Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

382. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, November 4, 1972, 9:10 a.m.

K: Bill?

H: Yeah.

K: On that Berlin thing.

H: Yeah.

K: What is the situation, we did check it through our people, we did tell the Russians it was ok.

H: Well, the problems are with the allies, the French and British Ambassadors are behaving pretty wildly.

K: But why, what the hell difference does it make?

H: It doesn’t, but you know they feel they’re in a contest with the Russians. Bahr is also insisting that certain things get in there because he can’t get them from the East Germans² and he gets the support of the British and French and now the Russians in Berlin have ended the subterfuge with Hillenbrand and they are talking to him privately.

K: Now, then what can we do?

H: Well, I think it boils down to one simple phrase right now, it’s weird but there—

K: What is the phrase?

H: “The question of four power rights.”

K: What difference does it make?

H: Well, literally we’re saying it doesn’t “affect the question of” and everybody, the allies would rather say it doesn’t “affect the rights.” And the second—

K: It doesn’t say it cannot raise the issue of the rights.

H: Well, the text that Marty’s working from³—

K: “The question—”

H: “The question of.”

K: Well why does that—what the Russians don’t want to do is reaffirm the rights again, they just want to keep it in the status quo.

H: Yeah and the British, French and Germans are all disturbed about the vagueness of “the question of.” That seems—they all come back to that every damn time. If they could—if the Russians could back away from that phrase it might unlock it. But it may all come down to Bahr. Bahr has now thrown in a real ringer by saying that if he can’t get a reference to Germany in his treaty or preamble then some reference to Germany has to be in the four power document. And this morning they are going to press Bahr to find out whether that’s really a demand of his or whether he’s just bargaining.

K: Couldn’t I talk to Cromer and tell him—

H: That would be very helpful because the British damn near walked out of the talks last night.⁴

K: OK, I’ll talk to Cromer.

H: But if Marty could, if they could have a little flexibility in Berlin, sometimes this comes down to a word and Hillenbrand is so damn scared to—but now that the Russians are talking to him there are a couple of minor changes that would placate people that have no substance.

K: Right. Like what?

H: Well, for example there’s a phrase “the four powers have agreed to support.” Now the Germans don’t want this, they say it’s condescending to their sovereignty and they would like to say, “state that they will support.” Now that’s minor. I’m sure the Russians would buy it.

K: OK.

H: Then there’s another “that they will support such membership” and the Germans would like to say “this membership.” But Marty’s afraid to make these changes because he’s been told this is—

K: OK, OK, good I understand.

H: OK.

K: Can you get this memo over to me?⁵

H: Yeah, I’m working on it right now and the text is so—

K: Can we do it fairly quickly?

H: Yeah.

K: Good.⁶

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 374, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2. Reference is to the negotiations for a treaty on basic relations between East and West Germany. See Document 383.
3. See Document 379.
4. In telegram 1923 from Berlin, November 3, the Mission reported that, in a meeting of the three Western Ambassadors that afternoon, Henderson stated his belief that, if Bahr insisted on inserting a reference to Germany in the declaration, “the Western side would have to make a dramatic presentation in order to convince the Soviets that we meant business. He went so far as to mention the possibility of a ‘walkout’should the Soviets turn it down again, although he quickly retreated from this and agreed with the US and French Ambassadors that a walkout would be undesirable.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
5. Reference is presumably to an unsigned memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger on November 4. In an attached typed note to Kissinger, Hyland reported: “Since writing this, we are informed that Bahr has agreed to drop effort to get ‘Germany’ in the four power text but suggest trading it for ‘the question of.’ The French want to drop ‘practices’ in trade for ‘the question of’ but we must oppose this; it is important on its merits and is in the agreed text with Sovs. State is instructing Hillenbrand to oppose.” Hyland added a handwritten postscript: “We do not have results of today’s meeting, which is still on.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 692, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. V) The Department forwarded the instructions referred to in telegram 201380 to Berlin, November 4. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
6. Kissinger called Hyland back at 10:58 a.m. and asked: “If they [Soviets] drop the phrase, ‘the question of’ can we then guarantee that the God damn document will be accepted[?]” Hyland replied: “I think we have about a 90% chance of getting everybody on board if they make the semantic concession.” “But if we want to guarantee that they [Soviets] drop ‘the question of,’” he added, “it would be good to have the British with us.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 374, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) Kissinger called Cromer at 11:15 to see if the British Government, and its “temperamental ambassador there,” would support this proposal; Cromer promised to “be back to you soon.” (Ibid.) Kissinger meanwhile called Dobrynin at 11:25 to confirm the agreement. “HK: If you drop ‘the question of’ and keep in the word ‘practices’—‘practices’ is in our text anyway—then we will support it. I have talked to the British and they will also support it. They will take one more run at the specialized agencies and if you reject it they will break off on it. I am telling you this confidentially. AD: Good. I will mention it. If we drop ‘the question of’ then you will send a telegram and your ambassador will be in touch with ours. HK: If you can say this—. AD: I will give the message to our ambassador and you to yours and then we’ll use it together.” (Ibid., Box 395, Telephone Conversations, Dobrynin, Anatoliy Federovich) Kissinger then called Hyland again at 11:35 with the necessary instructions for Hillenbrand. (Ibid., Box 374, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) In telegram 1936 from Berlin, November 4, the Mission reported that the Ambassadors had finally agreed on the text of the quadripartite agreement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6) For the full text, which the four governments issued simultaneously on November 9, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, p. 1213.