I should emphasize that there exists among the agencies and offices
involved significant differences in viewpoint regarding the restrictions
of the Treaty and acceptable courses of action for carrying out peaceful
nuclear cratering explosions under the Treaty. Accordingly, many
statements in this report do not have the specific concurrence of all
agencies and offices involved in its preparation. The report endeavors
to present the differing views without prejudice.
The Cape Keraudren project is but one segment of a larger problem of the
need for a more clearly defined relationship between the peaceful
nuclear explosions program and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The
fundamental differences that exist within the Executive Branch will
arise again, as they have in the past, in essentially the same form when
the next Atomic Energy Commission nuclear excavation experiment is
considered.
Enclosure
Subject Report
Washington, March 22, 1969
Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project and
the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water
I. Problem:
To review the relationship of the Cape Keraudren nuclear excavation
project to the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the various options by
which we might proceed with the project. (Review requested by NSSM 25, February 20, 1969.)
II. Background:
A. Description and History of the Harbor
Project
The Commonwealth of Australia on January 22, 1969, asked the US Government to authorize USAEC participation in a study of the
economic and technical feasibility, including safety, of using
nuclear explosions to create a harbor on the northwest coast of
Australia, stated by the Sentinel Mining Company to be required by
mid-1971. The US Government responded
affirmatively on February 3, 1969. Both Governments have stated that
subsequent steps will be subject to later decision.
The concept for the project calls for the simultaneous detonation of
five 200-kiloton thermonuclear explosives. The explosions would
occur 800 feet beneath the ocean floor and would create a channel
about 6,000 feet long, 1,500 feet wide and 350 feet deep, with
200-foot high side lips. (See Appendix A - The
Australian Harbor Project.)
B. Relevant Limited Test Ban Treaty History
The Treaty’s primary purpose is to inhibit the arms race by banning
any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion in
the atmosphere, in outer space or under water. In addition, an
important purpose of the Treaty, as expressed in its preamble, is
“to put an end to the contamination of man’s environment by
radioactive substances.”
[Page 3]
The Treaty also prohibits carrying out underground “any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any
other explosion… if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be
present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose
jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.”
The Treaty was extended to include “any other nuclear explosions”
because of the difficulty of differentiating between weapons test explosions and peaceful explosions without additional
controls, e.g., on-site inspection.1
Thus, explosions for peaceful purposes are subject to the same
restrictions as nuclear weapon tests; i.e., they are permissible
only if carried out underground and if
they do not cause radioactive debris to be present beyond
territorial limits. This criterion is imprecise and has given rise
to questions of interpretation.
Since the Treaty was signed, both the US and the USSR have
made representations to the other concerning their conduct under the
Treaty. (See Appendix B - US and USSR Conduct Since the Treaty.)
III. Discussion:
It is assumed that, should the US and
Australia decide to proceed with the execution of the Keraudren
project, they
[Page 4]
would do
so in a manner consistent with their obligations under the Limited
Test Ban Treaty (in its present form or as amended).
The Treaty is regarded throughout the world as the single most
important agreement, to date, in limiting the nuclear arms race. The
Parties to the Treaty can be expected to study any proposals for
changes in the Treaty or for interpretations with utmost
seriousness.
We would, accordingly, wish to be especially careful to avoid any
situation in which reasonable charges or widespread suspicions might
arise that the US seeks to circumvent
the Treaty. Such a situation would be contrary to our interests, not
only because it would cast doubt on the integrity of US commitments, but because it would
seriously prejudice our ability to elicit cooperation from key
countries whose help we want in important activities (e.g., making
the NPT work) in the IAEA, the UN and the ENDC.
On the other hand, both the Executive and Legislative Branches have
indicated their desire to further the progress in the important
field of nuclear excavation if such progress can be reconciled in a
responsible way with our obligations under the Treaty. Relevant to
the ongoing program, but not directly pertinent to the Cape
Keraudren project, are the interests of many key developing
countries in the economic significance of Plowshare technology, the
potential benefits of which are assured to them under Article V of
the NPT.
