Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

293. Telegram From the Mission in Berlin to the Department of State ¹

Berlin, August 17, 1971, 0055Z.

1645. Subject: Berlin Talks: Ambassadorial Session August 16, 1971—Highlights.

1. The August 16 Ambassadorial session of the Berlin talks lasted from 0930 to 1945, with a working lunch which was followed by a two-hour break requested by Ambassador Abrasimov to allow him to consult with his and GDR authorities. The meeting resulted in important progress in access and FRG-Berlin ties sections of an agreement. (Texts in septels).²

2. The potentially most difficult deadlock of the agreement was resolved when Abrasimov agreed to suggestion from Ambassador Sauvagnargues to say that the Government of the USSR would “guarantee” that access traffic will be unimpeded in return for Allied acceptance of the Soviet desire to include the phrase “after consultation and agreement with the Government of the GDR” in section II A of the agreement. This section now reads:

“A. The Government of the USSR guarantees, after consultation and agreement with the Government of the GDR, that transit traffic by road, rail and waterways of civilian persons and goods between the Western sectors of Berlin and the FRG will be unimpeded; that such traffic will be facilitated so as to take place in the simplest and most expeditious manner; and that it will receive preferential treatment.

“Detailed arrangements concerning this civilian traffic, as set forth in Annex I, will be agreed on by the competent German authorities.”

3. Ambassador Abrasimov then agreed to language on sealed conveyances which would provide “that inspection procedures will be restricted to the inspection of seals and accompanying documents.” He bracketed “will be” when Ambassador Jackling insisted on bracketing “the accompanying documents” phrase. The Ambassador considers that, while the Allies are fully aware of the potential difficulties the GDR could cause for sealed freight shipments through questioning accompanying documents and will resist inclusion of this phrase, the overall provisions of the access section are so unexpectedly favorable that in the final analysis they should not be jeopardized by Allied insistence on this point. Abrasimov agreed to through trains and buses without inspection procedures other than identification of persons. He agreed to provisions on unsealed vehicles and through travelers in individual vehicles with language clearly indicating that search of such conveyances or search, detention or exclusion of such travelers would be limited exceptions, with specific details to be worked out in the inner-German negotiations.

4. Tentative agreement was reached on language for para II B, on FRG-Berlin ties. After Abrasimov insisted that, if the Soviet Union was going to guarantee that access would be unimpeded, then the Allies should use the word “guarantee” in the ties section, the following compromise wording (on which the prior agreement of State Secretary Bahr had been received) was tentatively agreed:

“The government of the French Republic, the UK and USA, guarantee, in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities and after consultation with the government of the Federal Republic of Germany, that the ties between the Western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained not to be a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Germany and continue not to be governed by it.

“Detailed arrangements concerning the relationship between the Western sectors and the Federal Republic of Germany are set forth in Annex II.”

5. Paragraph I of Annex II on FRG-Berlin ties is identical to the first paragraph quoted in paragraph 4 above, except that it is followed by this sentence:

“The provisions of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the constitution operative in the Western sectors which contradict the above have been suspended and continue not to be in effect.”

6. The main problems outstanding for the August 17 session are the exchange of letters between the Allies and the Soviets, in which the Allies would transmit to Abrasimov a copy of their letter to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany containing their clarifications and interpretations of Annex II on FRG-Berlin ties; the use of FRG passports by West Berliners traveling to the Soviet Union; Soviet interests; part I and the preamble; and the final clean up of details on access. It seems possible that agreement on these points for reference to governments could be reached by the end of the day’s session. (It should be noted, however, that Ambassador Jackling reserved his position on II A, II B and all of Annex I pending further reflection by the UK delegation on the language developed.)

Klein

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Bonn, London, Paris, Moscow, Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, Munich, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Stuttgart, and USNATO.
2. On August 17 the Mission reported the details of the previous day’s session in telegrams 1648, 1655, and 1657. (All ibid.)