Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

65. Memorandum From the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Smith) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹ ²

Washington, February 13, 1969

Subject: ENDC Agenda

The following items are on the agenda of the ENDC and are ranked in rough order of descending importance in terms of international interest and potentiality for serious negotiation.

Delegates are not bound in their discussions to specific agenda items but there is a clear consensus that priority is to be given “to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”. Of these, there was a consensus at the last session of the ENDC that CTB holds priority interest. Most countries of the world will consider the principal obligations stemming from the NPT as that of the present non-nuclear weapon states to forego nuclear armament in exchange for that of the US, USSR, and UK to negotiate an end to the nuclear arms race and embark on nuclear disarmament. Thus, although neither the NPT nor SALT will be specific items for negotiation in the ENDC, progress on bringing the NPT into effect and initiating bilateral US-USSR talks on limiting the nuclear arms race will be predominant factors influencing the character, content, and pace of all other efforts to control armaments and will have a direct bearing on the prospects for a CTB or cut-off agreement. The ENDC will undoubtedly wish to be periodically informed of SALT developments, and will doubtlessly continue to serve as a useful forum for promoting adherence to the NPT.

1. Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB)

Most non-nuclear nations consider the achievement of a CTB as a much needed and readily attainable component in the effort to halt the nuclear arms race and create a viable NPT. Both the US and USSR have long been on the public record as favoring a complete ban on weapons testing, but have disagreed on the conditions for verifying such a ban—whether national capabilities are adequate or on-site inspections by international agreement are required. Most of the non-aligned nations, led by Sweden, believe.that the US insistence on on-site inspections should be dropped, convinced there is little motivation for, and good prospect of, detecting by other means any Soviet cheating. Many of our allies, including the UK, share this view, but as good allies do not press the issue in deference to our asserted need for continued testing. One problem in the ENDC will be to articulate the US position in a manner which keeps the CTB prospects alive while protecting our options to continue for the present our right to test underground.

Although insistent on closing off military testing, most nations will agree to a CTB which contains provision for continued testing and use, under international supervision, of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PLOWSHARE). We, on the other hand, may wish to propose amendment to the Limited Test Ban in order to get ahead with certain PLOWSHARE experiments while awaiting resolution of the CTB problem.

2. Cut-off of Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons

In view of their smaller stockpiles of fissionable materials the Soviets have never shown interest in the US standing proposal of four years that nuclear powers halt further production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. However, most other countries are keenly interested in such a proposal, since it would not only contribute to the cessation of weapons manufacture, but would also promote safeguards on peaceful-purposes production in the Soviet Union similar to those the non-nuclears are obliged to accept under the NPT. Whether or not the Soviets are likely to take any more favorable attitude now, our continued support for this measure would give us a favorable stance in the ENDC discussions, build support for, the NPT, and maintain pressure on the USSR for eventual acceptance of international verification. Our only problem may be one of judging how hard to press the Soviets on this measure if it should prove prejudicial to dialogues on more negotiable proposals—such as seabeds.

3. Arms Control Measure for the Seabed

During the last two years the imagination of the world community has been captured by the twin notions of reserving the deep seabed for peaceful purposes and exploiting its vast resources for the common benefit of all mankind. In agreeing to reserve the seabed for peaceful purposes the US has made clear that this does not prohibit the deployment of weapons or other military equipment, as such, but only their use for purposes inconsistent with the UN Charter. Given the lengthy time anticipated for any progress on SALT and the difficulty in making early progress on a CTB, this may prove to be the only significant area in which we can take a new initiative to demonstrate our desire to halt the nuclear arms race. To date US negotiators have been authorized only to explore the feasibility of an international agreement to prohibit the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. In view of the anticipated pressures in both the ENDC and in the UN Seabeds Committee to ban all weapons and military equipment from this environment, our problem will be to propose a concrete measure which will not adversely affect our basic security interests, which will preempt more far-reaching and unacceptable measures, and which will demonstrate our willingness to extend the outer space ban on nuclear weapons to the ocean floor.

4. Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW)

There is growing interest in exploring means to curb the threat and even the capability of engaging in chemical and biological warfare. Increasingly questions are raised regarding the adequacy of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which in view of some of its ambiguities has provided a basis for increasing Communist propaganda attacks on US activities in Vietnam. This heightened attention has been manifested in the world press, and in official circles it represents the fear that CBW technology may soon offer “a poor man’s alternative” to nuclear weapons. A UN study on the effects of chemical and biological warfare, expected by mid-year, will provide impetus for far-reaching and searching analysis of the problem. The UK is in the vanguard of an effort to go beyond the Geneva Protocol in controlling chemical and biological weapons, in their belief that these agents will never be used because they are actually uncontrollable in warfare, and that generally the investment in their development and production is still so small that something can be done at this time about them, unlike chemical weapons. The problems for the US will be to weather the usual propaganda attacks on our tear gas and herbicide practices in Vietnam, but more importantly to develop a position on more, comprehensive control of biological weapons looking toward substantive negotiation later this summer.

5. Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons

World support for persistent Soviet bloc efforts over many years to ban, unconditionally, the use of nuclear weapons appears to be on the wane since the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Earlier in 1968 it looked as if many non-aligned nations would attempt to exact binding security commitments from the superpowers in exchange for their adherence to the NPT. Although both India and Israel have special security problems which they relate to the nuclear option, there has been increasing awareness since the Czech event that nuclear weapons are not the only threat to most nations’ security. Discussion of this subject in the ENDC is not expected to lead to serious consideration of a standing Soviet proposal for an international agreement. We can continue to insist that greater security for a country against nuclear threat can be gained by adhering to the NPT—which can be a first step on the long road to nuclear disarmament, rather than by “going nuclear”. We must also insist to countries that UNSC Res. 255 represents the limit to which we can go in providing any security assurances. (Our obligations—as well as those of the Soviets— are limited to those in the UN Charter and are accordingly not considered to be of substantial significance to those non-aligned nations which fear that prompt Security Council action would be impossible in the event of US-Soviet disagreement.)

6. Nuclear Free Zones

Nothing much will come of this item, except that Mexico will undoubtedly urge all nuclear powers to adhere to the Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which treaty provides for a Latin American nuclear free zone. (We have signed Protocol II but have not yet ratified; the Soviets have not signed.) There is nothing on the horizon which would indicate early African emulation of the Latin American effort; no initiatives in the Far or Middle East. Perennial Soviet bloc suggestions for a Central European nuclear free zone are not likely to be discussed seriously in the ENDC.

7. Standing Soviet Proposals

Apart from some of the above items, the Soviets can be expected to urge the following:

(a) Ban on nuclear flights beyond national boundaries (aimed at US);

(b) Restriction of missile submarine patrols (beyond limits where our Polaris can hit Soviet territory);

(c) Elimination of all foreign military bases.

These Soviet proposals will be presented largely for propaganda purposes, but the US will need to make its traditional responses.

8. Conventional Disarmament

Experience suggests that the ENDC will give no more than lip service to the need to control the flow of conventional arms, particularly to the newly emerging and underdeveloped countries. No concrete proposals are expected, and it is not likely that the Soviets will seriously discuss the problem of arms control to the Middle East in the ENDC. The US will need to continue in its efforts to generate interest in non-nuclear areas of arms control.

9. General and Complete Disarmament

A Resolution of the last UNGA calls for a “new look” at the whole questin of GCD in order to see if new approaches or greater momentum cannot be achived. Thus all countries can be expected to expound on the desirablity of general and complete disarmament and to call for new approaches and emphasis but it is unlikely there will be any new general approaches or proposals other than the partial measures covered aboved.

10. ENDC Enlargement

The may become a subject for discussion, depending on the status of US–USSR bilateral negotiations and consultations with our allies. Should the Co-Chairmen agree on a slate, agreeable in turn to our NATO and their Warsaw Pact allies, during or before the March 6 session, it would be entirely appropriate for the Co-Chairmen to seek endorsement of the ENDC before seeking approval of the UN.

Gerard C. Smith

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 319, Subject Files, Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC). Confidential.
2. Smith reviewed the issues on the agenda for the March ENDC meeting. The items included a comprehensive test ban (CTB), seabed arms control, chemical and biological warfare (CBW), prohibitions on nuclear weapons or fissionable material, nuclear free zones, conventional disarmament, general and complete disarmament, and ENDC enlargement.