228. Telegram 78171 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva1 2
Subj: CCD Consultations With UK on Convention
Ref: State 76399
1. On May 4, UK Minister Millard and UK Emb Off Hiddleton called on ACDA Deputy Director Farley to discuss proposed US response to Soviet March 30 draft [Page 2] BW convention.
2. Millard said London appreciated US offer to add additional para (reftel) to our instructions in order to accommodate UK viewpoint. However, London continued to think that BW convention should include complaints procedure in case of BW use. In response to question from Farley, Millard said that British did not now have specific language which they were prepared to put forward to cover point. Millard noted that Article III, para 1, from earlier UK draft was what British had in mind but he did not disagree when it was pointed out to him that UK Rep Lord Lothian in Geneva had stated in CCD plenary speech that original UK Article III language might not be negotiable because of role assigned to SYG and that UK Del would not insist on this feature of article. Middleton explained that London had been working on an alternative formula but none had been approved.
3. Farley pointed out that a complaints procedure provision about use of BW would involve important substantive issues which would warrant careful study, e.g., relationship to Geneva Protocol. He suggested that we continue work on this problem with the UK to see whether we could devise a mutually acceptable formula for possible use with Sovs at later stage of negotiations. He pointed out that additional para to US instruction reftel would make clear to Sovs that we might wish to return to this point, but it did not press Sovs for yes or no answer at first stage of negotiations. We saw clear advantage to this approach in light of Soviet hostility to any references to BW use or to complaints procedure involving any entity except UN Security Council. We thought only chance of achieving some provision would be at later stage if Non-aligned dels pressed for it.
4. Millard said London had also wondered whether we might simply provide Sovs with comments on their March 30 draft without giving Sovs proposed draft text to which ourcomments were keyed. Farley said we thought such [Page 3] approach to Sovs would not move negotiations forward. He believed that a draft text was highly desirable in that it would clearly indicate language we would be prepared to accept in first agreed draft. It would also give us much firmer control over subsequent course of negotiations. ACDA Off added that UK would in no sense be “abandoning” its position in favor of complaints procedure on use through such an approach since new para (reftel) would allow us both to return to subject at later stage.
5. Farley said we believed that tabling of Soviet March 30 draft, which accepted basic UK and US approach to CW and BW negotiations should be recognized as a important new development. He felt it was in interest of all of us who want to make a success of UK proposal for a convention prohibiting production of BW to nail down major Soviet concession through prompt negotiation of a first agreed draft with the USSR.
6. Millard said he would of course report our views to London. He thought it might be helpful if he could report in addition that US would be prepared to strengthen the new para (reftel) that we proposed to add to our instructions, so that US would appear more in support of UK objective. After further discussion, Millard and Farley agreed ad referendum to modified version of this paragraph set forth below.
7. Begin text. We believe there may also be support in the CCD for including in the convention a complaints procedure in case of use of BW similar to that contained in the UK draft convention. We supported Article III, paragraph 1 of that convention on this point. The UK Delegation may, we understand, wish to provide the soviet delegation with illustrative clauses. We would urge the USSR to give serous thought to these ideas, so that at a subsequent stage we can be in a position to consider this matter further. We would hope that generally acceptable provisions could be worked out. End text.
[Page 4]8. On morning of May 5, after clearance with other interested US officials, ACDA Off confirmed to Middleton that new text of additional para was acceptable.
9. Afternoon May 5, Middleton called ACDA Off to convey following instructions from London. London had completed consideration of points discussed during our consultations of past week. UK appreciated closeness of these consultations. In view of importance London attached to inclusion of complaints procedure in case of use in BW convention, London believed it would be best, at present stage, for US and UK to give up idea of joint approach to Sovs and instead pursue separate, but mutually reinforcing, approaches. UK would support points in US guidance and hoped that we would retain new para (above) regarding UK desire for complaints procedure. London anticipated that UK Del would wish to give Sovs number of comments on USSR March 30 text, drawing attention to points in early UK draft that London considered worthwhile, but would not provide Sovs with new alternative text.
10. Middleton concluded that US is now clear to go ahead and circulate US proposed response to Sovs to our other allies. UK Del at Geneva will be preparing comments for presentation to Sovs which UK may also wish to provide to NATO dels.
11. ACDA Off expressed our appreciation for prompt UK response. He said he believed US would include strengthened para covering UK point.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 2]. Confidential. It was repeated to London, USNATO, USUN, and USDel SALT IV. Drafted by McCormack and Neidle (ACDA/IR); paragraphs 7 and 8 were cleared in OSD/ISA, ACDA/GC, PM/DCA, IO/UNP, and L/PM, and, in substance, in the White House; and approved by Farley (ACDA). The proposed text in paragraph 7 was added to the text of Document 226 [4/28 telegram 72644] and sent as telegram 71873 to all NATO capitals on May 6, 1971. (Ibid., Box 312, Subject Files, Chemical, Biological Warfare (Toxins, etc.), Vol. IV [Part 2])↩
- The telegram reported on changes to the U.S. draft Biological Weapons Convention resulting from a May 4 meeting with British Minister Millard and Embassy Officer Middleton.↩