I am still very concerned, however, about the low-key way they are going
about a six-week-old Presidential instruction to mount a serious peace
probe. Richardson seems to have
the message from you. He has decided to deal with the delicate problem
of bringing around the Secretary by having Newsom send a memo to Sec. Rogers which Richardson will endorse on its way in.
Yet it has taken two weeks just to get a draft of that memo (bootleg copy
at Tab A). Not only does it contain AFʼs
usual distortions of fact, but also—in making a watered-down probe
subject to prior Federal acceptance—it directly contravenes the
Presidentʼs instructions to pursue an even-handed and vigorous
initiative.
I would like your authorization, though, to have a quiet session with
Richardson to: (a) bring him
in on the Norman Cousins
initiative and our follow-up, and (b) suggest the importance (both for
success [Page 2] and consistency with
the Presidentʼs wishes) of an even-handed and flexible probe. I would
still not hand him the Terms of Reference, but rather use them as
talking points” to illustrate what I understand from you to be the
Presidentʼs preferred approach. All, to be sure, with tact. As a
refresher, the Cousins documents
are at Tab B.
This action takes on greater urgency, of course, with each day of
mounting starvation (and thus greater rigidity of position) in Biafra.
(I am sending you separately a complete updating on Biafra for the
President, including an analysis of major problems we face over the next
two–three months.)
Tab A
Draft Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs (Newsom) to Secretary of State Rogers
Washington,
undated
[Page 3]
SUBJECT:
- Nigeria—Recommendations of African Interdepartmental
Group—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
Following your decision that we should undertake exploratory
soundings on the Nigerian problem before considering further steps,
Mr. Brubeck has now completed four weeks of talks in Europe and
Africa. His findings, together with other current evidence, were
reviewed on October 10 by the African Interdepartmental Group. Its
conclusions and recommendations are summarized below.
Relief
We are engaged in a follow-up of your statement of September 9 in a
last effort to impel Biafran acceptance of ICRC daylight relief flights. All evidence suggests
that the Biafrans remain determined to prevent these flights, using
the need for third-party guarantees as their ostensible reason. The
only chance we see of persuading them to agree is to make the
political cost of refusal too high. They are under considerable
external pressure to accept and, in the hope it may be decisive,
Ambassador Ferguson is
making one final USG effort in support of current ICRC negotiations with the Biafrans.
Ferguson has approached
the Biafrans with the offer of a Presidential statement that the USG
“understands and accepts” the Nigerian undertaking not to violate
the agreement for military advantage. This is as far as we can go to
meet the Biafran demand for third-party guarantees (their other
demands are probably negotiable). Ferguson has asked for a “yes or no” response,
warning that if the Biafrans reject what we consider a reasonable
agreement, the USG would feel free to make public its view on the
merits of the Biafran position. We are advising the Nigerians,
ICRC, the French and the
British of this initiative, and have requested the support of Ivory
Coast President Houphouet-Boigny (as the closest supporter of the
Biafrans). We are now awaiting the Biafran response.
[Page 4]
Political
1. Assessment of Situation
The situation remains essentially as summarized in your memorandum of
October 6 to the President. Barring a negotiated settlement, the war
could drag on indefinitely, certainly for the next six months.
Neither side seems under sufficient pressure to make the concessions
necessary for compromise. Gowon insists on acceptance of “one Nigeria” and the
beginning of “serious” negotiations before a ceasefire. Ojukwu insists on unconditional
negotiations accompanied by a ceasefire., African efforts have
generally concentrated on an all-or-nothing negotiation of the basic
issues at the summit. These efforts seem to us as well as other
observers to have suffered from inept preparation and handling. The
latest such effort at mediation, by OAU Secretary General Telli with the Emperorʼs
sponsorship, has foundered. Our information suggests Telli was
presenting different terms for negotiation to the two sides.
At the same time, there are some possibly encouraging new elements in
the situation.
(a) Both Gowon and Ojukwu have indicated their
readiness for confidential, lower-level exploratory talks, but there
has been no systematic effort to exploit this avenue as a way around
the present impasse. Yet the occasional, limited contacts that we
know of, as well as Ambassador Fergusonʼs Cross River talks and the sporadic, often
conflicting exchanges taking place now through various African third
and even fourth parties make us think that exploratory talks are
possible.
(b) Among the Africans the flurry of recent negotiating initiatives,
though ill-prepared and often at cross-purposes, shows a mounting
concern to end the war. Even the committed supporters of the two
sides are urging the need for compromise and the need for outside
support for African mediation.
