Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–2, Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969–1972

119. Telegram 4138 From the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Department of State¹ ²

Brussels, September 15, 1969, 1845Z.

Subject:

• Seabeds

Ref:

• USNATO 4128

1. Summary: Extensive discussion in September 15 a.m. NAC resulted in approval for US to proceed immedately discuss with Soviet Co-Chairman US draft treaty on seabeds arms control. Italy and France merely stated no objections. Several PermReps made detailed comments; others were without specific instructions. Exchange highlighted number of specific points which our allies wish us to take into account. End summary.

2. Grewe (FRG), citing President’s assurances in Brussels welcomed consultation in NAC. With respect to Soviet draft, on which we had instructions, he indicated it posed no specific security problems to FRG as long as it was clear it would not affect operations of nuclear submarines. With respect to US draft, on which his instructions were only preliminary, he indicated that right of verification ought to be capable of being exercised jointly, through an international organization (presumably such as NATO). On the administrative articles, he made strong plea to delete reference to states parties possessing nuclear weapons in both places in Article 4, on the grounds that otherwise nuclear weapon states would be given premium of veto and becoming a nuclear state might hence become more desirable. He pointed out that US seabeds draft covered weapons addition to nuclear weapons and disadvantage to non-nuclear states inherent in NPT should not be extended. On accession he made standard plea for Vienna formula and stressed that nothing should be done “unnecessarily” to jeopardize FRG position, particularly in light of fact that 24th UNGA would shortly be considering results of 1969 Vienna Treaty Conference. He added that in the event all states formula was used, FRG would insist on formal disclaimer statement on accession by unrecognized regimes. Grewe concluded FRG believed seabeds treaty should have three depositary governments, like NPT.

3. Compbell (Canada) warmly welcomed US–USSR progress and said he was prepared to give “green light” to further US-Soviet talks. He hoped that US would keep interests of allies in mind in Geneva. On procedure, he suggested that, in event Co-Chairman or CCD not reach agreement in Geneva, the draft treaties and CCD-approved revisions be attached to CCD report to 24th UNGA. This would, he said, avoid appearances of CCD rubber stamp and preclude less responsible amendments in UNGA. With reference to comment in Ellsworth Sept. 12 letter (para 2 (1) of State 154165) that Moscow might wish demonstrate support for NPT he said illusory to think non-aligneds would regard this as true and he urged US to stress to Soviets importance Soviet ratification of NPT and beginning of SALT talks. Campbell then offered following specific comments. It might be necessary to modify preambular para 3 to obtain non-aligned support and he offered new text (see septel). He welcomed broadening of prohibition and wider zone in Article 1 (1) even though neither went as far as advocated by canada. he preferred US way of treating maritime zones to that of USSR. He asked whether Article 1 covered nuclear tests (as distinguished from explosions) beneath seabeds and wondered whether this might be covered under 1963 LTB. He said Article 2 (1) was unacceptable to Canada because it would make subject to the treaty prohibition areas now regarded as internal matters.

Moreover, he said Article 2 (1) was incompatible with international law and the Geneva Convention on territorial seas, inasmuch as it incorporated only some of the provisions of the convention but left out others of equal importance or validity. (He referred specifically to paras. 4, 5, and 7 (6). while there might be some disagreement as to the application of these provisions there was no suggestion that these would not have legal force or effect, especially since they incorporated principles enunciated by ICF in the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case. Campbell continued, without elaboration, that Article 2 (2) was not consistent with Article 2 (1). He said that Canada’s views on Article 3 were well known and indicated awareness that Article 3 (2) was gesture towards countries such as Canada. He wanted further information on Soviet and US reasoning leading to deletion of provision on review conference. He said some provision for review was essential.

4. De Ferrariis (Italy) said there had not been enough time to study latest US Text. He expected further consultation in NAC, even though he had no specific remarks on the US text, De Ferrariis mentioned without further explanation, preamble, review conference, Article 3, nuclear power veto on amendments and Articles 5, 6 and 7 as needing further discussion and not fully satisfying Italian interests. He said he could not approve US draft at this juncture and could not give general sign of approval because Italy could not approve certain points of substance.

