Here are my thoughts about the latest seabeds treaty development in
Geneva, and how I believe we might best go about dealing with it.
If this procedure does not suit you, I would appreciate hearing from
you.
Tab A
August 20, 1969
[Page 5]
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. and U.S.S.R. DRAFT TEXTS
OF SEABED ARMS CONTROL TREATY
PREAMBLE
The first paragraph of the U.S.S.R. draft of August 19 follows
closely the first U.S. paragraph. The U.S. text was derived from
UNGA Res. 2467A (XXIII) expressing recognition of the common
interest of mankind in the peaceful use of the seabed.
The second Soviet paragraph reflects their earlier proposal for a
complete prohibition of military use of the seabed and expresses
willingness to continue negotiations towards that end.
The third Soviet paragraph is identical to the second paragraph of
the U.S. text which states that the prevention of a nuclear arms
race would serve the interests of maintaining peace and
strengthening friendly relations among States.
In the fourth paragraph, the Soviet draft again states that the
treaty serves as a step toward a complete ban on all seabed military
activities.
[Page 6]
The Soviet preamble does not pick up the last paragraph in the U.S.
draft stating that the treaty will further the “principles and
purposes of the Charter of the U.N., in a manner consistent with the
principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms
of the high seas”. This paragraph is based on statements made by
U.S. Representatives on August 23, 1968, before the U.N. Ad Hoc
Seabed Committee, and on October 29, 1968, before the U.N. First
Committee.
ARTICLE I—PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES
The Soviet draft Article I represents a substantial change in the
earlier Soviet proposal to prohibit all military activities on the
seabed. The new Article I would prohibit the emplanting or
emplacement on the seabed and ocean floor, and in the subsoil
thereof, of objects with nuclear weapons or any other types of
weapons of mass destruction. It would also prohibit structures,
launching installations or any other facilities designed for
storing, testing or using such weapons.
When the text was presented on August 19 Ambassador Roshchin informed
the U.S. Representative (Geneva 2978) that the phrase [Page 7] “any objects” in
paragraph 1 of Article I implied launching installations and other
underwater facilities, nuclear mines, various storage facilities and
structures designed or capable of being used for storing, testing or
using nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
Ambassador Roshchin also stated that the word “fixed” in the U.S.
draft Article I was not adopted by the U.S.S.R. because it would
give the impression of narrowing the treaty’s prohibitions
excessively and the word “fixed” was not really needed. In response
to a U.S. query, Ambassador Roshchin said that submarines should be
viewed like other ships and would not violate treaty if anchored to
the bottom.
Paragraph 1 of Article I states that the prohibitions would apply
beyond a maritime zone as defined in Article II. This formulation is
apparently an attempt to remove the ambiguities in the earlier
Soviet draft.
In the second paragraph of Article I the Soviets use language based
on Article 1 of the NPT to prohibit assistance in carrying on
prohibited activities. The U.S. draft text on this point was drawn
from language in the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
[Page 8]
The U.S. text would impose an obligation on each party not to emplace
or emplant fixed nuclear weapons or other
weapons of mass destruction, or associated fixed launching platforms
on, within or beneath the seabed. The restriction would apply only
to immovable systems.
ARTICLE II—NARROW COASTAL BAND (U.S.) or
MARITIME ZONE (U.S.S.R.)
Paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Soviet draft prescribes that the
maritime zone shall have a width of 12 miles
measured seaward from the same baselines as are used to define the
limits of the territorial sea of coastal states.
Baselines
The Soviet definition does not clear up the problems arising out of
“historic” Soviet claims to certain coastal waters. While it is not
clear that in every case such waters are claimed by the Soviets as
inland rather than territorial waters, Roshchin responded to a query
as to Soviet thinking on this point by saying the “baselines problem
would be very difficult to negotiate since Soviets would not be
willing open up their internal seas for seabeds treaty.” [Page 9] Roshchin inquired
whether the U.S. proposal would bring Soviet internal seas within
the treaty and also subject them to treaty inspection? In a reply to
a U.S. query whether Soviets would be willing to provide names of
internal seas which they would wish to regard as not being subject
to treaty, Roshchin said he would report the question to Moscow but
hoped that the matter would not have to be the subject of
negotiation.
Paragraph 2 of Article II of the U.S. draft treaty was left blank
with an indication that the paragraph was reserved for baselines.
When the U.S. treaty text was tabled on May 22, Ambassador Fisher
stated that definitions of baselines were necessary for equitable
boundaries and balanced obligations in view of existing claims to
certain marginal seas (EMDG/PV, 414, p. 16) (The problem is not
confined to Soviet claims, but may include also claims made by some
U.S. allies (State 117102, 107285, 075159)), The Soviets indicated
on August 19 that the U.S. should take into account that the
U.S.S.R, is a party to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea
but no interpretations of that Convention such as the U.S. called
for on May 22 were suggested.
