Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America was signed for the United States on April 1,
1968. On June 26, 1970 the Secretary announced before the General
Assembly of the Organization of American States that the President would
submit the Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification
in the very near future. The enclosed report of the Secretary of State
and message from the President to the Senate are for the purpose of
making that submission.
Additional Protocol II calls upon nuclear-weapon States, not eligible to
sign the Treaty itself, to respect the denuclearized status of Latin
America as provided for in the Treaty, not to contribute to violation of
the Treaty, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
the Treaty parties. The United Kingdom has signed and ratified the
Protocol.
The Secretary’s report proposes a statement of understandings to be made
an integral part of United States ratification of the Protocol, similar
to the statement made by the United States at the time of signing the
Protocol. It expresses our understanding concerning territories and
territorial claims, transit and transport privileges, nonuse of nuclear
weapons, and the definition of “nuclear weapon”. The Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy
Commission concur in the proposed submission to the Senate.
Enclosure 1
Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to President
Nixon
Washington, July 16, 1970
[Page 2]
The President:
I have the honor to submit to you, with the recommendation that it be
transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification, Additional Protocol II, signed on April 1, 1968 on
behalf of the United States of America, to the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. The Treaty itself
is not open for signature to states that are located outside Latin
America, and such states are not eligible for membership in, or
bound by the decisions of, the regional organization established to
implement the Treaty.
Additional Protocol II to the Treaty is specifically designed for
adherence by nuclear-weapon states that are willing to undertake to
respect the express aims and provisions of the Treaty, not to
contribute to its violation in the territories to which it applies,
and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the states
parties to the Treaty. The United Kingdom has signed and ratified
the Protocol. The obligations which states assume upon ratification
of the Protocol derive from both the provisions of the Protocol and
the provisions of the Treaty itself.
[Page 3]
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is
the culmination of a regional effort to keep Latin America free of
nuclear weapons. A Joint Declaration on the subject was issued by
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico on April 29, 1963. This
effort was welcomed and encouraged by a resolution adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on November 27, 1963. After several
years of international negotiation, including consideration of
comments by the United States, the Treaty was opened for signature
on February 14, 1967. The United States has expressed its support
for the Treaty not only by signing Additional Protocol II, but also
in public statements made by President Johnson and Vice President Humphrey, by our
representatives in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee and
the. United Nations General Assembly, and by United States votes for
resolutions of the General Assembly in 1967 and 1968 commending the
Treaty and calling upon those eligible to sign and ratify Protocol
II to do so.
The Treaty has been signed by all Latin American states except Cuba
(whose present government has indicated that it does not intend to
sign) and Guyana (whose eligibility to sign is in dispute). It is
currently in force for 16 of these states, and a new regional
organization has been established to implement it.
[Page 4]
The basic undertakings of the Contracting Parties (defined in Article
2 as the states for which the Treaty is in force) are set forth in
Article 1. They are (a) to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the
nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction;
(b) to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories the
testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means
whatsoever of any nuclear weapons; (c) to prohibit and prevent in
their respective territories the receipt, storage, installation,
deployment and any form of possession of nuclear weapons by the
Contracting Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf, or in any
other way; and (d) to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or
authorizing directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in
the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of
any nuclear weapon.
The negotiating history of the Treaty makes it clear that these
prohibitions do not affect transit and transport privileges of
non-Contracting Parties. This fact is reflected in the statement
which accompanied United States signature of Protocol II and which,
it is proposed, should accompany our ratification thereof. In that
statement the United States “takes note of the Preparatory
Commission’s interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final
Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international
law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and
legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to grant,
or deny non-Contracting Parties, transit and transport
privileges.”
[Page 5]
The United States statement makes clear also that, as regards the
undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against the Treaty parties, this country would
have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party to the
Treaty, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be
incompatible with that Party’s corresponding obligations under
Article 1 of the Treaty.
Article 3 of the Treaty defines “territory” to include the
territorial sea, air space and any other space over which the state
exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own legislation. The
statement of the United States makes clear our understanding that
the Treaty and its protocols have no effect upon the international
status of territorial claims.
Article 4 of the Treaty defines the zone of application of the Treaty
as “the whole of the territories for which the Treaty is in force”.
The article also makes provision for a broader zone of application
within the Western Hemisphere, including international waters, upon
the fulfillment of all of a number of conditions, one of which is
United States ratification of Protocol I to the Treaty. Protocol I
calls upon states to apply the status of denuclearization in
territories for which they are internationally responsible within
the Treaty zone. The United States has not signed Protocol I, and
the United Kingdom is the only nuclear-weapon state that has to date
become a party to this Protocol.
