselves publicly to rendering all
assistance possible.
The Western Report is already known in relief circles and may well
have been leaked on the Hill. It is only a matter of time until the
storm breaks. Blame will fall unjustly but inevitably on the
President rather than on those responsible in the bureaucracy.
Nigeria is certainly important in the future of Africa. But it is
equally clear that beyond the euphoria of victory, the country will
be prey to the same powerful forces of instability and division that
have plagued it for 50 years. Gowon remains the figurehead of an
expedient compromise between elements whose clashing ambitions will
be rekindled with the end of the war. His own future is murky at
best.
Even at that, however, I am not suggesting a break with Nigeria. What
we have to do is tell them the unpalatable facts and stand clear if
they refuse to act. This may wound their pride, but it will scarcely
be the end of the U.S. position in Nigeria.
The alternative may well be to avoid ruffling feathers at the price
of large-scale human loss in the enclave and serious political
damage here.
