Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

69. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, March 25, 1970, 1533Z.

3280. Department for Hillenbrand. Subject: CDU Leader Barzel on German Eastern Policy.

1. I had a long talk March 24 with Rainer Barzel, Fraktion Chairman of the CDU, which was focused entirely on Brandt’s Eastern policy. I am forwarding his remarks in some detail because I think they should be seriously studied.

2. Barzel said he was known as a friend of the US and of the Atlantic Alliance. Because his attachment to the maintenance of the German-American relationship was so strong, he wished to speak far more plainly than was usual in encounters like this. He had long been a proponent of a flexible and active German-Eastern policy. Indeed, he had taken a considerable political beating for his advanced ideas on this topic in a speech he delivered in New York in 1966.² At the outset of the present government he had, as we know, made a determined effort to a bipartisan approach towards Eastern policy. This was better for Germany and better for the Alliance. He had tried his best to achieve this and had failed. Barzel said he had again and again asked for adequate consultation with the government, on Eastern policy, and had not received it. Brandt had just cancelled an appointment Barzel previously made to see him on March 25. From now on, discussion of this topic would have to be carried out by public means from the rooftops.

3. Barzel said that in recent weeks his own views on this subject had become so determined that he would be prepared to maintain them even if he split the CDU in doing so. If the party rejected them, he would leave active politics. The reason for his change of heart had been his conclusion that the Brandt government was in fact willing to push its policy so far that agreements with the East were in fact possible. But in any event, Barzel continued, his views and those of the party on Eastern policy were the same. The speech he had given in the Bundestag on March 20 in reply to Brandt’s report of his meeting with Stoph in Erfurt (Bonn’s 3174)³ had been cleared in written form with Kiesinger, Schroeder, Strauss, Gradl and every other top leader of the CDU. CDU party conventions in Baden Wuerttemberg on March 21 and on March 22 in North Rhine Westphalia had unanimously voted to support this position, which should be considered the official CDU view.

4. Barzel said that from today onward, the CDU would continue to support the Kassel meeting with Stoph but would oppose the continuation of the Bahr–Gromyko talks on their present basis and with their present subject matter. This was because the FRG position which was evolving from these talks would if carried in an agreement amount to total capitulation to the Soviet viewpoint across the entire front.

5. Barzel said that, according to their public comments on the subject, the US, UK and French Governments supported this policy. It was difficult to understand the reasons for their support, because what was involved was a change in the European balance of power which would have pronounced effects on the future of Europe. Barzel remarked that he had been active in politics for twenty years, from the thick of the cold war onward. He was by nature optimistic. He had never in the past doubted the future as he did now. A change in the overall nuclear balance between the US and USSR had taken place as was clear from both American and other statements. The discrepancy in favor of the USSR might grow. The US was engaged in internal controversy over its troop commitment in Europe which would apparently bring reductions. These were fundamental facts known to all Europeans. In the FRG talks with Poland, with the Soviet Union and with the GDR, the Brandt government appeared ready to accept the demands of the other side with only minor modifications.

6. Under the present political and military circumstances in Europe, this action would amount to a general accommodation of the USSR by the Western Alliance, with absolutely no recompense in return. The aftereffects would be extremely serious. German politics would be split down the middle. A nationalist reaction would develop. From Helsinki to Rome—in every capital in Europe—the Soviet word, Soviet policy, Soviet desires would have more weight. Europe would no longer be assured of its freedom and independence and would come to terms with the Soviets.

7. Barzel said he had no such reservations about the Berlin talks of the Four Powers. If the Western powers wanted to probe Soviet intentions there and made headway, then he was prepared to support the result because this would mean the continuation of the Four Power responsibility for all of Germany and would mean that the Western powers were satisfied they were getting something in return. Barzel asked rhetorically when the US and the Western powers would begin to put the brakes on Brandt’s foreign policy. Would they do this on the basis of the clearly defined overall general configuration of the policy which was emerging, as he and the CDU believed should be done, or would they do this only when they were confronted with treaties which had already been worked out. Barzel asked if the Allies had seen the treaty texts which were worked out by the government. He said the CDU had not. When would the Allies draw the line?