(c) Although their “asking prices” are irreconcilable both sides have
enough problems and could be brought enough pressure to justify a
try at a skillful exploratory mediation. while it is not our place
to speculate on the terms of settlement, we believe a basis for
exploratory discussions exists.
[Page 5]
Outside Involvement
We continue to feel that a direct US mediating role is unwise and
that we should confine ourselves to private, diplomatic support for
African mediation efforts. We recognize, however, that as the war
drags on and public US humanitarian concern persists, our deep
commitment to a relief effort carries its own dangers of deeper
involuntary political involvement.
Several governments have raised with us the question of a US role in
the current impasse. The role envisaged has been primarily an
approach to one or the other of the Europeans involved. The Nigerian
Foreign Minister has urged us to speak to the French. Houphouet and
Nyerere have urged us to speak to the British. This kind of a US
role, which might lead to our stimulation and support of
non-American mediation would mean greater involvement. The question
is whether the situation has now altered sufficiently and the
prospects for progress increased to the point where a
behind-the-scenes effort at the request of and in support of the
Africans would be feasible and would have a chance of effective
results. We now feel on the basis of our recent discussions with
other countries that circumstances have changed and that we can and
should now undertake this type of effort. Since the only real
solution to the relief problem is peace, such a role might carry
less risk than our present, in effect open-ended commitment to
relief.
Among the non-involved Europeans (Scandinavians, Dutch, Germans,
Italians) the situation is much like ours. Their domestic political
pressures are contained by their commitment to humanitarian relief.
At the same time, they are remarkably alike in realistically
assessing the need for a compromise. If some promising mediation
were in prospect, they would probably join with the US and others in
lending what diplomatic influence they have (though none wants to
get out in front).
The key Europeans directly involved, the British and French, are
uneasy, probably looking for some avenue to compromise, but have
real interests and commitments to the two sides. Their cooperation
will depend on finding an approach that they can honorably and
gracefully support. They are beginning to realize the need to come
to some mutual understanding to end the war. Pompidou told
Ambassador Soames recently that the French would be willing to
pressure Ujukwu for a settlement if the British would do so with the
FMG. While the Soviets are also
involved, they are unlikely to cooperate and we of course would not
count on their help.
Conclusions and Recommendations
[Page 6]
We conclude that:
(a) The present international climate for negotiated settlement is
probably as favorable as can be hoped for in the foreseeable future.
Given the alternative (protracted war perpetuating the relief
problem with its attendant political dangers) an effort to exploit
the present climate for negotiations is worthwhile.
(b) What is needed, and has so far been lacking, is a systematic and
coordinated effort under African auspices with widest African and
outside support. It should begin with what is possible—a
lower-level, confidential, exploratory mediation sponsored by key
Africans on both sides (especially the Emperor and Houphouet);
should be conducted by a skilled and discreet African mediator;
should have the diplomatic support of the non-involved outsiders (US
and European); and would require some prior understanding between
the British and French as the basis for their support. It should
begin with a carefully prepared agenda starting with modest,
exploratory questions and avoiding the basic issues, should aim
initially only at getting a dialogue going.
We have considered carefully how the US might help in promoting such
an enterprise, while avoiding a direct role and direct
responsibility. Balancing our view that this is not primarily a US
concern against the possibly useful role the US can play, we have
concluded that, at least, some further exploration along these lines
is warranted.
The following recommendations are admittedly limited and may not
produce results; but we believe they provide the most useful
contribution the US can make without risk of over-involvement:
1. That we continue the pattern of intensive consultation with
interested European and African governments begun with Brubeckʼs
trip. We should express a willingness to work closely with them in
support of a promising African mediation effort, and seek to develop
further a basis of mutual trust and understanding, and a potential
consensus for concerted diplomatic support of such a mediation.
[Page 7]
2. That we explore with governments more directly involved
(particularly France, Britain, Ivory Coast and Ethiopia) the
prospects for a low-key pre-negotiation negotiation; who might be an
effective mediator; African sponsorship and scenario for such a
mediation; and how far outside governments (particularly the French
and British, but with the cooperation of ourselves and other
Europeans) might lend diplomatic support to the mediatorʼs
efforts.
3. If a suitable mediator could be agreed upon, under the auspices of
some key African governments, we and other outside governments
should be prepared, privately and confidentially, to consult with
him and support his efforts with the two sides. The US would not
assume the mediatorʼs role, would act only in consultation with
other outside governments, but would be prepared to take an active
part, with these governments, in the effort to develop and support a
negotiating initiative.
4. That before beginning this further round of explorations, we
explain our views and role to the Nigerian Government, and proceed
only to the extent that they understand our limited, indirect
participation and regard it as helpful.
