Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

251. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 8, 1971, 1600Z.

6962. Subj: Berlin Talks: CDU Position.

1. CDU Fraktion leader Rainer Barzel asked EmbOff to call at his office urgently evening of June 7. He noted that the CDU Vorstand planned to meet in Berlin on June 14. He wanted to know if anything had happened since that meeting was originally decided on which might affect this decision. EmbOff described the status of the Berlin talks in general terms. He replied that, in view of the Allies’ relative success on eliminating a number of negative blanket provisions from the Soviet draft of March 26, of a certain degree of general progress in the Berlin talks, and of the Soviet prestige engagement in the June 14 SED party congress as reflected by Abrasimov during the June 7 Ambassadorial session in Berlin, he believed it might be in the German interest to postpone the planned meeting. If the meeting were held, the Soviets would try to reintroduce into the negotiations a specific prohibition against this type of meeting. Moreover, to be a focus of controversy at this particular time might not cast the CDU in a favorable light.

2. In further discussion of the Berlin negotiations which ensued, Barzel said one thing he could never accept as a CDU leader was some kind of good conduct clause which the Soviets could in effect use in future years to effectively strangle FRG-Berlin ties, no matter how well they otherwise might be protected on paper.

3. Barzel then returned to the question of the Vorstand meeting. He said he would agree to postpone it, but no one must know of the conversation which led to his decision. He would justify this decision to the Fraktion as a recommendation not to overdo the Berlin matter at this time in view of the parliamentary questions he was raising on June 9 in the Bundestag on the Berlin talks. Barzel said he had a bad feeling in reaching this decision. The US had also suggested that in the interests of the Berlin negotiations he postpone a Fraktion meeting he had planned for May or June. If the results of the Berlin negotiations showed meetings of this kind would not be permitted without Soviet intervention in the future, the US would “hear from him” and the CDU would reject the entire agreement outright. EmbOff said that with Barzel’s help, there was some prospect that the section of a possible Berlin agreement concerning FRG-Berlin ties would cover such meetings.

4. Barzel said that he planned to raise the Berlin issue in the Bundestag on June 9 in the form of a priority interpellation from the floor, followed by a so-called topical debate. He said he would be replying in this way to Herbert Wehner’s criticism of the CDU in a recent radio broadcast as asking the impossible on Berlin. Specifically, he would attack the Chancellor’s formula that the objective of the Berlin talks was “practical improvements,” stating that practical improvements were all right in their way, but if this was all that could be achieved in Berlin, then the FRG-Soviet treaty should be scrapped in favor of practical improvements in the German-Soviet relationship. Barzel said his second theme would be that he had heard from the heads of government of the US, UK and France in recent visits that the Allies intended to leave the question of what cuts would be made in Federal presence in Berlin to the decision of the Federal German Govt. Since this was apparently to be a German decision, he wished the government to know the view of the opposition on it. In particular, he did not agree with Wieland Deutsch (Bonn’s 6846)² whom Barzel identified in part accurately as State Secretary Frank, that the FRG ties with Berlin and FRG presence in Berlin was on Allied suffrance. These ties had grown over years and had achieved a legal standing of their own. Barzel said he would take pains to hold the interpellation within careful limits. He intended only to make brief remarks as the sole CDU speaker and was willing to leave it at that if the SPD was intelligent enough to follow suit.

5. Concerning ratification of the FRG-Soviet treaty and the FRG-Polish treaty, Barzel said he now considered the CDU position absolutely clear. It was Poland, yes; Russia, no. That is, the CDU might vote for the Polish treaty but would vote as a unit against the FRG-Soviet treaty when the time for ratification came. Barzel added that from what he could judge from the emerging Berlin agreement, the CDU might well also oppose it. He wished to remind us that he had given several indications of this possibility and did not wish to be accused of bad faith at a later time.

6. Concerning his own situation in the CDU leadership race, Barzel said he felt it was improving greatly. He said he was going to tell the CDU Fraktion before it left on summer vacation that his decision was simple. He would either be named party candidate at the convention at Saarbrucken in October or he would leave his post as CDU Fraktion leader.

7. Comment: Barzel’s remarks concerning CDU meetings in Berlin were calculated to give the impression that US credit is running out as concerns advising against specific meetings. On the other hand, Barzel himself sent for EmbOff with obvious foreknowledge of the situation including the SED congress and is in general a seasoned politician with always room for one more understanding, so that we do not take his remarks too seriously on this score. Barzel’s move in originating a Bundestag debate on Berlin is obvious grandstanding at a time when he is facing the CDU Fraktion with his take-it-or-leave-it position regarding his own future. Information from other sources would indicate that Barzel and Schroeder are fairly close contenders at present with Schroeder ahead in general public opinion and Barzel with somewhat more support from local party organization. We do take somewhat more seriously Barzel’s prediction that the CDU would oppose a Berlin agreement as he saw it emerging less because this outcome rests on Barzel’s assessment of the actual agreement, than because it is a logical necessity for the CDU to oppose a Berlin agreement if it wishes to make its opposition to the Soviet treaty convincing.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. In telegram 6846 from Bonn, June 5, the Embassy reported that controversy had erupted over an article published on May 19 in the Frankfurter Rundschau, in which the author, writing under a pseudonym, argued that “an eventual Berlin settlement will have to leave aside all legal issues and concentrate on limited practical improvements.” A CDU spokesman quickly attacked the article as evidence that the government had already conceded the West German position in Berlin. The Embassy further commented that the article, written by Deputy Spokesman von Wechmar, was based on recent briefings by Frank, Bahr, and Brandt. (Ibid.)