Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

323. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State¹

Berlin, August 27, 1971, 1335Z.

1742. Pass San Clemente for Ambassador Rush. Subject: Berlin Agreement: Textual Review. Ref: State 157008.²

1. Mission officer (Akalovsky) saw Kvitsinskiy and Khotulev on Aug 27 to raise para 4 of part I per instruction contained reftel.

2. Both Kvitsinskiy and Khotulev said that the Soviet text of the agreement had received final approval in Moscow yesterday and was therefore not subject to any change. Moreover, the change proposed affected one of key points advocated by Soviet side in course of negotiations and would destroy the balance of the compromise formulation finally agreed upon among four Ambassadors. They argued that purpose of this paragraph was to maintain status quo as regards both those aspects of the situation covered by quadripartite agreements, including the present one, and those that had resulted from unilateral actions. Kvitsinskiy said that for all these reasons he was sure that his higher authorities would reject U.S. suggestion, but nevertheless agreed to have Khotulev report to Abrasimov and obtain his reaction.

3. After Khotulev returned, he confirmed that no changes in the Soviet text were possible, asserting that Abrasimov was disturbed and surprised by the U.S. attempt to go back on what had been agreed to by Ambassadors. Khotulev also insisted that referral of this matter to Moscow would result in exactly same reaction.

4. Akalovsky pointed out that U.S. approach was entirely legitimate since the Ambassadors had agreed that the text they had developed was subject to review by the governments. He also stressed that the Soviets should be fully aware of the fact that the Western side considered reference to “the area” as covering all of Berlin and not only the Western sectors.

5. During the conversation, Kvitsinskiy and Khotulev also made clear that further discussion of the remaining differences between the Russian and the English texts would serve no useful purpose. Akalovsky emphasized the difficulties divergent texts would create along lines of Dean’s argumentation on August 25 (Berlin 1734).³ However, Soviets remained adamant that no further changes in the Russian text were possible.

Klein

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Bonn.
2. Document 322.
3. In telegram 1734 from Berlin, August 26, the Mission reported that Soviet and Allied advisers met on August 24 and 25 to compare English, Russian, and French translations of the Berlin agreement. In a meeting with Dean on August 25, Kvitsinsky confided that he had a “presentational problem” in Moscow. “When each of the relevant concepts had been introduced into the negotiations,” Kvitsinsky explained, “he had in his discussion with his own authorities, used the terms in the Russian text which were now in dispute. These terms were now part of the conceptual vocabulary of Soviet leaders interested in the Berlin agreement and it was too late to change them.” Although he personally accepted this explanation, Dean countered that the Allies could not “exclude the possibility that the Soviets were attempting to gain extra negotiating advantage in the last moment through the use of a divergent text.” The Allied advisers later underscored for Kvitsinsky the political implications as follows: “The discrepancies between the English and the Russian texts would be immediately seized upon by opposition critics in the Federal Republic because they concerned the core of the relationship between the Federal Republic and Berlin. Controversy on this point could undermine much of the political value of the Berlin agreement. This could in turn jeopardize the chances of ratification for the German-Soviet treaty and could make that treaty the main issue of the FRG political campaign which would begin in the summer of 1972, thus risking not only the success of the treaties themselves, but the continuation of the Brandt government.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B)