[Page 10]
WIDTH OF COASTAL ZONE
In presenting the new draft Ambassador Roshchin made it clear that
the Soviet offer to confine the treaty prohibitions to weapons of
mass destruction was conditional on U.S. acceptance of a 12–mile
coastal zone. This promises to be a most difficult matter within the
U.S. Government.
ARTICLE III—VERIFICATION-OBSERVATION
The new Soviet text provides categorically that each Party has the
“right to verify” the activities of other treaty Parties on the
seabed. If these activities raise doubts under the treaty, the
Parties would undertake to consult and cooperate to remove the
doubts. The operative paragraph 1 of the U.S. Article III does not
mention verification, and it provides that the Parties “shall remain
free to observe” activities of other States. This provision is
essentially a declaration of existing principles of international
law. Paragraph 1 also provides for consultation and cooperation if
observation does not eliminate questions. The U.S. text, as a
declaration of existing law, does not confine the right of
observation to the activities of other treaty Parties.
[Page 11]
Paragraph 2 of U.S. Article III provides that the Article V Review
Conference shall consider whether additional “rights or procedures
of verification” should be established.
The provision in the Soviet text for a right to “verify” without
interference is somewhat fuzzy. Ambassador Roshchin explained in
Geneva on August 19 that the net effect of the Soviet text would be
the same as the effect of the U.S. text. The right to verify must be
exercised without interfering with the activities being verified or
otherwise infringing rights recognized in international law,
including freedom of the high seas. It would include overflights,
observation from ships, and observation by divers. Entry would not
be included since it would interfere with the activity being
verified.
The Soviet draft does not include any provision for subsequent review
of the treaty.
AMENDMENT
Unlike the U.S. draft, the Soviet text would require acceptance of an
amendment by nuclear weapon states. According [Page 12] to Ambassador Roshchin this is derived
from the NPT. Both texts would bind only parties accepting an
amendment.
WITHDRAWAL
Both the U.S. (VI) and the U.S.S.R, (V) drafts have withdrawal
provisions based on the NPT.
REVIEW CONFERENCE
Article V of the U.S. draft treaty provides for a review conference
to be held in Geneva five years after the treaty’s entry into force.
This Article, inspired by similar language in the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, expressly states that the conference will take into account
relevant technological developments. Under the operation of this
treaty language, the scope of prohibited activities, and of
verification procedures could be enlarged.
The Soviets have not accepted the U.S. proposal for a review
conference. Ambassador Roshchin stated that not many ENDC members really believed a review
conference would achieve more comprehensive prohibitions. Timerbaev
stated that the [Page 13]
addition of review provisions in the NPT had not made the NPT
acceptable to those countries that disliked the NPT.
In drafting the review conference provisions, however, the U.S. had
in mind not only the possibility of more comprehensive prohibitions
but also possibility of arrangements for more intensive verification
activities. Contrary to Timerbaev’s views, statements have been made
at the ENDC indicating that a
review conference provision would be attractive to some members.
Unlike the NPT, there is no opposition to the seabed arms control
treaty, although there is yet no agreement on its full scope.
ENTRY INTO FORCE
The Soviet text (paragraph 3 of Article VI) provides that the Treaty
shall enter into force after ratification by 22 states, including
the depositary Governments. On August 19, the Soviets indicated that
the depositary Governments should be the nuclear weapons states, but
have not specified these until France has been given a chance to
join. The U.S. treaty has ho administrative provisions because of
FRG objections to [Page 14] the
“all states” formula again repeated in Soviet paragraph 1 of Article
VI.
