Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

77. Telegram 41598 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva¹ ²

Washington, March 18, 1969

FOR SMITH FROM THE SECRETARY

You are instructed to take the following positions in the ENDC:

1. Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). You will indicate that US supports conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban adequately verified (on site inspection). You should also make clear that the US will assist in any reasonable effort to achieve greater understanding of the verification issue involved, and in this connection you are instructed to reiterate the US seismic investigation proposal of December 5, 1968.

2. Cut-Off of Fissionable Materials. You are authorized to reiterate US support for a cut-off in production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. You should propose modified verification procedure of cut-off through acceptance by nuclear states of IAEA safeguards on declared facilities. Your presentation should retain offer transfer agreed amounts U–235 and PU to peaceful purposes, but should leave open question whether all material should come from demonstrated destruction of nuclear weapons.

3. Arms Control of the Seabeds. You are authorized to state that US favors a treaty which would ban the emplacement or fixing of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. To that end you should seek discussion of the critical factors which need to be considered in developing such an agreement. The list of critical factors to be discussed should include:

(a) What weapons should be included within the terms “weapons of mass destruction? Launching platforms and delivery vehicles?”

(b) What constitutes “emplace or fix” to the seabed?

(c) What forms of verification are necessary for such an agreement?

(d) To what areas of the seabed should the prohibition of the agreement apply?

You should not allow the prohibition to be extended to conventional weapons nor to peaceful nuclear explosive devices. You should also make clear the US cannot accept complete demilitarization of the seabed.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, DEF 18–3. Confidential; Immediate. It was repeated to USNATO, USUN, all NATO capitals, Tokyo, and Moscow. Drafted by Kranich (ACDA/IR) and Scoville (ACDA/ST); cleared in ACDA, AEC, DOD, J/PM, and the White House; and approved by Rogers.
2. Secretary of State Rogers cabled detailed instructions to Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Smith during the ENDC conference. Rogers confirmed that the U.S. supported a CTB providing the on-site inspections were sufficiently verified and to restrict production of fissionable weapons materials. Moreover, the U.S. favored a seabed arms treaty, providing a list of four questions were satisfactorily discussed.