256. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
SUBJECT
- Berlin Agreement: Soviet Presence in West Berlin and The Terms of NSDM 106
I understand from State that Ambassador Rush feels—apparently on the basis of his White House discussions2—that he should move ahead on the question of Soviet presence in West Berlin, including Allied agreement to the establishment of a Soviet Consulate General.
Assuming this were to be the case, the question arises whether the current Presidential guidelines (NSDM 106)3 should be modified, and to what extent. That NSDM (copy at Tab A) at the moment precludes in paragraph 6 any significant Soviet expansion and the establishment of a Consulate General. If negotiations with the Soviets are to continue under formal guidance of a NSDM, you may want to eliminate subparagraphs a and b of paragraph 6 of NSDM 106 so as to permit a Consulate General.
[Page 753]The final paragraph of paragraph 6 contains the provision that the Berlin Agreement itself should contain nothing on the issue of Soviet presence (this is the only exception to the statement in paragraph 5 that an agreement must not contain secret protocols). Further, it provides that any actual expansion of Soviet presence should be well distanced from the conclusion and implementation of a Berlin agreement. Again, you may want to consider whether this aspect of the NSDM requires revision.
Regarding the substance, while an increase in Soviet presence may pave the way to an agreement, there are serious dangers to it, and very serious ones if it were to include a Consulate General. Recapitulating my earlier memos on this, the three most evident dangers seem to be:
- —the risk is greatly increased that the Soviets, once officially established in West Berlin, will accede to GDR pressures to end the current official Allied access to East Berlin which is highly embarrassing to the GDR;
- —there is a substantial risk that the Soviets will feel relatively free to further expand their West Berlin activities, both overt and covert, considering that the Western powers will be unlikely to curtail them for to do so would run the risk of the Soviets threatening a counter breach of the Agreement as a whole;
- —it is entirely possible that with the addition of a significant Soviet presence in West Berlin to an agreement which, in the eyes of Berliners, provides only marginal practical benefits at the expense of reduced ties to Bonn, there will be considerable public dissatisfaction with an agreement, to the extent that an agreement might not be acceptable at least to the Berliners.
It was to reduce these dangers somewhat that even the modest increase provided for in NSDM 106 called for the actual Soviet expansion to take place only after an agreement is concluded and is actually being implemented. Consequently, I recommend that this provision be retained.
Guidance Requested:4
- Revised NSDM not necessary
- Prepare revised NSDM which will allow Consulate General in addition to other new Soviet offices
- With respect to distancing the establishment of an expanded Soviet presence from the implementation of an Agreement,
- this should be retained
- this should be dropped
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 692, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for action. According to another copy, Downey drafted the memorandum. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 14, Chronological File, 1969–75, 20 May–10 July, 1971)↩
- Kissinger underlined this comment and wrote in the margin: “When will you grow up?”↩
- Attached; see Document 225.↩
- The memorandum does not indicate whether Kissinger provided any guidance, as requested, on Soviet presence in West Berlin.↩