Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

62. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 3, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Letter from Chancellor Brandt on Berlin

Chancellor Brandt has sent a letter to you, President Pompidou and Prime Minister Wilson, delivered through the Ambassadors in Bonn,² commenting on the Berlin issue in the planned Allied talks with the Soviets and also as it relates to the FRG’s talks with the USSR. The full text is at Tab A. Brandt makes the following points:

• —He cannot estimate the prospects for progress in the FRG talks with Poland and with the USSR on renunciation of force which will begin again on March 9 and 3 respectively; there has been no movement toward agreement so far;
• —the East Germans can be expected to use all efforts to prevent agreement between the FRG and the Soviets;
• —in the Moscow talks the West Germans made clear, and will continue to do so, that agreement can be reached only if Four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin and Germany as a whole remain untouched;
• —it is very important that the FRG, and the Three Powers, take a unified position particularly with respect to Berlin;
• —to avoid even the impression of Western discord, Brandt attaches special importance to an early beginning for the Four Power talks, although we should not allow ourselves to be put under time pressure on such an important question, and we should not count on rapid results from the talks.

The prime purpose of Brandt’s letter seems to be to apply some gentle pressure on the Three Powers in hopes that they will agree to open the Four Power talks by the time Brandt and GDR Premier Stoph meet in East Berlin, and the FRG negotiations with the Soviets resume— both in early March. The Germans want these three sets of negotiations in progress concurrently, and they suspect that an agreed Western position on the Four Power talks might not be prepared in time. Brandt probably senses that the British will be willing at least to have an initial meeting of the Four Powers even if the Western position is not agreed, but that the French and the US will be more inclined to delay Four Power talks until Western agreement is secure.

Brandt also directed that a memorandum be given to the three Ambassadors reporting in some detail the FRG–USSR discussions on Berlin (not previously fully reported to us), as well as stating the FRG position on the Berlin issue in the Four Power talks (the first full presentation on this point).³ Thus, a secondary purpose of the Brandt letter probably was to ensure that he could not be charged with lack of consultations with us.

As I reported to you in my memorandum of February 24,⁴ a small interagency working group is preparing for your approval the full US position on the Four Power talks. Brandt’s letter and his Government’s position will be taken into account in the study, which can be expected very early next week.

Particularly since some of the statements in the FRG position paper are novel and may have far-reaching consequences, I think it would be desirable to delay a reply to Brandt’s letter until you have had an opportunity to review the proposed US position.⁵

Tab A

February 25, 1970.

Letter From German Chancellor Brandt to President Nixon

Dear Mr. President:

The German-Soviet and German-French exchanges of view on the question of an agreement on the renunciation of force have been suspended for a short time. State Secretary Bahr will continue the talks in Moscow on the third of March and State Secretary Duckwitz in Warsaw on the ninth of March.

The first round, in Moscow as in Warsaw, served for a detailed presentation of the respective standpoints. The atmosphere was not bad. Up to now, there has been no movement toward agreement on the important questions of substance. It cannot yet be estimated what the prospects are for the next round.

We will have to expect that East Berlin will undertake all imaginable efforts, not only in propaganda but also in debates within the Bloc, to prevent agreement between us and the Soviets. Ulbricht presumably has used Gromyko’s visit to Berlin to bring to bear his influence in this sense. One would foresee that the resumption of our exchange of opinions in Moscow will show whether and to what degree he succeeded.

State Secretary Bahr left no doubt about our position that there can be an agreement on the renunciation of force only in the event that the rights and the responsibilities of the four powers for Berlin and Germany as a whole remain untouched. I consider that this position for many reasons must be maintained for the future also.

As a result of questions by Gromyko, the Berlin issue was mentioned in Moscow. The German side presented with full clarity the view that the situation in and around Berlin must be made more secure. I am convinced that you too will consider desirable the improvements we are striving for.

I consider it very important that the Federal Government and the three powers take a unified standpoint in their respective conversations in all questions, but particularly with regard to the Berlin issue. I therefore have taken the liberty to transmit a working paper to the Ambassadors outside the normal diplomatic channels. The first portion contains the statements of State Secretary Bahr in Moscow. The second part presents the position of the Federal Government on the Berlin issue. I believe it corresponds to a Western position based on common interests.

Certainly, we should not allow ourselves to be put under time pressure on a question of such far-reaching importance. Moreover, even in the event that the Soviet Government should adopt a relatively conciliatory position, we could not count on rapid results. All the more, however, we should avoid the impression that the three powers and the Federal Republic are not yet agreed and hence obliged to delay the negotiations. I therefore attach special importance to the early beginning of four power talks on Berlin on the basis of an agreed Western position.

I have taken the liberty of writing the President of the French Republic and the Prime Minister of Britain in the same sense.

Please permit me to express my special esteem.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 753, Presidential Correspondence File, Germany, Chancellor Brandt (1969–Apr 70). Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft for Kissinger’s signature on February 27. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, February 27; ibid.)
2. See footnote 2, Document 59.
3. Reference is to the German working paper; see footnotes 2–4, Document 59.
4. Document 58.
5. Nixon approved this recommendation by highlighting the last sentence and writing “OK” on the memorandum.