126. Telegram 167972 From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva 1 2

SUBJECT:

  • Seabeds Treaty

REF:

  • GENEVA’s 3531.

You should seek meeting with Soviet Co-Chairman to make following presentation:

1.
We appreciate prompt Soviet response to proposals made by us on September 15 and we share objective of tabling Co-Chairmen draft treaty to CCD at earliest possible moment. Subject to concurrence by our allies and final Co-Chairmen agreement on remaining differences we would hope to table such draft on October 7. We also appreciate that Soviet side does not object to our understanding of Articles I and III (paragraphs 1–D and E reftel)
2.
Our proposal presented to Soviet Co-Chairman Sept. 15 was designed to assure equitable balance of obligations and we continue to believe that any effective and durable arms control measure must reflect this key provision of 1961 Joint Statement of Principles.
3.
We believe formulation suggested by Soviet Co-Chairman on Oct 2 for paragraph 1 of Art II is ambiguous in its reference to “outer limit” to mention baselines. Having in mind the provision of paragraph 2 of this article (on which we believe there already is agreement) we would suggest formulation as follows: “For the purpose of this Treaty the outer limit of the contiguous Zone referred to in Article I shall be measured from baselines drawn as specified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and in accordance with international law.” The formulation is designed [Page 3] to facilitate international agreement on a significant arms control measure which would be responsive to Article VI of the NPT, but which would not prejudice the existing rights or claims of potential parties to a seabeds treaty with respect to waters whose juridical status in international law is in dispute.
4.
As Soviet Government is aware, US does not accept claims asserted by Soviet spokesmen or writers in past regarding marginal waters off Soviet coasts. Thus we are adopting the provisions of the Geneva Convention as the basis for drawing baselines for the purposes of this treaty, with the understanding that, where there is any question as to how that Convention should be applied or as to situations that are not clearly covered by that Convention, including disputed waters of any description such as waters claimed on the basis of so-called “historic title” or under an archipelago theory of baselines, the baselines shall be drawn in accordance with international law. We use baselines drawn in this manner to determine the area in which the treaty applies, and to govern our behavior under the treaty. If other [Page 4] parties act inconsistently with the treaty as so understood and consultations between the parties concerned are unavailing, US might have to go to so far as recourse to withdrawal from the treaty.
5.
We have carefully noted Co-Chairman statement that Soviet government does not contemplate making statement that USSR would not violate purposes of treaty to seabed underlying disputed waters. US Government believes that it would be better if no statements are made affecting the seabeds with respect, to disputed waters, because such statements would require counter-statements.
6.
Regarding Soviet objection to our omission of preambular reference to further negotiations on complete demilitarization of seabed, you should say US does not envision negotiating such an agreement except in context of GCD. You authorized accept Oct 2 suggestion of Co-Chairman (para C Geneva 3531) on additional preambular paragraph covering this point or to suggest combining it with third para of US Sept. 15 proposal as follows: [Page 5]

“Convinced that this treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race, pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end.”

7.
US prefers not to delete para 2 of Art I in US draft since it clarifies ambiguity in earlier US and Soviet drafts. US, however, prepared to table Co-Chairmen draft without this provision to expedite tabling and consideration of treaty draft by other CCD members, with understanding that this or some similar provision can be reintroduced, if desirable, during later stages of negotiations.
8.
Regarding point raised informally in paragraph 3 of 3329, you may say, if it is raised again, that emplacement or emplanting of nuclear mines on seabed would be prohibited.
9.
After making above presentation you should inform Western Five plus Japan of presentation and, in your discretion, initial Soviet reaction. You should inform allies that we believe [Page 6] our position is consistent with that we believe represents interests of our allies and assume that if Soviets agree to table seabeds treaty on basis of our compromise suggestions, there will be no objection. We plan NAC consultation on Oct. 6 and would appreciate expression Japanese views through Japanese CCD del.
10.
FOR USNATO: You should circulate letter on Oct. 3 drawing on above and Geneva reftel for your presentation. You should also propose special NAC meeting on Oct. 6 at which time we would like “green light” to table draft at CCD if Soviets agree to our proposal for resolving remaining difference over formulation of para 1 of Art II. You should say we have had difficulty reaching decision over problem presented by claims of various states, including USSR, to marginal waters which US regards as high seas. We believe that formulation suggested by us is most consistent with disclaimer clause (para 2 of Art II) and therefore should be acceptable to our allies. [Page 7] Per para 7 above, although we prefer retain Art 1, para 2 in order provide explicit coverage of points discussed paras 1–F and 2 reftel, we prepared accept deletion this paragraph with understanding these points implicitly covered under Art I, and under proviso Soviets prepared be receptive suggestions for meeting these points if others wish pursue matter in CCD.
11.
We regret necessity for requesting special NAC meeting to deal with draft seabeds treaty but believe it desirable to table draft as soon as possible to permit next stage of negotiation to start within CCD which has been standing by almost one month beyond normal adjournment time in anticipation of Co-Chairmen agreement.
12.
FOR TOKYO: You should fill in Fonoff soonest on above and say we hope GOJ will not object to our tabling draft treaty at CCD if Co-Chairmen agreement reached.
12.
NATO CAPITALS: You should draw on above in explaining US position to appropriate Fonoff officials to facilitate their instructing NATO dels for October 6 special NAC.
Richardson
  1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–5. Secret; Limdis. Also sent to USNATO and Tokyo. It was repeated to USUN, Moscow, and all NATO capitals. Drafted by Gleysteen (ACDA/IR) and Hancock (ACDA/GC); cleared by Sonnenfeldt and, in draft, in PM, H, AEC, IO, EUR, L, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Smith.
  2. The telegram instructed Leonard to seek a meeting with Soviet Representative Roshchin. At the proposed meeting, Leonard was to present a detailed response addressing each issue articulated by the Soviets with regards to the seabeds treaty.