368. Editorial Note
As Chancellor Brandt prepared for the vote in the Bundestag on ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, President Nixon and Assistant to the President Kissinger were preparing for the upcoming U.S.-Soviet summit in Moscow. After the decision to mine the harbor at Haiphong, Nixon and Kissinger were concerned that the Soviets might retaliate by canceling the summit. During a meeting at 3:09 p.m. on May 11, the two men discussed issuing a public statement supporting ratification to discourage this eventuality.
Kissinger: “They [Soviets] won’t do a damn thing until the German treaties are ratified.”
Nixon: “You don’t think so?”
Kissinger: “No. And they want a statement from you.”
Nixon: “Well, we’ll get it to them, you know. When is that? When do we have to have that done?”
Kissinger: “I guess Tuesday [May 16]would be a good day to have it. Monday or Tuesday. Until that they won’t do a thing.”
Nixon: “But if we give them that it has to be a straight quid pro quo, don’t you think?”
Kissinger: “They won’t cancel it now. There’s nothing in it for them to cancel it a day before you go.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation Between Nixon and Kissinger, May 11, 1972, 3:09–3:24 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation 723–10) The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.
During a telephone conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at 11:15 a.m. on May 12, Kissinger raised the possibility of issuing a public statement on ratification.
“K: We are thinking now very seriously of a public statement on Monday.
“D: On what?
“K: On the German thing.
“D: Oh, I think it’s—
“K: That will have the maximum effect.
“D: Oh, I think it’s very [important]. Could I send this or are you just thinking? Better not to make disappointment. Sorry I really ask you blunt question. If you are really so, I will send them but if you change your mind—
“K: Let me say, you know, if there is no, which I don’t anticipate, no [further] aggravation of this situation.
[Page 1034]“D: Oh, I don’t think—I think for our part could say this, whether you do or not. Don’t you think so?
“K: What?
“D: About whether it will be an aggravation or not.
“K: What do you mean we can say?
“D: No, I think we could judge—I think you and me could fairly say whether there would be aggravation or will not be before Monday.
“K: Yeah. My impression is there will not be.
“D: You mean about [Barzel?] and Bonn [Brandt?]?
“K: No, no; I mean in the overall world situation.
“D: Oh, well, this is what I think is my impression….So if your impression is the same, so I think we are on the same ground.
“K: Right. So I just wanted to tell you that. In that framework I think you are pretty safe assuming it.
“D: Yeah. It would be White House statement?
“K: A White House statement.
“D: A special statement?
“K: Well, we’ve planned it in answer to a question.
“D: Okay, an answer to a question.
“K: And I will work that out and give it to you Monday morning.
“D: Okay. I think it’s fair enough and good enough.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 372, Telephone Conversations)
Before the White House issued the statement, the CDU executive board met on May 15 to consider the joint parliamentary resolution on ratification. Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff sent Kissinger the following Associated Press release soon after the meeting: “Leaders of West Germany’s opposition announced today they have dropped final objections to Chancellor Willy Brandt’s treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland—all but guaranteeing the pacts will be ratified by a broad majority in parliament.” Sonnenfeldt suggested, therefore, that the White House issue its statement at a press conference that afternoon. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, May 15; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 687, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Bonn), Vol. XII) When a reporter sought reaction to the news from Bonn, White House Press Secretary Ziegler responded as follows:
“Well, this is of course a decision for the Germans themselves to take. It is of central importance to their future, so the decision must be theirs. That has been and is our position.
“Now, the President recognizes that the Berlin agreement, to which we are a party and which we think is a very good one, has been made [Page 1035] dependent on the ratification of the German treaties. He obviously would like the Berlin agreement to take effect. He understands that the leaders of both the government and the opposition in Bonn have made efforts to achieve a common approach and that seems to him a wise course.” (Telegram 85265 to Bonn, May 15; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL GER W–POL)
On May 17 Nixon and Kissinger discussed another important German matter: the signing of the final protocol for the quadripartite agreement on Berlin. At a senior-level meeting in Washington on May 16, Allied representatives agreed that the protocol should be signed the next month in Berlin with the participation of the four Foreign Ministers. The representatives also decided to approach the Soviets “informally during the President’s Moscow visit on timing, and that if a favorable Soviet response is received, a specific date for the signing be fixed at the quadripartite dinner in Bonn on May 29.” (Telegram 86030 from Bonn, May 16; ibid., POL 28 GER B) In a telephone conversation at 9:52 a.m. on May 17, Nixon and Kissinger interpreted this decision in a different light:
“K: Another thing that’s come up is that apparently State is again talking to the Russians and the Germans about signing the Berlin agreement while we are in Moscow. And I just think that’s a mistake.
“P: Just…sit… and we’ll put out a…
“K: I’ll take care of it.
“P: Just say that from me, I do not want any agreements…I don’t want anything done except by ourselves, I don’t want anybody else there.