5. Boon (Netherlands) distinguished between procedural and substantive “green light” and said he was in position to give former. It would not be a good idea, according to Boon, to get NAC fixed on a specific text; some room for concessions should remain and at this stage there would be a distinct virtue in having US go forward with text which was not approved in every detail by NAC. The Netherlands would still like to see mention in imperative part of text of (a) further disarmament measures, (b) a provision for review conference and (c) a more specific verification procedure, such as proposed by Canada. Netherlands also had views similar to those of FRG about nuclear power veto on agreements. Boon specifically said that Netherlands could agree to Article 1 as long as it was clear that submarines could rest on sea bottom. For sake of clarity he suggested deletion of phrase “objects of nuclear weapons or any other” of Article 1. He expressed agreement with 12-mile zone in Article 2. He said Article 3 was in line with general policy of Netherlands on arms control. On Article 6 he made strong pitch in favor of UNGA disarmament committee. He concluded that he had received further comments on Article 4 but had been asked at last moment not to make them.

6. Burrows (UK) gave “green light” on understanding UK not committed to details US draft. He said UK still preferred certain of its own formulations to those of US and cited Article 1 (1) as example. He held open the possibility that, in absence of US- Soviet agreement, UK might revert to its draft.

7. Kosciusko-Morizet (France) reiterated familiar four principles on which French policy based (USNATO 368R, para. 13 and USUN 2808). There were some points not entirely satisfactory in U.S. draft and he said “sincerely” that he could not “give or withold green light”. French position would be communicated in due course through the proper channels.

8. Huorth-Nielsen (Denmark) said his authorities would have preferred broadening scope of treaty to include offensive conventional weapons but concluded that discussions so far failed justify expectations for treaty with such wide scope. He was pleased to give “green light”. He thought draft could be strengthened by inclusion of article along lines of Article 6 of NPT. He also observed that treaty would apply to historic waters and in this connection wondered about meaning of Articles 4 and 7 (6) of Convention on Terrttorial Sea.

9. Birgi (Turkey) gave “green light”, though without instructions. His authorities had been “positive” toward Soviet draft. He thought Canada’s proposal for 200 mile security zone worth considering.

10. Kristiansen (Norway), in giving “green light” expressed appreciation for US efforts to take views of allies into account and make prohibition as broad as possible. He also expressed preference for Vienna formula on accession but said he was not hopeful. He concluded Norway most appreciative at chance to consult in NAC.

11. Da Cunha (Portugal). In supporting “green light”, thought Article 3 left verification “in the air”. He echoed Grewe’s remarks about nuclear power veto on amendments. He said his authorities preferred 3 rather than 12 miles for the contiguous zone (Da Cunha left impression he was confusing contiguous zone with width of territorial sea).

12. De Staercke (Belgium) joined other in “green light” and expressed support for Boon’s argument that US should not at this stage be tied to text which NAC had approved in every detail.

13. Schaus (Luxembourg) expressed hope negotiations would lead to agreement on seabeds arms control treaty. He also echoed Grewe’s point on nuclear power veto on amendments.

14. Cavaleirato (Greece) expressed gratitude at US consultation and, though without instructions, gave “green light” on personal basis.

15. Sigurdson (Iceland) welcomed fact that US and Soviets were moving to agreement, expressed appreciation at NAC consultation and gave “green light”.

16. Ellsworth expressed thanks for serious and detailed responses. He stressed that “green light” related merely to use proceeding to take matter up with Soviets and did not imply NAC agreement to substance of US text. He concluded US hoped now proceed immediately in Geneva.

17. Brosio attempted to finesse Italian position by stating that NAC had given US procedural “green light”, De Ferrariis objected that he was not able to agree to procedural “green light”. He said he could take note of US Sept. 12 communication (State 154164 and 154165), express satisfaction for US efforts and offer no objections to the US proceeding in Geneva, but a “green light” was not possible and indeed a misapplication of the term to the current situation. In response to Ellsworth’s question whether Italy would object to the US proceeding with Soviets in Geneva, De Ferrariis said no. Brosio then summed up that NAC had taken note (a) that US would begin discussions with Soviet Co-Chairmen and (b) of remarks made in course of NAC consultation. Brosio added that matter would remain on NAC agenda and encouraged those who had not made substantive comments to do so, if possible at September 17 NAC.

Ellsworth

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–1969, POL 33–6. Secret; Limdis. It was repeated to all NATO capitals, Canberra, Moscow, Tokyo, USMission Geneva, and USUN.
2. The telegram reported North Atlantic Council approval to proceed with discussion of the draft U.S. treaty with the Soviet Co-Chairman. It then provided a detailed summary of the comments made by each permanent representative.