197. Memorandum From Michael
Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
2
Washington, June 25, 1970
SUBJECT
- Updating on Geneva Protocol and the Senate, Plus Some
Considerations for Timing of Submission
1. Updating
On June 12, Senator Fulbright
wrote Secretary Rogers (Tab
A) requesting word on the Administration’s intentions with regard to
submission of the 1925 Geneva Protocol because of the Committee’s desire
to arrange its schedule for the remainder of the session.
He mentions reports of differences within the Executive over tear gas and
herbicides, and states that his views Con the subject were set forth in
a letter to the President on February 19 (Tab B).
On June 16, Senator Kennedy
charged the Administration for failure to submit the Protocol in
spite of its support for a UN resolution,
approved unanimously at the last session, which “invites all States
which have not done so to accede to or ratify the Protocol in the course
of 1970”.
He views the Protocol as an opportunity to review the whole range of
CBW issues including (a) whether our
CW policy has gone far enough in
light of our nuclear capability, and (b) the conflicting interpretations
over tear gas and herbicides and our use of these weapons in
Vietnam.
On June 17, Senator Young (D-Ohio) charged the
Administration for failure to submit the Protocol and censured the use
of defoliants in Vietnam.
Congressmen Zablocki and Fraser (House Foreign Affairs
Committee) urged that the Protocol be submitted to the Senate in time
for hearings this session. Both expressed opposition to a reservation on
tear gas and herbicides.
II. Considerations for Timing of Submission
We recognize that Senate hearings on the Protocol (1) could be
troublesome on the tear gas and, particularly, the herbicides and
anti-crop issues, and (2) could highlight the issue during the UN General Assembly this fall which, in
turn, might lead some state(s) to push for an advisory opinion by the
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International Court of
Justice or for some resolution against the US position. On the other hand, in light of the UN resolution (80–3–36) against our position
last fall, those states against our understanding might either consider
another resolution redundant or prefer to wait until the US has ratified the Protocol in one form or
another.
We believe that the Protocol should be forwarded to the Senate this
summer before the UN General Assembly
convenes in mid-September. Ambassador Yost has cabled Secretary
Rogers (Tab C): “If we have
failed to move by the time GA convenes this matter could become quite
embarrassing particularly since main focus of disarmament debate this
year is likely to be CBW and
seabeds.”
Ambassador Yost hopes it will be
submitted in the “very near future” and will “feel no embarrassment in
defending” our understanding on tear gas.
Assuming that the Protocol will be forwarded before the UN convenes, there remain two options.
Option 1. Forward the Protocol to the Senate
as soon as possible (e.g., mid- or late-July) which would very likely
mean some hearings this session.
Option 2. Forward the Protocol to the Senate
too late for hearings this session (e.g., very late August).
Option 2 has an advantage in avoiding possibly embarrassing hearings now.
However, it would be difficult to delay this long since our position,
whenever submitted, will not differ materially from that which the
Senate expects.
You have our proposed memorandum for the President outlining the issues
yet to be resolved preparatory to submission of the Protocol. As soon as
these decisions are reached, a memorandum on timing will be forwarded
with a scenario of consultations and approach to the Senate.
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Tab A
Letter From Senator Fulbright to Secretary of State
Rogers
Washington, June 12, 1970
Dear Mr. Secretary,
I would like to know the nature of the Administration’s present
intentions with regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925.
On November 25, 1969 the President announced his intention to
resubmit the Protocol to the Senate for its advice and consent. He
has not yet done so, of course, nor has there been any further
indication either from the State Department or the White House,
regarding the administration’s plans.
Since November 25, 1969 there have been continuing reports of
differences within the Executive branch over the interpretation of
the Protocol as regards tear gas and herbicides. It would be useful
to know whether these points have now been resolved so that the
Protocol might be submitted to the Senate.
My own interest in the Protocol and my view on its interpretation
were expressed in a letter which I sent the President on February
19, 1970. Apart from a pro forma acknowledgement signed by Mr.
