An uneventful and successful half-year of nuclear weapons testing
suddenly, with the venting of radioactive material in Nevada on December
18, 1970, turned into a period of intensive self-examination by the
Atomic Energy Commission. The Under Secretaries Committee thus delayed
until now its recommendation to you on the testing program proposed by
AEC for the next six months, waiting
for the results of AEC’s
technical/managerial review of its testing procedures.
We are preparing an analysis of public/Congressional attitudes toward
testing in connection with our report on the high yield underground
test—CANNIKIN—now scheduled for September of this year in the Aleutians.
Our recommendations on CANNIKIN will be forthcoming shortly.
Enclosure
Report Prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee
for President Nixon
Washington, undated
Subject:
- Underground Nuclear Test Program for the Third and Fourth
Quarters of FY 1971 (EMERY III/IV)
The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission submitted to the Under
Secretaries Committee on November 25, 1970 the projected Underground
Nuclear Test Program for the Third and Fourth Quarters of FY 1971 (EMERY III/IV) for the review
required by NSDM 18. However, on December 18, an underground test
conducted at the Nevada Test Site (BANEBERRY) vented into the
atmosphere. The Commission immediately suspended all further tests,
and launched a thorough investigation of the accident. Subsequently,
the Commission decided to continue the suspension of the test
program until the causes of the BANEBERRY venting accident had been
clearly identified and appropriate corrective actions had been
initiated to reduce substantially the probability of a recurrence of
such an incident.
BANEBERRY INVESTIGATION:
The Atomic Energy Commission has now determined the causes of the
December 18 venting:
- 1.
- The unrecognized high water content of the geologic
environment surrounding the BANEBERRY device caused the
detonation to act as if it were of higher effective yield and
therefore emplaced at too shallow a depth.
- 2.
- The emplacement geometry and other geologic characteristics of
the surrounding media played a contributing, although somewhat
lesser, role in the venting.
(The enclosure on BANEBERRY contains a more detailed technical
explanation of the accident.)
After careful study of the results of the BANEBERRY investigation,
the Commission has imposed (a) a number of additional scientific and
technical requirements on the test program and procedures, and (b) a
series of additional managerial controls over test operations. New
or more stringent requirements have been or are being imposed to
insure a more thorough knowledge of the geology of each test site.
Specialized consultants are being retained in certain technical
areas to supplement or to verify the investigations and assessments
of AEC scientists and engineers.
Test review procedures are being expanded and strengthened. The
functions of the Advisory Panels, particularly the panel of
consultants on safety, are being enlarged. An investigation of the
BANEBERRY incident in more detail will continue. A major effort is
being undertaken to produce a better understanding of the complex
problems, both scientific and engineering, that are involved in the
containment of low yield tests, with special emphasis on more
conservative burial depth.
In view of the corrective measures that have been and are being
taken, the Commission believes that testing can now be resumed with
the expectation of enhanced safety. The Under Secretaries Committee
has discussed the findings of the Commission on BANEBERRY in detail
with Dr. Seaborg and members
of his staff. We are satisfied that the remedial measures already
taken and planned by AEC will permit
the resumption of testing with reasonable assurance of minimum
risk.
[Page 5]
PROPOSED TEST PROGRAM:
The Commission has reviewed the EMERY III/IV test program initially
proposed in November and has determined that the program as
originally designed is still valid and required. Because the test
program will not begin until early in the fourth quarter of FY 1971, it will not be possible to
complete the program before the end of the fiscal year. It will
therefore be necessary to carry a number of tests over into the
following quarter. All of the tests included in the EMERY III/IV
program will be subject to the tighter technical and managerial
controls now being imposed.
[text not declassified]
POSSIBLE NEGATIVE REACTION:
Although the tests included in the EMERY III/IV program do not of
themselves raise any particular domestic or international issues,
the resumption of underground testing, whatever the specifics of a
particular test program, may very well, in the wake of BANEBERRY and
the renewed international pressure for a Comprehensive Test Ban, be
met with a sharp negative reaction. Given the events of the past few
months and the increased public sensitivity both here and abroad to
continued nuclear testing, the Committee wishes to draw your
attention to three aspects of the proposed test program which may
stimulate press, public, and/or Congressional opposition.
[Page 6]
First: Although the level of activity proposed in EMERY III/IV is in
the same range as that of earlier years, the proposed program calls
for an increase (from 26 to 31) in the number of tests as well as in
the number of devices detonated (from 41 to 49) when compared to the
corresponding period of FY 1970 (see
enclosure 4).
Second: During calendar year 1969, the US detected 18 Soviet underground tests and only 13 in
calendar year 1970 (see enclosure 5), a significantly fewer number
than we carried out. (It should, however, be kept in mind that the
Soviets may have carried out additional low yield tests which we did
not identify.)
Third: The concern already expressed by some members of the
scientific community and Congress about CANNIKIN, the test of the
large yield ABM SPARTAN warhead slated for September, may be
reinforced by the concern generated by the BANEBERRY accident with
the end result being increased public opposition to both the Nevada
Test Program and the Amchitka experiment.
On the other hand, the apparent increase in the proposed Nevada Test
Program stems from the fact that the comparable test period last
fiscal year (Third and Fourth Quarters) was shortened from six to
five months by the strike of AEC
contractor personnel. In fact, if all the tests contained in the
proposed test program are carried out as planned over a six month
period, the AEC will be maintaining
roughly the same monthly level of test activity in the EMERY III/IV
program as was maintained in the Third and Fourth Quarters of FY 1970, that is, five tests per month.
However, because of the uncertainties on timing introduced by the
current suspension of testing, what the actual monthly rate of test
activity will be for EMERY III/IV cannot be precisely determined at
this time. Since a significant change in the rate of testing could
have public repercussions, we intend to keep the monthly level of
test activity under continuing review.
[Page 7]
For the mid-term, the Committee understands that the decisions taken
on the AEC budget will result in a
decrease in weapons testing in FY
1972. The cost figures for the Nevada Test Program reveal a drop
from $143.7 million in FY 1970 to
$133.6 million (estimated) in FY 1971
The downward trend is made even clearer by the still smaller amount
($119 million) requested for FY 1972.
As for CANNIKIN, the Committee is well along in its review of this
major event, and will be submitting its report to you in the near
future.
CARRY-OVER AUTHORITY:
You will note that the test program proposed under EMERY III/IV
covers two quarters rather than the single quarter covered in
previous requests. It is as such the first semi-annual program
request to be forwarded to you under the new procedure authorized by
you in September. While the test program proposals will now cover a
period of six months, we believe that the carry-over authority
granted the Atomic Energy Commission to carry out approved tests
during the quarter following the end of the original approved period
if their execution has been unavoidably delayed, should remain
unchanged. Thus tests approved in July could be carried out as late
as the following March without further approval. (In the case of
EMERY III/IV, this would mean that tests approved now could be
carried out as late as September 30 without further authorization.)
While the extension of the program period coupled with the existing
carry-over authority lengthens significantly the possible elapsed
time between the approval and the execution of a particular test, it
is believed that this stretch-out poses no serious problems. We will
in any event continue to follow the test program closely as it
proceeds.
The Under Secretaries Committee recommends that you approve EMERY
III/IV and reaffirm the existing carry-over
[Page 8]
authority procedure. To implement this
recommendation, we have enclosed the text of a Memorandum to the
Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission which you may wish to
send.
