Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

38. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹ ²

Washington, November 7, 1969

SUBJECT:

• The NPT and FRG Request for US Statement on NATO and Security Guarantees

In connection with their signature of the NPT, the Germans have asked us for a statement on the relationship between the NPT and our continued commitment to European security. There has been some confusion over whether the statement should be made by the Secretary at the time the FRG signs the NPT, or in a letter to Scheel in time for the Bundestag debate (November 12) or, alternatively, made by the Department’s press spokesman. As of today, the FRG has suggested the following procedure: no US statement prior to the debate; in his opening remarks on November 12, Brandt will refer generally to previous US assurances (by the last Administration) and say that he will ask the US to confirm these; depending on the developments in the debate, the FRG may ask us to have the Department spokesman confirm these prior assurances; finally, the Germans request that the Secretary make a statement at the time the FRG actually signs the treaty.

Secretary Rogers has taken with him to Florida a draft memo for the President requesting authorization for him to make a statement at the time of signature. We have no official notice of this memorandum and do not know if it will be submitted to us. I have attached a bootleg copy of the EUR memo to the Secretary enclosing the memo to the President and the proposed text of the statement (Tab A 1, 2 & 3). Do not reveal that you have this.

I have no real objection to the procedure outlined by the Germans. On the other hand, I find the text of the proposed US statement painful in the extreme (Tab A.3). It refers to the NPT with the rhetoric of the last Administration which this one, at least this part of it, has studiously avoided. It ties NPT to SALT (bottom of page 1) in ways which cannot help but raise pressures for US concessions when SALT runs into difficulties. It tells the Germans that wonderful things will happen to them as a result of their signature.

But there is nothing that it seems feasible to do at this stage, because State and ACDA have negotiated this statement with the Germans, and to change it now would reverse an entire negotiating process. This is another case, where State has proceeded without reference to the White House and now confronts us—if indeed it chooses to ask us at all—with an accomplished, and to my mind wholly distasteful fact.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 366, Subject Files, Non-Proliferation Treaty, Vol. I, April 69–March 70. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger wrote at the top of page one: “Can’t we get control of [these?] matters? How about showing Hillenbrand SALT instructions with Colorado language?” The attachments are not published.
2. In this memorandum, Sonnenfeldt discussed the FRG request for a U.S. statement on NATO and security guarantees. The FRG wanted confirmation that, should the NPT outlast NATO, the U.S. nuclear guarantee would continue to pose as a deterrent to nuclear attack. While he noted he had “no real objection” to confirming U.S. support of the German requests, Sonnenfeldt called the U.S. statement “painful in the extreme.” As the procedure applied an outdated rhetoric to the NPT and made unavoidable connections between the NPT and SALT, which would force the U.S. to make unfortunate concessions on both should SALT encounter difficulties.