“K: Yeah, well the present plan is for Rogers and Gromyko to come back to Berlin, but it would…I don’t see why we should do that. We can do it later. Of course the treaties may not pass in time. There’s another chance now to pull another little wrinkle which we’ve discovered which is that the German upper house we thought it had automatically to vote on it on Friday [May 19] but we found that if there’s one German state that wishes a delay in the debate they can delay it. So now we’re looking around whether we can find a state that can ask for a delay without our getting caught at it. Because that’s the best insurance you have for good Soviet behavior.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 372, Telephone Conversations)
Kissinger then raised this issue during a meeting with Dobrynin in the Map Room at the White House at noon. According to a memorandum of conversation, Kissinger “said that the President did not wish the Berlin agreement signed during the visit to Moscow because he did not want to get Four Power activities mixed up with the summit. Dobrynin agreed that this was so, but said the initiative did not come from them; it came from the State Department.” (National Archives, Nixon [Page 1036] Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 494, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 12 [Part 2])
The Bundestag, meanwhile, began its vote on ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties. Although the opposition had agreed to allow its members to vote for the treaties, Franz Josef Strauss, leader of the Christian Social Union, reversed his position: he insisted at a meeting of the CDU/CSU parliamentary party group on May 16 that members could vote for the resolution but not for the treaties. In a choice between cohesion and conscience, Rainer Barzel, leader of the Christian Democratic Union, decided that the opposition should remain united by abstention. On May 17 the Bundestag, therefore, approved the bills of ratification by simple majority of 248 votes and the joint resolution by an absolute majority of 513 votes. Kissinger reviewed the outcome in a telephone conversation with Nixon at 11:12 a.m.:
“K: The German vote has come out very well.
“P: Oh.
“K: They fell short of an absolute majority by one, but they have a relative majority so now it has to go to the upper house. They were going to vote on it Friday, but the two German states have…it has to lie before that house for six days unless they unanimously vote to accept the consideration immediately.
“P: And they didn’t?
“K: They refused… they couldn’t get a unanimous vote so now they will vote next on the 24th, next Wednesday, and then it won’t get signed until the following Friday. So that will cover most of your visit there. That removes even the one percent chance that they [Soviets] might kick over the traces.
“P: Yeah, they… they’d be playing a damn dangerous game.
“K: That’s right.
“P: That’s right. Well they’re not anyway… they can’t now anyway Henry; it’s too late.
“K: No, exactly.
“P: Well, they can but they’re … then they’re proving that they’re utterly stupid, and if they’re utterly stupid we should be smart.
“K: But it also means that we have a pretty clear run for the better part of that week while we are there [Moscow]. I mean we would have it anyway, but this gives us a little insurance.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 372, Telephone Conversations)
Robert McCloskey, Department of State spokesman, called Kissinger at 11:58 a.m. to discuss an official response on ratification. McCloskey explained that the Department had prepared a statement for the Secretary, including the following sentence: “In light of this action we would hope for an early signature of the final quadripartite [Page 1037] protocol which will bring the Berlin agreement into effect, an accord which President Nixon described as a milestone [achievement].”
“K: Well, the only thing that the President…it so happened I talked to him about this early signature business in a different context.
“M: I see.
“K: He does not want to build a fire that any of that be done in the next two or three weeks. If you said ‘In light of this we should not proceed to the signature …’
“M: Uh, hm. ‘The way is open for early signature.’
“K: Well, he doesn’t want to use…I know he won’t want to use the word ‘early.’
“M: Yeah, I see.
“K: For the signature.
“M: All right. ‘In light of this action, the way is open for signature.’
“K: Yes.
“M: Okay. Otherwise all right?
“K: Yeah.” (Ibid.)
Secretary of State Rogers also called Kissinger at 2:20 p.m. to confirm the decision to delay the official response:
“R: [O]n the matter of the statement on the German matter—you and I saw eye to eye. I called [McCloskey] just before you did and told him I didn’t think it was a very good idea.
“K: Yes, because their constitutional process hasn’t completed yet—
“R: That’s what I said. There is no point putting it up to the President.
“K: Okay, I will hold it Bill.
“R: I heard on the radio and called him and said hell it isn’t finished so there is no point—we have taken the position until it is final or almost final we shouldn’t say anything.
“K: I completely agree.” (Ibid.)
The ratification process in Bonn, however, proceeded ahead of expectations in Washington. On May 19 the Bundesrat followed the Bundestag by approving the bills of ratification by simple majority. Rogers, therefore, delivered the official U.S. response in a press conference at the Department of State that morning:
“First, I would like to say that it looks now as if the German Parliament has ratified the Eastern treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. And although the final act of ratification has not occurred, I think it is now fairly certain that it will take place. And that provides an opportunity for me to state that the United States Government views with satisfaction the action taken by the Parliament of the Federal [Page 1038] Republic and the ratification of these treaties with the Soviet Union and with Poland. The path will now be open for signature of the final Four Power protocol which will bring the Berlin agreement into effect, an agreement which President Nixon has called a milestone achievement.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 5, 1972, page 779)
On May 23, the day after Nixon arrived in Moscow, President Heinemann signed the bills of ratification in Bonn. West Germany exchanged the formal instruments of ratification with the Soviet Union and Poland in Bonn on June 3. On the same day, the United States, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France signed the final protocol for the quadripartite agreement in Berlin. For the text of the joint resolution, see Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pages 1188–1190; for the text of the final protocol, see ibid., pages 1204–1206.