[Page 15]
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THE U.S. and U.S.S.R. DRAFT TEXTS
OF TREATY FOR SEABED ARMS CONTROL
| U.S.S.R. TEXT*
|
U.S. TEXT |
| DRAFT TREATY ON PROHIBITION OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEA-BED
AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF |
DRAFT TREATY PROHIBITING THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED
AND OCEAN FLOOR |
| The States Parties to this Treaty, |
The States Parties to this Treaty, |
| Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress
of the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor
for peaceful purposes, |
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the
progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and ocean
floor for peaceful purposes. |
| Seeking to achieve agreement on the comprehensive
prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed
and the ocean floor [Page 16] and the subsoil thereofand determined
to continue negotiations to this end, |
|
| Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on
the sea-bed and the ocean floor serves the interests of
maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions, and
strengthens friendly relations among States, |
Considering that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on
the seabed and ocean floor serves the interests of
maintaining world peace, reduces international tensions, and
strengthens friendly relations among States, |
| Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the
complete prohibition of military activities on the sea-bed
and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, |
Convinced that this Treaty will further the principles and
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner
consistent with the principles of international law and
without infringing the freedoms of the high seas, |
| Have agreed as follows: |
Have Agreed as Follows: |
[Page 17]
| ARTICLE I |
ARTICLE I |
| 1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to
emplant or emplaee on the seabed and the ocean floor and in
the subsoil thereof beyond the maritime zone, as defined in
Article II, any objects with nuclear weapons or any other
types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as structures,
launching installations or any other facilities designed for
storing, testing or using such weapons. |
1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to
emplant or emplace fixed nuclear weapons or other weapons of
mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms on,
within or beneath the seabed and ocean floor beyond a narrow
band, as defined in Article II of this Treaty, adjacent to
the coast of any State. |
| 2. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to
assist, encourage or induce any State to commit actions
prohibited by paragraph 1 of this Article and not to
participate in any other way in such actions, |
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes to refrain
from causing, encouraging, facilitating or in any way
participating [Page 18]
in the activities prohibited by this Article. |
| ARTICLE II |
ARTICLE II |
| I. The maritime zone established under Article I shall
have the width of 12 nautical miles, and its outer limit
shall be measured from the same base-lines as are used in
defining the limits of the territorial sea of coastal
States. |
1. For purposes of this Treaty, the outer limit of the
narrow band referred to in Article I shall be measured from
baselines drawn in the manner specified in paragraph 2,
hereof. The width of the narrow band shall be three (3)
miles. |
| 2. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as
prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to
rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with
respect to recognition or non-recognition of rights or
claims asserted by any other State, relating to the
territorial sea or other contiguous waters or to the sea-bed
and the ocean floor. |
2. Blank (baselines). 3. Nothing in this Treaty shall be
interpreted as prejudicing the position of any State party
with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may
assert, or with respect to recognition or non-recognition of
rights or claims asserted by any other State, [Page 19] relating to
territorial or other contiguous seas or to the seabed and
ocean floor. |
| ARTICLE III |
ARTICLE III |
| In order to promote the objectives and ensure the
observance of the provisions of this Treaty, the States
Parties to the Treaty shall have the right to verify the
activities of other States Parties to-the Treaty on the
sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof
beyond the maritime zone, as defined in Article II, if these
activities raise doubts concerning the fulfillment of the
obligations assumed under this. Treaty, without interfering
with such activities or otherwise [Page 20] infringing rights recognized under
international law, including the freedom of the high
seas. |
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the
observance of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties to
the Treaty shall remain free to observe activities of other
States on the seabed and ocean floor, without interfering
with such activities or otherwise infringing rights
recognized under international law including the freedoms of
the high seas. In the event that such observation does not
in any particular case suffice to eliminate questions
regarding fulfillment of the provisions of this Treaty,
Parties undertake to consult and to cooperate in endeavoring
to resolve the questions. |
| The States Parties to the Treaty undertake to consult and
to cooperate with a view to removing doubts concerning the
fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this
Treaty. |
2. At the review conference provided for in Article V,
consideration shall be given to whether any additional
rights or procedures of verification should be established
by amendr ment to this Treaty. |
| ARTICLE IV |
ARTICLE IV |
| Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to
this Treaty. Amendments must be approved by a majority of
the votes of all the States Parties to the Treaty, including
those of all the States Parties to this Treaty possessing
nuclear [Page 21] weapons
and shall enter into force for each State Party to the
treaty accepting such amendments upon their acceptance by a
majority of the States Parties to the treaty, including the
States which possess nuclear weapons and are Parties to this
Treaty. Thereafter the amendments shall enter into force for
any other Party to the Treaty-after it has accepted such
amendments. |
Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to
this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each
State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon
their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the
Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the
date of acceptance by it. |
| ARTICLE V |
ARTICLE VI |
| Each Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if
it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject
matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interest
of its country. It shall give notice of such -withdrawal to
all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations
Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall
include a statement of the [Page 22] extraordinary events it considers to
have jeopardized its supreme interests. |
Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty
have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides
that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of
this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
Country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations
Security Council three months In advance Such notice shall
include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards
as having jeopardized its supreme interes ts. |
|
ARTICLE V |
|
Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a
conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva,
Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty
with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble
and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such
review shall take into account any relevant technological
developments. The review conference shall determine in
accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties
attending whether and when an additional review |
[Page 23]
| ARTICLE VI |
|
| 1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States.
Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry
into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article
may accede to it at any time. |
|
| 2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by
signatory States, Instruments of ratification and of
accession shall be deposited with the Governments of
_______, which are hereby designated the Depositary
Governments. |
|
| 3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of
instruments of ratification by twenty two governments,
including [Page 24] the
Governments designated is Depositary Governments of this
Treaty. |
|
| 4. For States whose instruments of ratification or
accession are deposited after the entry into force of this
Treaty it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit
of their instruments of ratification or accession. |
|
| 5. The Depositary Governments shall forthwith notify the
Governments of all States signatory and acceding to this
Treaty of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit
of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the
date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the
receipt of other notices. |
|
[Page 25]
| 6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations |
|
| ARTICLE VII |
|
| This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and
Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments,
Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by
the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the States
signatory and acceding thereto. |
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized
thereto, have signed this Treaty. |
[Page 26]
| Done in _____ at __________ this ______ day of _______,
__________. |
|