William E. Timmons of
the White House staff, I have had no response to my letter.
In view of the foregoing, because of the Committee’s desire to
arrange its schedule for the remainder of the session, I would
appreciate an early reply from you concerning the Protocol.
Sincerely yours
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Tab B
Letter From Senator Fulbright to President Nixon
Washington, February 19, 1970
Dear Mr. President:
I feel that I should communicate to you at this time my personal
concerns regarding the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925
which you decided last November to submit to the Senate. I certainly
welcomed that decision just as I did your more recent one regarding
toxins. At the same time I am increasingly troubled by a question
which I suspect has also occasioned considerable debate within the
Executive Branch. Although you yourself have not spoken on the
question, I take it there are those who believe we must reserve the
right to initiate the use in war of certain chemical weapons, namely
harassing gases and herbicides. It troubles me that the United
States should take the view, and should be attempting to persuade
other nations, that these chemicals are not within the scope of the
Geneva Protocol. I believe if our position were different, there
would be every reason to believe that we could achieve total, or
near total, unanimity among all nations as to just what the Protocol
prohibits.
Surely it is strongly in our long-term interest to reinforce the
existing understandings and restraints which now discourage nations
from devoting their efforts to the acquisition of chemical and
biological weapons and which act as a restraint against the use of
such weapons. If the rest of the world can be brought to accept a
broad and uniform interpretation of the Protocol, why should we seek
to make it otherwise?
It can be said, of course, that because we are using harassing gas
and herbicides in Vietnam, we can not give them up. I believe that
this issue must be decided in the broader context of a conflict
between highly questionable short-term interest and an important
long-term one. Our overriding interest is to discourage the
acquisition and
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use of
chemical and biological weapons so as to keep this relatively
unexploited dimension of military technology from developing
further. In this regard, I noted with interest a recent statement of
the United States representative on the UN Secretary General’s study of chemical and biological
weapons, Dr. Ivan Bennett, Jr., who is also the
Chairman of your Science Advisory Committee’s panel on chemical and
biological weapons. Dr. Bennett recently told a
House subcommittee that, “… most individuals with whom I have had
any opportunity to discuss this who are in any way connected with
it, deeply regret the fact that we ever initiated the use of tear
gas in Vietnam. I think that we did it with good intentions; but I
think that what is going on now is deeply regretted by all decent
people.”
I have not completed my study of the issues presented by the Geneva
Protocol and will not do so until the treaty is submitted to the
Senate and the Foreign Relations Committee has held hearings on it.
However, I believe that even before the Protocol is submitted we
should seek an approach that will allow us to achieve a uniform
interpretation of the Protocol and, in years ahead, to discourage
the employment of all forms of chemical warfare. One way in which we
might do this would be to note the existence of certain ambiguities
in the Protocol and to reaffirm that we have not previously regarded
tear gas and herbicides as coming under its scope. However, at the
same time we would announce that upon becoming a party to the
Protocol we would agree to extend our interpretation of the scope of
the Protocol to include these substances. We could explain that this
action was being taken in good faith in an effort to achieve the
broadest possible agreement on the meaning of this important
international agreement.
Sincerely yours,
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Tab C
Telegram 1293 From the Mission to the United Nations to
the Department of State
New York, June 23, 1970,
2233Z
Subject:
I have noted recent telegrams from our CCD
del in Geneva reporting statements
by Sovs and Japanese reps concerning
ratification of Geneva Protocol on CBW.
Having in mind the President’s statement on this subject last
November which we announced with some fanfare to the GA Political
Committee during disarmament debate, we may be sure that other dels
will privately and publicly before and during next GA remind us of
our announced intention to seek Senate consent to ratification at an
early date. If we have failed to move by the time GA convenes in mid
September, this matter could become quite embarrassing particularly
since main focus of disarmament debate this year is likely to be
CBW and seabeds. I should
therefore very much hope that we might in the very near future again
request Senate consent to ratification. I should moreover feel no
embarrassment in defending an interpretation of the protocol which
would maintain that it does not apply to tear gas.
