240. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1 2
SUBJECT:
- Convention Banning Biological Weapons and Toxins
We are on the verge of completing an agreement at Geneva on a convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons (BW) and toxins. You will recall that the convention relies on complaint procedures rather than verification per se.
After negotiations with allies and non-aligned, our delegation and the Soviets are seeking clearance on a package of amendments (Tab B). Our delegation believes that if we and the Soviets approve the package, the prospects are good for broad acceptance at the impending UN General Assembly and signature in 1972.
The amendments are consistent with the instructions you approved on April 28 (Tab C). However, there is one political “hooker” worthy of attention: i.e., there are more references and a closer tie into chemical weapons (CW) generally. (The added references to CW are marked at Tab B.) For example, where the draft preamble (non-operative) before referred to the importance of eliminating BW and toxin weapons it now refers to the importance of eliminating chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. Where this has occurred, our delegation has added “through effective measures” to protect our position that any CW agreement would require more effective verification.
Also, earlier drafts of operative Article VIII contained only an obligation to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting CW. This article has been expanded to include (1) affirming “the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons” and (2) aiming at “reaching early agreement”. I agree with State, ACDA and DOD that this does not, in real terms, alter or enlarge our obligations.
The non-aligned have generally favored a single ban for CW and BW. The references to CW have been the price for general support of a BW ban and do not bother the Soviets who, you will recall, previously supported a single CW/BW ban. Though we would, of course, prefer to do without the added references to CW, the options are either (1) to go along with the amendments now with the aim of getting UNGA approval this fall and signature in 1972, or (2) to carry negotiations over into next year after having pushed a BW ban this year and with no assurance that we will be in a better position next year.
[Page 2]The ACDA draft cable at Tab A in effect accepts the amendments and two minor changes by the Soviets (see below) and authorizes NATO consultations this Wednesday or Thursday (September 22 or 23). It has been cleared by ACDA (Farley), State/PM, and OSD (Eagleburger). JCS concerns have been met except on one main point. The JCS consider that the addition of the words “chemical and” in preambular paragraph 1 tends to change the entire thrust of the BW convention and may not be entirely consistent with NSDM 35’s statement that BW and CW are to be treated separately: “…. convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and their elimination through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
We also prefer the earlier draft’s references to only “bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons” in this paragraph, but believe the ACDA/State/ OSD position should be approved, particularly when the platitudinous preambular paragraph does not alter our real obligations. The cable at Tab A states that we prefer the earlier language, but not at the price of holding up agreement on a treaty this year.
This should be decided upon as soon as possible since we should notify our NATO allies on Monday (September 20) for consultations on Wednesday or Thursday before responding at Geneva. Geneva is getting ready to pack up this session and the Soviet delegation has informed us that the USSR accepts the amendments with only two minor changes. The UK has also responded that it is ready to co-sponsor the treaty, as may Canada and the Dutch.
Hal Sonnenfeldt and Dick Kennedy concur.
Recommendation:
That you approve my clearing the attached instructions (Tab A) approving the amendments.
APPROVE [HK initialed] DISAPPROVE
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger wrote “Approved H” on page one and initialed the “Approve” option on page two. At Tab A are the instructions transmitted in Document 241. At Tab B is Document 225. The attachment at Tab B is not published.↩
- Guhin briefed Kissinger on changes in the draft Biological Weapons Convention, most notably the shift from eliminating biological and toxic weapons to chemical and bacteriological ones and the separation of the bans on chemical and biological weaponry. Kissinger approved the changes.↩