Until the Feasibility Study is completed, it will not be possible to
determine the precise dimensions of the problem which execution of
the project would pose with respect to our obligations under the
Treaty.
The joint Feasibility Study will, among other things, include
estimates of the amounts and kinds of radioactive debris, including
induced activity, that may be expected to escape into the water and
the atmosphere, and how much of it is likely to pass beyond the
territorial limits of Australia, and in what form.
[Page 5]
Until we have the results of the Feasibility Study no international
commitment on any course of action with respect to the Treaty should
be taken. In the meantime, we can obtain a better understanding of
international attitudes—for example in our planned technical talks
with the Soviet Union on Plowshare as well as on the role of the
IAEA as the appropriate
international body to make the benefits of Plowshare available to
third countries pursuant to Article V of the NPT.
IV. Courses of Action Considered:
The courses of action set forth below should be considered in light
of the fact that, if we decide to proceed with the project, we will
be called upon at some time to justify publicly the project as being
consistent with our obligations under the Treaty.
A. Amendment
If, on the basis of the Feasibility Study estimates, it is concluded
that the project cannot be carried out without an unacceptable risk
of violation or reasonable charges of violation of the Treaty, an
amendment could be sought.
The Treaty permits amendment by a majority of the Parties (which now
total 97), including the concurrence of the US, the USSR and the
UK.
Two types of amendment could be considered. First, a general
amendment permitting, under specified conditions and procedures,
Plowshare projects that would otherwise be prohibited by the Treaty.
Second, an amendment limited just to authorizing the Cape Keraudren
explosions.
It is doubtful that either of these types of amendment could be
accomplished in time to meet the deadline (mid-1970) contemplated
for the detonation of the nuclear explosives. This deadline is
consistent with the understanding by the Australian Government of
the need by the Sentinel Mining Company to have an operating harbor
by mid-1971. However,
[Page 6]
considerations may arise which may slip this completion date.
Although the political complexities of negotiating and bringing into
force an amendment are considerable and should not be
underestimated, we should examine the deadline carefully from all
aspects when the Feasibility Study is completed before determining
that the amendment route is incompatible with the project schedule.
Pros and cons of seeking each kind of amendment are set forth in
Annex I.
B. Interpretation
Another possible approach could be based on an interpretation of the
Treaty, as for example when radioactive debris would be considered
to be present outside of a country’s territory. In his testimony
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the 1963
hearings on the Treaty, Dr. Seaborg said:
“The intent of the test ban treaty is to prohibit tests in the
atmosphere, outer space or underwater, but to permit underground
nuclear explosions.
“It is recognized that there may be venting to the atmosphere
from some of these underground explosions, and a limitation has
been set upon the delivery of radioactive debris outside the
territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or
control such explosion is conducted.
“In those cases where venting does take place, no problems are
presented if the effects are noticed solely within the United
States. The treaty would prohibit a test which resulted in a
quantity of radioactive debris delivered outside of the
country’s territorial limits in amounts sufficient to establish
that such contamination resulted from a recent test within that
country.”
This concept has a limited subjective quality since the technical
ability of various nations to detect radioactivity varies widely and
depends upon the extremes to
[Page 7]
which detection techniques are employed,
where collections are attempted, and environmental factors. In
addition, the sensitivity of detection has markedly increased in the
last six years. For example, under the most favorable conditions and
utilizing the most sensitive means, almost any amount of
radioactivity, however miniscule, can be detected. Nevertheless, in
view of the record any change from the interpretation stated during
the Treaty hearings may be difficult to justify both to the Congress
and to other countries.
It probably would be conceded that the Treaty would not be violated
if some minimal amount of radioactive debris passed across the
border of a country in which an underground nuclear explosion took
place. This leaves room for an approach involving an interpretation
of the Treaty, and there are several possibilities.
