Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

266. Message From the Ambassador to Germany (Rush) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Bonn, July 7, 1971.

Falin returned from Berlin with what he termed the good news that he and Gromyko were not as far apart as Falin had thought, and thus he had not needed to go to Kosygin or Brezhnev for a resolution of differences.² The highlights of our meeting of yesterday were as follows:

1. With regard to the text of those parts of the agreement we had tentatively agreed upon, Gromyko has approved everything except the following:

(A) He wanted to revert to their desire that the entire substantive part of the access provision be modified by the phrase: “according to international practice.” I flatly refused but agreed to shift the word expeditious in Annex I so that the applicable paragraph reads:

“1. Transit traffic by rail, road and waterways of civilian persons and goods and goods between the Western sectors of Berlin and the FRG will be facilitated and take place unimpeded in the simplest manner. It will receive the most expeditious and preferential treatment provided as international practice.”

(B) With regard to visits and travel by residents of the Western sectors to East Berlin and the GDR, Gromyko refused to accept “with areas contiguous to the Western sectors of Berlin as well as areas of the GDR not contiguous to those areas.” As a substitute formulation Falin has tentatively agreed to our suggested rewording as follows:

“The Government of the USSR, after consultation and agreement with the GDR, declares that communications with the Western sectors of Berlin will be improved; permanent residents of the Western sectors will be able to travel to and visit areas beyond them for compassionate, family, religious, cultural or commercial reasons, or as tourists, under conditions comparable to those applying to other visitors and travelers entering areas of the GDR.”

2. The big problem continues, of course, to be that of “Federal presence.” Falin came back with a new approach which has much merit. It is embodied in the following rewording of Annex II, the new parts being paragraphs 2 and 3:

“Annex II

Communication from the Governments of the French Republic, the UK, and the USA to the Government of the USSR.

The Governments of the French Republic, the UK and the USA, with reference to part II.B of the quadripartite agreement of this date and after consultation with the Government of the FRG, have the honour to inform the Government of the USSR that:

1. They declare, in the exercise of their rights and responsibilities, that the ties between the Western sectors of Berlin and the FRG will be maintained and developed taking into account that these sectors continue not to be a constituent part of the FRG and not to be governed by it. Those provisions of the Basic Law of the FRG and the constitution operative in the Western sectors, which contradict the above continue not to be in effect.

2. The Federal President, the Federal Government, the Bundesversammlung, the Bundesrat, and the Bundestag, including their committees and fractions as well as other state bodies of the FRG will not perform in the Western sectors of Berlin constitutional or other acts which contradict paragraph 1. Official bodies of the Western sectors of Berlin will also act in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1.

3. The Government of the FRG will be represented in the Western sectors of Berlin to the authorities of the three governments and to the Senat by a permanent liaison agency.”

This represents a great advance over the earlier extreme Soviet position barring most if not all committee and Fraktionen meetings and “official” visits of the President, Chancellor and other high officials as well as eliminating or severely restricting the location of Federal agencies in Berlin. According to Falin the new language would not involve the barring of any such meetings, visits or location of Federal agencies, but would impose an obligation that they not take place for governing Berlin. They could of course take place for “maintaining and developing” the ties, or otherwise than “governing” Berlin. The general nature of the language could be a future source of controversy, but this danger always overhangs in any event. Politically and substantively this approach seems preferable to any definite and precise limitations which the Russians have indicated would be adequate for their purposes.

Bahr is taking the new formulation to Brandt for his decision. Unless you advise otherwise, I will be guided by Brandt’s desires. If this approach is adopted, I would hope that we can improve the language.

3. We should have no difficulty in meeting your timetable of post July 20 for the final agreement. We can use your trip plus the new proposal of Gromyko’s for delaying purposes.

4. In view of the sure leakage to the press of action by the four Ambassadors, however, I think it would be preferable after Bahr, Falin and I have reached full, final agreement, to have the four Ambassadors have a long wrapup session to reach accord on the full agreement rather than reach agreement on different sections piecemeal at different sessions. We can thereby avoid critical attacks by the Springer press and other bitter opponents of the Ostpolitik until the full agreement is made known. This method should also allow us to ease the problem of the State Department. Since the entire agreement would go in at once, you could advise them that all in all it looks satisfactory and that they, in essence, should not press personal preferences on wording or technical matters.

5. I have followed your trip and related events with avid interest. What a great contribution you are making to the best interests of our country.³

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1. Top Secret; Sensitive. The message was sent through the special Navy channel in Frankfurt; no time of transmission or receipt is on the message.
2. Kissinger later commented on this report: “Even skeptics like me, whose minds boggled at the vision of Gromyko’s learning of a month’s quota of major concessions for the first time from a subordinate who then threatened to go over his head if need be, could not doubt that the Soviets meant to press Berlin to a rapid conclusion.” (White House Years, p. 830)
3. Since Kissinger was in Islamabad, preparing for his secret arrival the next day in Beijing, Haig sent the following special channel message to Rush on July 8: “Thank you for your message on July 7. Due to sensitivity, I will hold here until Kissinger’s return on July 12. I wish to emphasize again the essentiality of employing delaying tactics during those sessions to which you have already been committed and the need to avoid commitments on any pretext for future meeetings.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 1) Rush replied by special channel on July 9: “Thanks for your message of July 8. I can employ delaying tactics, but a failure to agree on future meetings would arouse deep suspicions on the part of both the Russians, and more importantly the Germans, that is, Brandt and Bahr. Before your message of July 6 [see footnote 3, Document 265] arrived, I had agreed to meetings of next week and do not think these can be cancelled without serious effects.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 59, Country Files, Europe, Ambassador Rush, Berlin, Vol. 2)