Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

44. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 19, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Message from Chancellor Brandt

Chancellor Brandt has sent you a personal message through the special channel established for this purpose.² The message informs you that he has sent a letter to Kosygin expressing skepticism about an early European Security Conference, and reiterating the FRG’s interest in improved relations with the USSR, Poland and East Germany. Brandt told Kosygin that he proceeds on the basis of existing alliance systems, i.e. Germany’s NATO membership.

Brandt indicates he sent the letter in an effort to influence a Communist summit conference reportedly opening in Moscow today and in which Brandt thinks the East Germans will play a negative role.

Brandt’s letter to Kosygin follows the general line of his earlier statements; he evidently wants to open a direct channel to Kosygin, something the latter apparently suggested to the German Ambassador in Moscow.

At the same time, Brandt is clearly interested in using the confidential channel to you and to show his readiness to reciprocate your personal messages to him and his predecessor.

I plan to send a brief acknowledgment in your behalf through the same confidential channel.

Recommendation:

That you approve a brief acknowledgement to Brandt.³

Attachment

Message from Chancellor Brandt to President Nixon

I would like to let you know by this means that according to information available to me there will take place, possibly beginning tomorrow (November 20), in Moscow, a meeting of the Party and Government heads of the States of the Warsaw Pact. The main topic is to be the harmonization of the attitude toward the Federal Republic and the plan for a Security Conference for Europe. Given the special significance that may attach to such a meeting in view of the increasing stiffening of East Berlin’s attitude toward Bonn, I have today sent via the Soviet Ambassador in Bonn a letter with the following contents to Chairman Kosygin:

(Note: What follows apparently is a paraphrase rather than the complete text.)⁴

I declare myself willing to engage in an exchange of views, in accordance with Kosygin’s suggestion to the German Ambassador in Moscow, in the hope of removing or preventing misunderstandings— something that is possible only through an extended process rather than from one day to the next.

As far as the reduction of the mistrust and the greater assurance of peace are concerned—both of which are the policy of the Federal Government—the Soviet Union has a weightier responsibility than the Federal Republic, which is well aware of its responsibility for security in Europe. I consider it an illusion and dangerous to proceed from anything other then the alliances and security systems that exist today.

For this reason the goals that are set for a European Security Conference could only be modest. It must be sufficiently well prepared so that when it formally meets a certain degree of accomplishment appears certain. Otherwise the hopes of the European peoples would be so disappointed that the conference had better not take place at all. The proposal that the conference should meet in a few months has aroused additional doubts whether in these circumstances serious preparatory work is remotely possible.

The improvement of bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic must not take second place to preparations for such a conference. Negotiations concerning a bilateral declaration of force renunciation should begin in the near future and it should be possible to complete them satisfactorily. In this context it is Germany’s intention to place the relationship of the two countries on a basis, similar to that which exists between the three Western Powers and the Federal Republic, whereby no further claim will be made under the notorious “enemy state article” and instead Article 2 of the United Nations would be implemented.

The renunciation of force with respect to Poland would recognize territorial integrity; the renunciation of force toward the GDR would contribute to normalization insofar as one can speak of normalization under conditions of the division of Germany.

In conclusion I express the hope that the Governments of the socialist countries involved will have the same constructive attitude as the Federal Republic.

(End of Brandt’s message to Kosygin.)

So much for the contents of my letter, which I will not publish. I will inform you should Kosygin answer.

Hearty congratulations for the magnificent landing on the moon and all good wishes for a safe return of the astronauts.⁵

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 753, Presidential Correspondence File, Germany, Chancellor Brandt (1969–Apr 70). Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Sonnenfeldt forwarded it to Kissinger on November 19. In a covering memorandum, Sonnenfeldt commented: “The message [from Brandt] seems to be an effort to establish, from his end, the special relationship with the President. He shrewdly uses information on a message to Kosygin to do so. The letter to Kosygin, insofar as he discloses the text to us, seems rather hard-nosed for Brandt, but he clearly keeps the door open for bilateral exchanges with Moscow. The Germans seem worried that the Soviets are trying to avoid bilateral dealings (or are being driven to do so by the GDR) by pressing hard on the European Security Conference in which the GDR would take part as a full-fledged member. (The Soviets just told Scheel again that American-Canadian participation was dependent on GDR participation.) If Brandt’s letter says what he told the President, it is not likely to get a very forthcoming response from a Warsaw Pact meeting.” (Ibid.)
2. The message was transmitted in a telegram sent by backchannel on November 19. According to the telegram, the message was “from Egon Bahr to be passed to Mr. Henry Kissinger for President Nixon at White House on behalf of Chancellor Brandt.” The telegram also notes: “Bahr stated only Brandt, Ehmke and himself know of the msg at this time.” (Ibid., Box 682, Country Files, Europe, Germany, Vol. III)
3. The President approved this recommendation on November 25. The text of the message to Brandt reads: “I greatly appreciate your message and your courtesy in informing me of your letter to Kosygin. I am also deeply grateful to you for your congratulations concerning the moon landing. As regards your letter to Kosygin, I very much agree with your comments about the inadvisability of any early European security conference. I believe we are on the right track in seeking to pursue meaningful negotiations on concrete issues. I will be interested in your assessment of further developments in your relations with the Eastern countries. With best wishes, Richard Nixon.” (Telegram WH93025 from the White House to Bonn, November 26; ibid., Box 753, Presidential Correspondence File, Germany, Chancellor Brandt (1969–Apr 70))
4. The text that follows is a paraphrase of Brandt’s letter to Kosygin. For the complete text in German, see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1969, Vol. 2, pp. 1313–1315 and Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, 1969–1970, pp. 65–66; for a facsimile, see Kevorkov [Keworkow], Der geheime Kanal, pp. 50–53; and Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit, pp. 277–278.
5. Reference is to the Apollo 12 mission, which took off on November 14 and, after completing the second moon landing, returned to Earth on November 24.