By way of illustration one could adopt an interpretation of the
Treaty that would suggest that radioactivity is “not present”, as
that term is employed in health and safety guides, and therefore
does not constitute “contamination”. Another approach, which is not
necessarily incompatible with the foregoing, would be to base the
interpretation on the practices which have occurred under the Treaty
to date. The pros and cons of these approaches to interpretation are
summarized in Annex II.
Quite apart from the type of interpretation employed, one is
confronted with the tactical question of the techniques that might
be used to establish agreement or acquiescence in an interpretation.
In the event the data developed by the Feasibility Study and the
prevailing political climate suggest that the project could not be
conducted without incurring serious allegations of a Treaty
violation, broad international acceptance of an interpretation could
be explicitly sought. This approach would have the difficulty of
being very time consuming and there would be political complexities
similar to the amendment process.
On the other hand, if the data and the political climate suggest that
the political risks were not likely
[Page 8]
to be very acute, it might be feasible for
the US to gain acceptance or
acquiescence to an interpretation short of having to canvass all of
the Treaty adherents. Selective consultation would stand the risk of
challenge from those not consulted. There is a divergence of
viewpoint as to the effectiveness of this technique.
These factors would suggest the necessity for preserving some
flexibility until the results of the Feasibility Study are
known.
C. Other Courses Considered
Consideration was also given to several other possible courses of
action. There exists a wide range of viewpoints as to their
acceptability. These other courses include:
- 1.
-
International Resolution
We might seek to have the IAEA General Conference or the UN General Assembly pass a
resolution authorizing States to conduct peaceful
nuclear explosions under designated observation and
control procedures and providing implicitly or
explicitly that the Treaty does not apply to explosions
conducted under the authority of the resolution.
- 2.
-
Project Approval
Specific approval of this project might be sought from
one of a wide spectrum of groups ranging from those most
affected (i.e., neighboring States, the UK and the USSR), to the IAEA, UN or the Treaty
signatories.
- 3.
-
Tacit International Consent to
Keraudren
The United States or Australia could inform the other
Treaty signatories, the UN, the IAEA, or the countries neighboring
Australia that we plan to proceed with the project,
convincing as many as possible of the value and peaceful
nature of the project without necessarily providing
specific rationale of its consistency with the Treaty.
We would, as necessary, invite the informed group to
observe, to co-sponsor, or to participate.
- 4.
-
International Consent to Peaceful
Nuclear Excavation.
Consent might be sought, particularly of the Original
Parties, that underground nuclear explosions that can be
established through inspection as being for a peaceful
purpose and not weapons tests as well as not
contaminating man’s environment, may be conducted.
Secretary Rusk said in NPT Hearings
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 10, 1968, in
reply to a question concerning Plowshare under the Limited Test Ban
Treaty:
“…Now, it is also contemplated that in an
excavation situation where there might be extraterritorial
fallout there would be discussions in a suitable international
body such as the IAEA in Vienna
and conceivably the Security Council. And one can imagine that
there would be consent and agreement that a particular type of
explosion for peaceful purposes might occur, despite the
limitations of the Test Ban Treaty, with the consent of
everybody who would be ready to acknowledge that it is in fact a
genuine Plowshare operation with a legitimate civilian
purpose.”
These possible courses of action would avoid the procedural delays of
amendment, and, in that sense, have a greater chance of being
accomplishable on a time scale compatible with the harbor
project.
As a legal matter, none of these, in and of itself, would alter our
obligation to conduct the Keraudren project in compliance with the
Test Ban Treaty and, consequently, each would entail the political
risks associated with suspicions that the US seeks to circumvent the Treaty. Those who consider
these courses therefore unacceptable suggest that favorable
resolutions, if obtainable, and development of a consensus on
acceptable inspection and control procedures should not be regarded
as an alternative to amendment or general acceptance interpretation,
but might be helpful in building support either for an amendment or
a favorable interpretation.
