Office of the Historian

264. Message From the German State Secretary for Foreign, Defense, and German Policy (Bahr) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Bonn, June 30, 1971.
1)

Two discussions of the three [Rush, Falin, and Bahr] on the 28th and 29th of June yielded, or rather confirmed, agreement on the preamble, the issues of access and visits of West Berliners as well as the exclaves, the Teltow Canal, and Part 3 (Final Provisions). The issues of foreign representation and Soviet interests in West Berlin were not discussed.

An exchange of views followed on the Final Act without formulations.

A partial formulation on the theme of Federal presence took place but at the same time the positions have hardened. This is becoming the most difficult point.

I will send the texts to you as soon as they are available.2

2)

Falin was ordered to Moscow today and will return on Sunday.3 As agreed, the next discussion will be on Tuesday afternoon, the 6th of July.

The hardening can be attributed to Gromyko’s intervention, who thinks Falin is too conciliatory. Some jealousy is also involved: Gromyko would like to leave his personal mark on a Berlin settlement; he does not like that Falin has authority and is protected at a higher political level. Only after Falin’s return will we know if we have reached a confrontational stage or a crisis.

In my opinion, we should take the time necessary to deal with this.

On the other hand, Rush and I gave Falin the impression that we are ready to reach a swift conclusion.

3)

The worsening on the issue of Federal presence is apparent above all in the Soviet demand that committees and parliamentary party groups should only be allowed to come to Berlin at the invitation of the Senat. Falin reported that a clear distinction must be drawn from the current situation and that it would be the responsibility of the three powers to regulate this in detail. The Soviets propose periods of very limited visits, amounting to almost nothing.

For the German side, this is unacceptable. I pointed out that we would accept no regulation which would change the procedure for meetings of committees and parliamentary party groups outside of [procedures determined by] Bonn (invitation and scheduling by the party chairmen).

4)
We discussed in great detail the method for shifting the result of our negotiations to the official level. It would not be useful to communicate the details until Falin returns.
5)
Regarding the Final Act, Falin left no doubt that the French proposals4—in which the Four Powers should approve the German arrangements and thus assume a higher legal authority—were completely unacceptable. Rush and I are agreed that the German arrangements must be integrated into the Final Protocol, thereby ensuring their subordination to quadripartite consultation in case minor difficulties complicate consultation at the German level. We are accordingly trying to [Page 768] influence the French, for which the Pompidou visit5 should give us a good opportunity.
6)
This visit will not be easy, since we must expect an attempt to reduce Phantom jet sales. The Chancellor stands by what he told the President.6
7)
The GDR has unofficially offered to expand telephone and telegraph connections and to discuss, with the goal of an official agreement, setting up a television broadcast cable.

Warm regards.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 60, Country Files, Europe, Egon Bahr, Berlin File [2 of 3]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The message, translated here from the original German by the editor, was sent through the special Navy channel in Frankfurt. No time of transmission appears on the message; a handwritten note indicates that it was received in Washington at 2157Z. For the German text, see also Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1971, Vol. 2, pp. 1035–37.↩
  2. Bahr forwarded the available texts without comment in a special channel message to Kissinger on July 1. (Ibid.) Kissinger replied the next day: “Thank you for your cables. I am glad things are still going well. You can count on our support even if the Soviet line should harden temporarily. All the best.” (Ibid.)↩
  3. July 4.↩
  4. At the Ambassadorial meeting in Berlin on June 25, Sauvagnargues declared that “one could not go back on practice followed without obstacles for twenty years in the whole world, except for Eastern Europe. It was also necessary here to respect the realities.” “[I]n order to take into account the Soviet concerns,” the Ambassador proposed that the Western Allies were “ready to expressly state in the framework of the agreement that their rights and responsibilities, particularly in matters of status and security, were not and could not be affected by the delegation of concrete functions to the Federal Republic.” (Telegram 1198 from Berlin, June 26; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)↩
  5. A French delegation, led by President Pompidou, was in Bonn July 3 and 4 for semiannual consultations with the West German Government.↩
  6. See Documents 254 and 255.↩