265. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Laird to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\1 2
SUBJECT:
- Chemical Warfare Study—NSSM 157
In response to your 13 August memorandum, I have read with care the recent CW study coordinated by ACDA, which brought forth all the different options available to us in proposing a U.S. initiative at the CCD negotiations currently underway in Geneva. I am pleased to see that the study presents a comprehensive range of options, several of which can be useful in moving beyond our present CW negotiating position.
As I explained in my 12 July letter (Tab A) to the Secretary of State, my decision is in favor of option 2 which proposes a production ban on all lethal agents, including binaries, and no limitation on present stockpiles. As I see this option, it is a realistic proposal that has a good chance for acceptance at Geneva. At the same time, the proposal would not now nor in the near future affect present U.S. capabilities.
To permit formalization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff position, I have requested their comments to be submitted by 1000 hours, 16 August. On receipt, I will forward the Chairman’s memorandum to you. It appears that the JCS position will favor option 1. This option would allow binary production, modernization and improvement of CW stockpiles, and a continuing R&D program, all considered important to JCS. However, it offers very little that could help effect realistic CW restraints.
In the event that there is no production, JCS appear to be concerned primarily over the deterioration of the stockpile and the R&D program. I, too, am concerned about these matters but I believe that they can be taken care of in a treaty that has a provision for review after five or ten years as well as another provision that would serve as an escape clause. Technical measures can be undertaken within DOD [Page 2] to prolong the shelf life of chemical agents, protect our present stockpile, and modify plans for phasing out certain delivery systems employed at present. Control measures could insure a continuing R&D program.
Let me say in closing that prompt action is essential in order to table something at the CCD by early September before the possibility vanishes of doing anything meaningful in chemical warfare this year.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–66, SRG Meeting, NSSM 157, 3/5/73. Top Secret. The memorandum at Tab A is not published.↩
- Laird expressed his support for Option 2 in the NSSM 157 study calling for a treaty that prohibited the production and transfer of chemical weapons but did not limit present stockpiles.↩