8. Barzel said that for its part, the CDU had regretfully but firmly decided it was time to draw the line. The CDU thought the situation of the Brandt government in relation to the Soviets at this juncture was like that between Chamberlain and Hitler. The CDU did not intend to carry out a policy of appeasement. If the government continued on its present course, the CDU would bring it down. It had the necessary votes to do this if this was the issue posed. It would bring down the government even if its Eastern policy had been supported by the Allies, even though the consequences both for the Alliance and German domestic politics would be most serious.

9. Barzel said he would be glad to go to Washington if there was a desire there to talk about the serious problems he had raised. But we should not believe that if Willy Brandt went to the US, France or England and came back with the endorsement of all three governments, that this would cause the CDU to diminish its opposition to the present course.

10. I replied that the US had a continuing stake in Europe, in Germany and in Berlin, and that what happened there was and would be of great consequence to us. We agreed that the present situation had potential risks, but we had no intention of capitulation to the Soviets and of clearing out and leaving the field for them. What we did have in mind and what we were pursuing, mainly in the SALT talks, was an attempt to maintain the present balance of power at less strain and cost to each side. The Federal Republic had a developed democratic system. We had confidence in the policy outcome of the German political process, of which both the present government and the CDU opposition were integral components. We did not believe the government was being irresponsible and we should continue to maintain a close watch on policy and events as regarded our own interests.

11. Comment: Although Barzel was good-humored, it was evident that he was wholly serious in his remarks. They point up a political development which has become increasingly evident here. German Eastern policy was the main foreign policy issue of the 1969 Bundestag election campaign. We expected it to become the main issue between the SPD–FDP and the CDU opposition after the government was formed. This was not the case as rapidly as we had foreseen because Brandt was fairly general in his formulation, except for the two German state theory, and because Barzel had considerable success in his effort, which was not without an aspect of self-interest, to achieve a bipartisan policy in which his voice would be the most important one for the CDU. But now Brandt’s policy is taking on a somewhat more specific form and CDU opposition is hardening.

12. The aid and authority of the US has been invoked by both sides since the outset of the new government. Now this problem too is taking on larger dimensions. Brandt’s spokesmen are saying they will not decide anything further in Eastern policy until he has talked with President Nixon during Brandt’s forthcoming visit to the US. It can be expected that Brandt will hold up any private or public statements of support he receives from the President on the visit as a buckler against the CDU. Barzel and other CDU leaders are telling us with increasing insistence that we have to stop the SPD before it is too late. Ex-Chancellor Kiesinger will undoubtedly put this point with vigor on his trip to the US in May.⁴

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 12–6 GER W. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Berlin, London, Paris, and Moscow. According to another copy, the telegram was drafted by Dean, cleared by Fessenden, and approved by Rush. (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, JD Telegrams and Airgrams 1970) Sonnenfeldt summarized the telegram in a memorandum to Kissinger on March 26. After noting similar concerns raised by the French, Sonnenfeldt commented: “These crosscurrents underscore the need for precision and frankness during the Brandt visit in framing the nature of US support for Ostpolitik, and for distinguishing between goals and approach on the one hand, and pace and tactics on the other.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. IV)
2. Reference is to a speech Barzel gave in New York on June 17, 1966, to the American Council on Germany. See Barzel, Auf dem Drahtseil, pp. 83–95. The previous day Barzel met President Johnson at the White House, evidently submitting an advance copy of his speech. For a memorandum of the conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XV, Document 154.
3. Dated March 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER E–GER W)
4. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Kiesinger met Nixon in the Oval Office on May 19 from 11:19 a.m. to 12:18 p.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of the discussion has been found. A briefing memorandum from Kissinger to the President is ibid., NSC Files, Box 683, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. IV. Memoranda of the conversation that afternoon between Kiesinger and Rogers are ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–US.