26. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon 1

SUBJECT

  • The Soviet Position on Berlin

The Soviet answer to the three-power sounding of August 7 on Berlin problems contained virtually no substantive advance. It was little more than an elaboration of the Gromyko speech of July 10, when he indicated Soviet interest in discussions over Berlin.2 While the Soviets have more or less accepted the idea of talks, their note does not suggest a time or place.

The main points of the note are:

  • —talks would be limited to the four powers and would concern West Berlin;
  • —the question must be approached from the standpoint of European security, and the sovereignty and legitimate interests of East Germany;
  • —it is impossible not to take into account that West Berlin’s lines of communication are “along the lines of communication of the GDR”;
  • —a normalization of relations between the GDR and Bonn proceed from the basis of “international law,” and the principles of the Bucharest and Budapest declarations of the Warsaw Pact (i.e., recognition of East Germany, inviolability of borders, etc.).3

The note ignored the one new item of interest in our presentations, i.e., the willingness of the Federal Republic to make “concessions” on the question of their activities in Berlin, and to give their discussion with East Germany an “organizational” aspect. Presumably, the Soviet references to European security, and the Budapest appeal are meant to convey the theme that FRGGDR talks fall outside the responsibilities of the four powers.

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The note also suggested that Soviets are not interested in pursuing access problems in the four-power context, but will focus any talks on the responsibility of three Western powers to curb Bonn’s presence and activity in West Berlin.

At the same time, there is no allusion to a new status for West Berlin or any hint that the Soviets have a specific proposal in mind in this regard.

In sum, not a very helpful response.

Further steps may evolve from the Gromyko conversations in New York. The Soviets obviously have given just enough to keep the issue alive. But they are seeking all the atmospheric advantages surrounding the opening of negotiations on another major issue without any indication that they are prepared for substantive progress. More important they seek these gains without indicating responsiveness on the other major issues—Vietnam, the Middle East, and SALT.

Thus, I feel we should not appear at all anxious to move on Berlin; nor should we probe very hard for clarifications on the Soviet position. They are obviously in no hurry, and I see no reason for us to be, especially since pushing the negotiations runs some danger of forcing the Soviets simply to repeat their rigid support for East German “sovereignty.”4

Text of the Soviet reply is at Tab A.5

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 689, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. According to a handwritten notation, the memorandum was returned from the President on October 1. The memorandum is based on another, dated September 12, from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, who, upon reading it, left the following handwritten instruction: “Turn into memo for Pres but strengthen danger of pushing negotiation which may force Soviets to back GDR.” (Ibid.) According to another copy, Hyland redrafted the memorandum, including several minor corrections as well as one substantive addition noted in footnote 4 below, on September 23. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 286, Memoranda to the President, 1969–74, June–Sept. 1969)
  2. See Document 21.
  3. See footnote 5, Document 24.
  4. This phrase was added in accordance with Kissinger’s instructions.
  5. Printed as Document 24.