Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972

209. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 27, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Berlin: Soviets Table a Counter draft Agreement²

The March 26 anniversary session of the Ambassadorial talks did not produce much movement in the oral discussions. A large portion of the meeting was devoted to Ambassador Rush’s statement countering recent Soviet claims that Berlin was originally a part of the Soviet Zone. (The cables reporting the meeting are being sent to you, Berlin 570 and 571.)³

The highlight of the session, as expected, was Abrasimov’s tabling of a counter-draft to the Western February 5 text.⁴ (The text is also being sent to you, Berlin 573.)⁵ There was no serious discussion of the text, but the Three Ambassadors promised to study it before the next meeting on April 16.

At first glance, the Soviet draft resembles the format of the Western draft in that there is a Four Power document, with several annexes, and then a final act which notes related inter-German agreements. In fact, however, the Four Power document contains specific language and a clear quadripartite role only with respect to the separation of Bonn and Berlin, and Soviets interests in West Berlin. In the areas of access and inner-Berlin communications, the Four Power document is less than hortative: it notes that the Four envisage agreements between the competent authorities; the related annexes make clear that the Soviets are simply informing the Three of what the GDR is prepared to do. The Final Act notes that the German agreements will enter into force at the same time as the Four Power agreement, and that all the agreements are related in the sense that a breach of one would invalidate all. Enforcement responsibilities are not raised.

Some of the terminology is interesting. The Soviets have employed the term “Berlin (West)” for the first time.⁶ The term “Berlin” never appears in any of the documents, thus making it plain—despite the fuzzy language of part I—that the Four have reached an agreement which relates only to West Berlin. Also, in several instances, the description of the Three Power rights in West Berlin suggests that the Three have only a limited “competence” and not supreme authority. Coupling this with the phrasing dealing with Soviet presence in West Berlin plainly evidences some form of Four Power status for West Berlin.

Substantively, there is not a great deal of forward movement. However, on Federal presence, there is a new formulation prohibiting virtually all Federal organs (including Bundestag committees and fraktionen) from activities which signify an extension of their competence. There is a flat prohibition of national party congresses and conventions. On access, the Soviets will inform us that the GDR will agree to civilian transit on the basis of international norms without interruption. The only specific commitment is a suggestion that freight could be sealed prior to entering the GDR, though the GDR expressly reserves the right to spot check.

The GDR will also agree to visits to East Berlin and the GDR, as well as some improvement for phone lines and other inner-Berlin communications. As previously hinted, the Soviets have handled the issue of Berlin’s representation abroad by use of an annex containing Three Power and Soviet communications. This had been billed earlier as an effort to permit both sides to maintain their respective principles, but to permit agreement where they overlapped. The result is that the FRG may provide consular protection to West Berliners abroad (not in the GDR, however), and nonmilitary and nonpolitical treaties of the FRG might be extended to West Berlin.

Finally, the Four Powers agree in the main document to respect “Soviet interests” in West Berlin, and Annex V contains a communication from the Three to the Soviets with more details. The communication notes the agreement of the Three for the opening of a Consulate General and MFN treatment for Soviet economic relations with West Berlin.

Thus, at first glance the Soviet counter-draft seems to contain some advances from the earlier Soviet positions, but clearly is very far from what could be accepted by the Western side. We shall be reviewing this further, and pulling together comments as they are received.⁷

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 691, Country Files, Europe, Germany (Berlin), Vol. III. Secret. Sent for information. The memorandum was apparently forwarded to Kissinger, who departed for San Clemente at 4:58 p.m. on March 26 and returned to Washington at 7:25 p.m. on April 5. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
2. See Document 201.
3. Both dated March 26; attached but not printed. (Also in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
4. See Document 173.
5. Dated March 26; attached but not printed. (Also in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 38–6)
6. This time [term] was also used in a Brandt public statement to Barzel on March 22, which cause some discomfort. The term is fine in describing the Bonn/Berlin relationship, and indeed is customary in many Federal texts and laws. However, by using it also, as Brandt did, in relation to a new Four Power agreement on Berlin (West), does carry the implication of an acknowledgement of a separate entity. [Footnote in the source text.]
7. In telegram 3664 from Bonn, March 28, the Embassy provided the following assessment: “The fact that the overall form of the Soviet draft is relatively close to the Western paper of February 5 and that it covers all the topics we have raised in the talks (together with others we would prefer not to include), is its most positive aspect. We can now be relatively sure that a possible agreement might include some reference to Four Power rights, a statement that the present agreement did not affect them, formulations on access, inner-Berlin, and FRG-Berlin ties, and that it would be followed by inner-German negotiations and a subsequent Four Power wrap-up.” “As regards substantive content,” the Embassy continued, “the draft demonstrates Soviet determination to drive the hardest possible bargain on Berlin. We can assume it represents a maximum position.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 28 GER B) In an April 2 letter to Fessenden, Sutterlin commented: “The tabling of the Soviet draft last week can hardly be said to usher in a new stage in the negotiations. Rather it seems to me to highlight a number of the very serious and perhaps insurmountable problems we face in the negotiations.” “I fear that in the process of negotiating on these drafts,” Sutterlin explained, “the Western negotiators may place so much emphasis on expectations which are hardly realizable that it becomes increasingly difficult to deal with pragmatic improvements which might be achievable.” (Department of State, EUR/CE Files: Lot 85 D 330, JD Correspondence 1971)