[Page 6]
Article 5 of the Treaty defines nuclear weapons. It excludes an
instrument that may be used for the transport or propulsion of a
nuclear explosive device if it is separable from the device itself
and not an indivisible part thereof. But it includes any device
which is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled
manner and which has a group of characteristics that are appropriate
for use for warlike purposes. This definition is particularly
significant in connection with Article 18 of the Treaty, which deals
with peaceful uses of nuclear explosions. Paragraph 1 of that
article provides that the Contracting Parties may carry out
explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes, or collaborate
with third parties for the same purpose, provided they do so in accordance with the provisions of
Article 18 and the other articles of the Treaty, particularly
Articles 1 and 5. Paragraph 4 of Article 18 specifically permits the
Contracting Parties to accept the collaboration of third parties for
such purposes.
The statement which accompanied signature by the United States of
Additional Protocol II, made the following comments on the
definition of “nuclear weapon” in Article 5:
“The United States wishes to point out again the fact that the
technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful
purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making
nuclear weapons and the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear
explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of
releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the
common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy
generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore we
understand the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty
as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is
our understanding that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the
activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of
Article 18;
[Page 7]
“The United States further notes that paragraph 4 of Article 18
of the treaty permits, and that United States adherence to
Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States
with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out
explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner
consistent with our policy of not contributing to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this
connection, the United States reaffirms its willingness to make
available nuclear explosion services for peaceful purposes on a
nondiscriminatory basis under appropriate international
arrangements and to join other nuclear weapon States in a
commitment to do so.”
Subsequent to the making of this statement, the United States in fact
joined in such a commitment in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which entered into force on March 5, 1970. Accordingly, it is
proposed that when used in connection with our ratification of
Additional Protocol II the last sentence of this statement be
Updated to read as follows:
“In this connection, the United States calls attention to Article
V of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which it joined
in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that
potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear
explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states
party to that treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend
such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the
present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear
explosive devices.”
Neither the Treaty nor our adherence to Additional Protocol II would
present any bar to the use by the United States of nuclear
explosions for excavation of a new Atlantic-Pacific interoceanic
canal with the consent of the party in whose territory such
excavation took place, although it would have to be consistent with
other treaty obligations, including the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
But, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America would require certain procedures [Page 8] to be followed in connection with such a
project. These include (a) advance notification to the International
Atomic Energy Agency, containing the information specified in
paragraph 2 of Article 18, and (b) observation as provided in
paragraph 3 of that article, by representatives of the International
Atomic Energy Agency and of the new regional organization
established to implement the Treaty.
Articles 6–11 of the Treaty are not of direct interest to the United
States, since they relate to meetings of the signatories and the
organization and procedures of the regional “Agency for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America” (the Spanish
acronym for which is OPANAL). The
first meeting of this organization was held in Mexico City September
2–9, 1969, and was attended by a United States observer. Article 7
of the Treaty provides that “Only the Contracting Parties shall be
affected by its decisions.”
Articles 12–16 of the Treaty establish a control system for the
purpose of verifying compliance with the obligations entered into by
the Contracting Parties in accordance with Article 1. Article 13
requires the Contracting Parties to enter into agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of its
safeguards to their nuclear activities.’
I enclose a copy of the Treaty and Additional Protocol I, which I
suggest be transmitted to the Senate for its information in
connection with consideration of Protocol II. Also enclosed is a
copy of the statement which I propose be made an integral part of
United States ratification of Protocol II, [Page 9] I believe that ratification of Additional
Protocol Il to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty would
complement our other efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
Respectfully submitted,
Enclosure 2
Proposed Statement on U.S. Ratification of
Additional Protocol II
undated
[Page 10]
PROPOSED STATEMENT ON RATIFICATION BY THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II TO THE TREATY FOR
THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA
I
The United States understands that the Treaty and its Protocols
have no effect upon the international status of territorial
claims.
The United States takes note of the Preparatory Commission’s
interpretation of the Treaty, as set forth in the Final Act,
that, governed by the principles and rules of international law,
each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and
legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the Treaty, to
grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport
privileges.
As regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting
Parties, the United States would have to consider that an armed
attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a
nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the Contracting
Party’s corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the
Treaty.
II
The United States wishes to point out again the fact that the
technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful
purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making
nuclear weapons and the fact that nuclear weapons and nuclear
explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of
releasing nuclear [Page 11]
energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of
characteristics of large amounts of energy generated
instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore we understand
the definition contained in Article 5 of the Treaty as
necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is
our understanding that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the
activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of
Article 18.
The United States further notes that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of
the Treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol
II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with
Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions
of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent
with our policy of not contributing to the proliferation of
nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United
States calls attention to Article V of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, under which it joined in an
undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that
potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear
explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states
party to that treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend
such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the
present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear
explosive device.
III
The United States also wishes to state that, although not
required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such
territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the
geographical area defined in paragraph of Article 4 of the
Treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with
respect to the territories of Contracting Parties.
