Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

250. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State¹

Bonn, June 8, 1971, 1425Z.

6947. Subj: Berlin Talks: Request for Interpretation of Policy Guidance on Berlin Negotiations. Ref: State 70827.² For the Secretary.

1. In reviewing the current status of the Berlin talks, which have now entered a more active phase following recent sessions, I have reached the conclusion that substantial progress has in fact been made in the talks and that their successful termination in the coming months is possible. After careful study of the Soviet position thus far, as well as that of our allies, I have also concluded that it will be impossible to go forward toward concluding the negotiations successfully unless we are prepared to begin discussion of the issue of Soviet interests in the Western sectors. I therefore believe that the situation envisaged in paragraph 6A(3) of NSDM 106 (reftel) has arisen. I would like to request your concurrence with this finding, and authorization to open discussion on this topic at the next quadripartite Ambassadorial session, now scheduled for June 25.

2. Not to take this action would, in my opinion, seriously prejudice the prospects for a Berlin agreement. In the event of our continued refusal even to discuss the topic with the Soviets, I anticipate that the Soviets would in the near future refuse seriously to discuss open issues in the quadripartite talks and that the talks would reach an impasse for which the US would be blamed by all concerned in the negotiations, including our French and British allies and in particular, the Federal Germans. This outcome was clearly foreshadowed by the statements of the British, French and Federal German Ministers at the June 2 quadripartite dinner in Lisbon.³ I see no intrinsic reason in the subject matter as we would wish to deal with it for us to incur this political cost.

3. In order to give further background for the requested determination, it may be helpful to indicate our current views on possible tactical handling of the topic if the decision of principle is reached. I have not discussed the following ideas with my British and French colleagues or with the Germans, but from previous knowledge of their views believe they would be in agreement. Tactical handling of the issue could be divided into two distinct phases. I believe the first phase should be introduced at the next Ambassadorial session. The second phase might take place after an agreement has been substantially completed except for a relatively small number of still contested hard points. The material contained in the second phase would in effect form part of our bargaining counters for the last stage of bargaining on these remaining hard points.

4. The Soviet position as outlined in their March 26 draft agreement calls for the Allies to agree to (A) a Soviet Consulate General; (B) nondiscrimination against Soviet property in the Western sectors; (C) most-favored-nation treatment in economic relations; (D) consignment warehouses for Soviet firms; and (E) permission for Soviet employees of Soviet firms to reside in the Western sectors. Thus far, the Allies have reserved their position on this whole issue, indicating only that any increases in Soviet activities in the Western sectors, if agreed to at all, can come only if the overall agreement is satisfactory, and in any case must take place outside the agreement.

5. As we would envisage the first discussion of this topic, the Allies might take the following position: we can ask the Soviets to expand in greater detail on the meaning of the individual requests contained in the Soviet draft of March 26 concerning Soviets interests. In the course of the discussion we could indicate to the Soviets that the Western Allies might be prepared to consider the following Soviet interests in the context of a successful agreement, one which would include satisfactory provisions on access, Federal ties, and foreign representation of the Western sectors. In a subsequent advisers session, the Allied advisers could become more specific and tell the Soviets that, under these conditions, and subject to the overall requirement for a satisfactory agreement we might be willing to take the following specific actions:

(A) Allow Soyuzpushnina and Merkuri to open offices in the Western sectors.

(B) Allow consignment warehouses for permitted firms.

(C) Allow Soviet employees of all permitted firms to reside in the Western sectors, without official status and subject to local legislation.

(D) Return the Lietzenburgerstrasse property to the Soviets, also permitting them to exchange it for another property if they wish.

(E) Allow the Soviets to centralize private offices in the Western sectors, either at Lietzenburgerstrasse, or at an alternate location obtained in exchange.

6. We would not go beyond this position during an initial discussion. We would soon thereafter be engaged in a still further run-through of the text of the agreement as a whole attempting to fill in as many as possible of the gaps still outstanding. If this runthrough results in substantial completion of the text of the agreement, and there is a clear indication that the Soviet position on all major issues in the talks is sufficiently forthcoming, the Allies might at that time indicate their willingness to consider the following additional items on Soviet interests in the Western sectors. Using the items as counters in a final bargaining process against other items we wish to obtain from the Soviets:

(A) Permit Intourist offices to sell tourist reservations.

(B) Permit Aeroflot to establish an office in the Western sectors.

(C) Agree to consider, on a case by case basis, the possibility of permitting establishment of further offices of individual Soviet firms.

(D) Subject to further examination, determine whether and in what acceptable way Soviet interest in facilitation of their trade with the Western sectors might be met.

(E) Agree to the establishment of a Soviet state trading agency but without official status.

(F) Agree to permit a Soviet visa official to operate in the premises of the state trading agency.

7. All of the above steps, it will be noted, stop short of the establishment of an official Soviet representation in the Western sectors, which the NSDM opposes. When Abrasimov raised the issue of Soviet interests including a possible Consulate General at the private dinner on May 31 (Bonn 6607),⁴ I told him quite clearly that any form of political representation caused us great difficulty and that we would insist that any commercial offices we might consider should have no political function whatever. I stressed that any ultimate agreement by us to increased Soviet presence in the Western sectors must be met by full compensating advantage for us and that there must be no trace of shift to these offices of responsibility of Abrasimov and his successors of Four Power responsibility for Berlin as a whole.

8. I would be obliged if we could discuss this matter during my pending visit to Washington starting June 11, and if a decision on it can be reached prior to my return to Germany on June 23 to resume negotiation with the Soviets.

Rush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Berlin.
2. In telegram 70827 to Bonn, April 26, the Department forwarded the text of NSDM 106 (Document 225). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, POL 28 GER B)
3. See Document 246.
4. In telegram 6607 from Bonn, June 1, the Embassy also reported the following exchange: “Abrasimov replied that it would not be the purpose of a Consulate General to handle such matters [related to Berlin and the Western sectors]. It would be confined to problems of travelers and consular functions. In response to the Ambassador’s specific question, Abrasimov said the Consul General would have no political officers and would not engage in any policy activity. If individuals did, it would be without authorization and ‘you should kick them out.’ The Ambassador then said that this is a sensitive subject with us. At the same time we recognize that it seems to be important to the Soviet side. We will give the matter careful consideration and hope that we can come up with something that will meet minimum Soviet needs. In any case, it is to be hoped that this issue will not be an obstacle to an overall agreement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US–USSR)